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INTRODUCTION
During 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit continued to build on its landmark in banc decisions handed
down in 1995.1 The following Article summarizes selected published
opinions on substantive patent law by the Federal Circuit that are
worthy of study for all intellectual property practitioners. This review
is partitioned into four sections. Part I addresses the jurisdictional
and procedural issues relating to federal court practice. Next, in Part
II, the Article contains summaries of the Federal Circuit's decisions
on patentability and validity issues. The Article then focuses on
infringement issues in Part III, and finally, in Part IV, the Article
concludes with a discussion of the court's decisions involving
remedies.
I. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF FEDERAL COURT PRACTICE
This section of the Article focuses on the procedural aspects of
patent related litigation in the federal courts.2
1. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997); Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), afd, 116
S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
2. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1338, the Federal Circuit has exclusivejurisdiction over appeals from
civil actions relating to patents. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994); id. § 1295(a) (1).
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A. Declaratory Judgments
In three separate decisions, the Federal Circuit sought to rein in
the improper use of declaratory judgment actions by competitors
against patentees. That is, within the scope of patent law, a declarato-
ry judgment suit traditionally allows a non-patent holder to seek a
determination of whether its product or conduct infringes a valid and
enforceable patent. In order to vest a district court with Article III
jurisdiction, an actual case or controversy must exist between the
potential infringer and patentee. In the field of patent law, an actual
controversy exists if there is: "(1) an explicit threat or other action
by the patentee, which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part
of the declaratory plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit, and
(2) present activity which could constitute infringement or concrete
steps taken with the intent to conduct such activity."' Nonetheless,
even ifjurisdiction exists, the presiding judge may exercise discretion
and decline to hear the case.4 In this past year, the Federal Circuit
upheld such exercises of discretion in three unique circumstances.
In EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp.,5 a party to an ongoing license
negotiation, EMC, filed a declaratory judgment action in an apparent
attempt to gain a tactical advantage over the patent holder, Norand.6
The district court, although declining to determine whether an actual
controversy existed, exercised its discretion and refused to allow the
action.7 The district court explained that, under circumstances
where the parties were in the midst of ongoing negotiations, it would
not allow a declaratory judgment action to be suborned to a tactical
advantage or bargaining tool.' EMC appealed, arguing, inter alia,
that the district court abused its discretion in failing to rely on
legitimate bases to support its decision to not hear the action.9
The Federal Circuit disagreed, remarking that the Declaratory
Judgment Act1 affords district courts a "unique breadth ... of
3. B.P. Chems., Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975,978,28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1124,
1126 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
4. See Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., 940 F.2d 631, 634, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545,
1547 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that even in cases where there is an actual controversy, the
exercise ofjurisdiction is discretionary).
5. 89 F.3d 807, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
6. See EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 809, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1451, 1452
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
7. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452.
8. See id. at 810, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452-53.
9. See id. at 811, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1994). The DeclaratoryJudgment Act provides in pertinent part:
"In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United States, upon
the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
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discretion to decline to enter a declaratory judgment"1 ' and requires
appellate courts to review those decisions under the deferential abuse
of discretion standard. 2 As such, the Federal Circuit explained that
a district court may take into account the pendency of serious license
negotiations, as well as the possibility that the parties may reach a
nonjudicial resolution in determining whether to exercise
juridiction.15 The court cautioned the district courts, however, to be
wary of patentees feigning interest in continued license negotiations
in order to deflect a declaratory judgment action.'4 Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit upheld the district court's decision in that the court
viewed EMC's complaint as a tactical measure filed to improve its
posture in the ongoing negotiations, a purpose which the Declaratory
Judgment Act was not designed to serve.15
Next, in Cygnus Therapeutics Systems v. ALZA Corp., 6 Cygnus sought
a declaratory judgment ruling that ALZA's patent was invalid and
unenforceable after unsuccessfully negotiating for a patent license.
17
The district court dismissed Cygnus' claims for lacking an objectively
reasonable apprehension that it would face an infringement suit.
18
The district court based its ruling in part on the fact that ALZA had
never expressly threatened to sue Cygnus.19
In a de novo review2" of whether an actual controversy existed, the
Federal Circuit held that a reasonable apprehension of suit did not
arise merely because ALZA exercised its lawful commercial prerogative
in refusing to grant a license to its competitor, effectively placing
Cygnus in the position of having to choose between abandoning a
specific commercial venture or running the risk of engaging in
interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought."
Id. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Act as giving district courts discretion to decline
jurisdiction even if there is an actual controversy. See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277,
285 (1995) (refuting assertion that district courts can only decline to exercise declaratory
judgmentjurisdiction in "exceptional circumstances"); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344
U.S. 237, 241 (1952) (stating that Declaratory Judgment Act gives courts discretion to grant
relief and does not grant "absolute right" to litigant seeking redress).
11. EMC Corp., 89 F.3d at 813, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455 (quoting Wilton v. Seven Falls
Co., 515 U.S. 277, 287 (1995)).
12. See id. at 813, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455-56.
13. See id. at 814, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
14. See id. at 815, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457.
15. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457.
16. 92 F.3d 1153, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
17. See Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v. ALZA Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1157-58, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1666, 1669 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
18. See id. at 1159, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
19. See id. at 1160, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
20. The question of whether an actual controversy exists is one that the Federal Circuit
must address de novo. See B.P. Chems., Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978, 28
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1124, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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arguably infringing activities.2 1  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
upheld the district court's dismissal of the claims.22
In a third case where a party improperly filed suit, GAF Building
Materials Corp. v. Elk Corp.,23 the Federal Circuit affirmed a lower
court's dismissal of a declaratoryjudgment action because, at the time
the suit was filed, the patent in question had not yet issued.24 There,
Elk had notified GAF of its pending design patent application in a
cease-and-desist letter demanding that GAF halt all infringing
activities." Thereafter, GAF filed a declaratory judgment suit in the
District of New Jersey prior to the issuance of the patent, but
amended its complaint once the patent had issued.26 On the day
the patent issued, Elk filed suit for patent infringement in the
Northern District of Texas.27  Elk also sought to dismiss GAF's
declaratory judgment action in the New Jersey court for want of
subject matter jurisdiction." Rather than dismiss the case, the New
Jersey court transferred the case to the Texas court, which consolidat-
ed the actions.29  The Texas court then entered a final decision
dismissing GAF's declaratory judgment action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction from which GAF appealed."0
In upholding the dismissal, the Federal Circuit agreed that at the
time GAF commenced its suit, it had a reasonable apprehension that it
would be sued for patent infringement 3 ' However, at the time GAF
filed suit, a real and substantial controversy could not have existed
because the patent had yet to issue.32  The court reasoned that
because the district court did not know with certainty that the patent
21. See Cygnus, 92 F.8d at 1160, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671.
22. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672.
23. 90 F.3d 479, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
24. See GAF Bldg. Materials Corp. v. Elk Corp., 90 F.8d 479,482,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1463,
1466 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (reaffirming that the existence of an issued patent claim is a requisite to
litigation of declaratory judgment action).
25. See id. at 480, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1464.
26. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1464.
27. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1464.
28. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1464.
29. See id. at 481, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1464.
30. See id. at 481-82, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1464.
31. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465. At the time that GAI filed the declaratory
judgement action in January 1994, Elk had received a Notice of Allowance from the Patent
Office and paid the issue fee; issuance of the patent, therefore, seemed imminent. See id., 39
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465. Furthermore, GAF had continued to manufacture and market the
accused product since receipt of Elk's "cease-and-desist" letter on December 8, 1993. See id, 39
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465.
82. See id. at 482, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1466.
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would issue, the dispute was purely hypothetical,3 and the district
court could not fashion specific relief without the patent before it.'
Moreover, perhaps exalting form over substance, the Federal Circuit
considered it irrelevant that the patent had issued while the action
was pending, or that GAF had amended its complaint the day the
patent issued." Rather, the Federal Circuit held that the justiciabili-
ty requirements of Article Illjurisdiction are measured at the time a
suit is filed, not at an indeterminable future date when the district
court might reach the merits after a patent issues.8 Accordingly, the
court affirmed the dismissal of GAF's claim."
B. Standing
In the federal system, a litigant must satisfy constitutional standing
requirements in order to create a legitimate case or controversy within
the meaning of Article III of the Constitution; otherwise a district
court will lack jurisdiction to adjudicate the alleged conflict.s'
Standing is established if a party is sufficiently affected by the conduct
of another, thereby insuring that ajusticiable controversy is presented
to the court. 9
During this past year, the Federal Circuit confronted a unique
approach toward circumventing the constitutional standing require-
ments. In Gaia Technologies, Inc. v. Reconversion Technologies, Inc.,4' the
Federal Circuit overturned a district court's decision that a party had
standing to sue even though it did not own the asserted intellectual
property at the time it filed suit.4" Gaia had sued Reconversion
under federal and state law alleging, inter alia, infringement of various
patents and trademarks.' As a defense, Reconversion asserted that
Gala did not own the patent and trademarks at the time suit was filed,
33. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1466 (stating that a declaratory judgment on GAF's
complaint would have constituted an "impermissible advisory opinion").
34. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1466.
35. See id. at 483, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1466-67.
36. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467.
37. See id. at 484, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467.
38. SeeSierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972) ("Whether a party has a sufficient
stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy is
what has traditionally been referred to as the question of standing to sue.").
39. See id.; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (stating that
standing requires a party to have suffered "injury in fact," with a causal connection between the
injury and conduct complained of, which will "likely" be redressed by judicial action).
40. 93 F.3d 774,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1826 (Fed. Cir.), amended on reh'g, 109 F.3d 1296,41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
41. See Gala Techs., Inc. v. Reconversion Techs., Inc., 93 F.3d 774, 780, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1826, 1831 (Fed. Cir.), amended on reh', 109 F.3d 1296, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1130 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
42. See id. at 775-76, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827-28.
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and thus lacked standing to assert its claims of infringement.4 Gaia
countered that its pre-suit ownership of the property was established
by (1) a third party's documents approving the future sale of the
intellectual property to Gaia, and (2) the fact that Gaia subsequently
purchased the intellectual property after the suit was filed from the
third party. The third party contract contained a clause purporting
that Gaia had received retroactive ownership of the property,"
After reviewing the district court's decision that Gaia had standing
to sue, the Federal Circuit rejected the district court's determination
that jurisdiction was proper, and held that the third party document
was merely an agreement to assign and did not actually transfer to
Gaia legal title granting it the right to sue." The court also rejected
Gaia's argument that a retroactive assignment of patent rights
conferred Gaia ownership as of the property at the time the third
party allegedly agreed to sell the property.4 In doing so, the court
stated that to allow subsequent assignments to cure standing defects
would "unjustifiably expand the number of people who are statutorily
authorized to sue" and would inevitably result in increased litiga-
tion.4' Accordingly, the Federal Circuit dismissed the federal claims
and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) still existed for
the remaining state law claims.4"
C. PersonalJurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction grants a court power over a party when the
party is physically present in the state where the court resides, or, if
that party's activities are somehow connected with the forum state and
the maintenance of the suit, the exercise of such power would not
offend traditional standards of "fair play and substantial justice."49
In Viam Corp. v. Iowa Export-Import Trading Co.,5  the Federal Circuit
reversed a district court's dismissal of Viam's declaratory judgment
action for lack of personaljurisdiction. 1 Viam filed an invalidity suit
in California against Spal, an Italian company that owned the patent
43. See id. at 777, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1828.
44. See id. at 779, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830-31.
45. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831.
46. See id. at 779-80, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831.
47. See id. at 780, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831 (citing Procter & Gamble Co. v. Paragon
Trade Brands, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 305, 310, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678, 1682 (D. Del. 1995)).
48. See id. at 780-81, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831-32.
49. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
50. 84 F.3d 424, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1833 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
51. See Viam Corp. v. Iowa Export-Import Trading Co., 84 F.3d 424, 430, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1833, 1837 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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at issue, as well as Iowa Export, the exclusive licensee of the patent.
52
Spal moved for dismissal on the grounds that the district court was
without personal jurisdiction.53 Similarly, Iowa Export moved for
dismissal on the grounds that, without Spal, which it considered a
necessary party to the suit, it too was entitled to dismissal.54 The
district court granted both motions, 55 and Viam appealed.
The Federal Circuit, in applying a stream of commerce analysis to
satisfy the minimum contacts test, 6 determined that Spal had
established a "regular distribution channel" with Iowa Export, who
had the exclusive right to advertise, market, and distribute products
covered by the patent throughout the United States, and had sold
several million dollars worth of Spal's products in the country.57 The
court also determined that Spal "knowingly and intentionally
exploited the California market" through its exclusive distributor's
advertising and sales in California. 8 Thus, because Spal placed its
products in the stream of commerce and knew that the products
would likely reach the forum state, it should have reasonably
anticipated the possibility of being hailed into a California court. 9
In determining whether concepts of fair play and substantial justice
would be offended in forcing Spal to defend its patent in the forum
state, the court explained that "[i] t is not unfair to require that an
out-of-state patent holder who asserts its rights through a local
distributor in its regular chain of distribution against an in-state party
to be held to have subjected itself to the due process of the relevant
jurisdiction."' Otherwise, the court reasoned, out-of-state corpora-
tions could establish domestic offices through which they could do
business without subjecting their parents to the high level of scrutiny
demanded by U.S. patent law.61 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
held that personal jurisdiction existed in the California forum, and
reversed in part the district court's ruling.
62
52. See id. at 426, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834.
53. See id. at 426-27, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834.
54. See id. at 427, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834.
55. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834.
56. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835.
57. See id. at 428-429, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836.
58. IM at 429, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836.
59. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836.
60. IM at 429-30, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.
61. See id. at 430, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.
62. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.
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D. Preemption
The judicial doctrine of preemption is founded on the supremacy
of federal legislation over state legislation, thereby preventing state
legislatures from interfering with legal rights previously defined by
Congress.2 In Cover v. Hydramatic Packing Co.,' the Federal Circuit
reversed a district court's ruling that the patent code preempted a
provision of the Pennsylvania Uniform Commerical Code ("U.C.C.")
governing warranties for merchants dealing regularly in goods.65
Cover sued Sea Gull for patent infringement and Sea Gull's supplier
Hydromatic for contributory infringement. 6  Hydromatic filed a
cross-claim against Sea Gull for indemnification under 13 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2312(c),67 which requires a buyer furnishing blue print specifica-
tions to a seller to hold the seller harmless against any rightful claims
of infringement that arise out of compliance with those specifica-
tions.' Cover settled with Sea Gull and Hydromatic before trial.69
As a result, the only claim at trial was Hydromatic's cross-claim against
Sea Gull for indemnification under the Pennsylvania statute."0 The
district court ruled that, considering that Cover had failed to mark its
product, Sea Gull was not liable for damages because it had not
received notice of infringement until the complaint was filed, and that
Hydromatic's cross-claim was preempted under the federal patent
statutes.
71
The Federal Circuit reversed, explaining that Title 35 of the United
States Code governs only the field of patent law, not commercial law
between buyers and sellers.7 2 Further, the court explained that
"there is no conflict preemption because Pennsylvania's commercial
law neither renders compliance with the patent code a 'physical
impossibility' nor 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
63. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 24 (1824) (holding that state laws are
invoked if they "interfere with, or are contrary to, the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of
the constitution."); Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678, 684, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 128
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that state law is invalid if it "clashes with the objectives of the
federal patent laws").
64. 83 F.3d 1390, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1783 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 183 (1996).
65. See Cover v. Hydramatic Packing Co., 83 F.3d 1390, 1394, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1783,
1787 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 183 (1996).
66. See id. at 1391, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1784.
67. SeeCoverv. Hydramatic Packing Co., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1199, 1200 (E.D. Pa. 1995),
rev'd, 83 F.3d 1390, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1783 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 183 (1996).
68. See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2312(c) (West 1995).
69. See Cover, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1201.
70. See id. at 1200.
71. See Cover, 83 F.3d at 1391, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785.
72. See id. at 1393, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786.
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execution' of the patent law."73 Once the parties had settled the
patent issues, the patent code ceased to affect the parties' legal
relationships as defined by commercial law.' Accordingly, the




In Spraytex, Inc. v. Homax Corp.,7" the Federal Circuit confronted
a question of first impression, specifically, "whether a judgment that
disposes of fewer than all actions consolidated by the district court
into one case may be separately appealed."'8 In March 1995,
Spraytex filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that it had not
infringed Homax's patent.79 Five months later, Spraytex sought a
second declaratory judgment that it had not infringed a second
patent owned by Homax, which issued from a continuation applica-
tion of the original patent during the pendency of the first suit."
The district court consolidated the two cases, granted Spraytex's
motion for summary judgment of noninfringement of the first patent,
and entered final judgment on the first claim." Homax appealed,
and Spraytex moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the
Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction because the district court had not
disposed of the action concerning the continuation patent or granted
certification under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.82
73. Id. at 1393-94, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786.
74. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786.
75. See id. at 1394, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787.
76. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146. Rule 54(b) provides:
[W] hen more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, or when multiple parties are involved,
the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than
all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just
reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the
absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision,
however designated, which adjudicated fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the sights and
liabilities of all the parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
77. 96 F.3d 1377, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1145 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
78. Spraytex, Inc. v. Homax Corp., 96 F.3d 1377, 1379, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1145, 1146
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
79. See Spraytex, Inc. v. Homax Corp., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1566, 1567 (C.D. Cal. 1995),
appeal dismissed, 96 F.3d 1377, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1145 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
80. See id. at 1568.
81. See id. at 1573.
82. See id.
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In considering the scope of its jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit
noted that the U.S. circuit courts of appeal were split in their
treatment of appeals from consolidated actions.8" Ultimately, the
Federal Circuit adopted the rationale of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits,
holding that consolidated actions merge into one for jurisdictional
purposes (being similar to a case having several claims or counter-
claims) and may not be appealed separately absent certification under
Rule 54(b)84 The court reasoned that "[because] consolidated cases
are generally based on the same factual circumstances, appellate
review of the total consolidated case serves the purposes of appellate
efficiency." 5 Further, by establishing a bright-line rule, as opposed
to those circuits that consider such jurisdictional issues on a case-by-
case basis, the court elected to provide more certainty to the appellate
process.8  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal,
holding that it lacked jurisdiction until the district court issued "a
final judgment disposing of all aspects of the consolidated case."
7
E ResJudicata and Collateral Estoppel
In 1996, the Federal Circuit addressed the effects of administrative
rulings by the International Trade Commission ("ITC") on subsequent
litigations involving the same parties under the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. The legal doctrine of resjudicata (or
claim preclusion) prevents a party from litigating a legal claim that
should have been raised in a prior litigation, if the prior litigation was
fully litigated on the merits.' The doctrine of collateral estoppel
(or issue preclusion) recognizes that the determination of facts
litigated between two parties in a proceeding is binding on those
parties in all future proceedings against each other.
8 9
83. See Spraytex; 96 F.3d at 1380, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147 (noting that the First and
Sixth Circuits permit separate appeals of "judgments disposing of fewer than all claims in a
consolidated case" while, in contrast, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits prohibit the appeal of
judgments involving part of a consolidated claim unless certified pursuant to 54(b)).
84. See id. at 1382, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148 (rejecting adoption of case-by-case
approach utilized by First and Sixth Circuits).
85. 1, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
86. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149 (rejecting case-by-case analysis in part because it
results in premature appeals).
87. Id, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
88. See RESTATEMIENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS §§ 18-26 (1982) ("[W]hen a valid and final
personal judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff. (1) The plaintiff cannot thereafter
maintain an action on the original claim or any part thereof....").
89. See i&. § 27 ("When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid
and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is
conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different
claim.").
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In Bio-Technology General Corp. v. Geentech, Inc.,9" the Federal
Circuit affirmed a district court's ruling that a prior decision of the
ITC to dismiss the patentee's complaint did not have preclusive effect
on an infringement claim in a district court.91 Genentech filed a
complaint with the ITC alleging that Bio-Technology engaged in
unfair methods of competition based upon the importation and sale
of products covered by its patents.92 The ITC dismissed the com-
plaint with prejudice under 19 U.S.C. § 1387 as a sanction for
Genentech's violations of various discovery orders.9" Bio-Technology
subsequently sought a declaratory judgment that Genentech's patents
were "invalid, unenforceable, and not infringed;" Genentech
responded by filing a counterclaim for infringement. 94 As a defense,
Bio-Technology argued that Genentech could not assert an infringe-
ment claim because Genentech was attempting to relitigate in the
district court the same claim it lost before the ITC.95
In rejecting the suggestion that the ITC's dismissal had a preclusive
effect, the Federal Circuit evaluated whether the ITC had the same
power to award the full measure of relief sought in the later litigation
before the district court.96 Under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d), "when the
ITC determines that a defendant has engaged in unfair practices in
import trade, it may direct that the articles at issue be excluded from
entry in the United States."97 The Federal Circuit remarked,
however, "the ITC does not have the power to award damages for
patent infringement," a remedy exclusive to the United States district
90. 80 F.d 1553, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir.), cet. denie, 117 S. Ct. 274 (1996).
91. See Bio-Technology Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1564, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir.), cert denied 117 S. Ct. 274 (1996).
92. See id. at 1563-64, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328-29.
93. See id at 1563, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328. Section 1337 of the Tariff Act of 1930
authorizes the ITC to monitor unfair practices in:
the import trade, including- (B) [t]he importation into the United States, the sale for
importation, or the sale within the United States after importation by the owner,
importer, or cosignee, of articles that-
(i) infringe a valid and enforceable United States patent.., or
(ii) are made, produced, processed, or mined under, or by means of, a process covered
by the claims of a valid and enforceable United States patent.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1) (B) (1994).
94. See Genetech, 80 F.3d at 1557, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
95. See W. at 1563, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328 (holding of administrative agency when
acting in ajudicial capacity, may sometimes be given preclusive effect).
96. See id. at 1563-64, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 ("'Where a plaintiff was precluded
from recovering damages in the initial action by formal jurisdictional or statutory barriers, not
by plaintiff's choice, a subsequent action for damages will not normally be barred by resjudicata
even where it arises from the same factual circumstances as the initial action.'" (quoting Burgos
v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).
97. Id. at 1564, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
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courts.9" Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that due to the
'jurisdictional limitations on the relief available in the ITC ... the
ITC's prior decision cannot have claim preclusive effect in the district
court."99
Following the Bio-Technology decision, the Federal Circuit consid-
ered, in Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp.,
100
whether a finding of infringement by the ITC--subsequently affirmed
by the Federal Circuit-should have preclusive effect on a later district
court infringement action involving the same patent and parties. 1'
Factually, Texas Instruments initiated an action with the ITC against,
Cypress Semiconductor, asserting that Cypress Semiconductor
engaged in unfair acts by importing and selling encapsulated circuits
produced by processes covered by its patent.02 The Commission
ultimately issued a ruling that Texas Instruments' patent was infringed
and entered an exclusion order prohibiting the importation of the
circuits.' °3 This decision was later affirmed by the Federal Cir-
cuit.1°
4
Contemporaneously with the ITC proceeding, Texas Instruments
sued Cypress Semiconductor alleging infringement of the same
patents. 5 At trial, the jury returned a verdict of infringement,
which the district court subsequently set aside on defendant's motion
for a judgment as a matter of law.0 ' On appeal, Texas Instruments
argued that the ITC's previous finding of infringement (as affirmed
by the Federal Circuit) should have preclusive effect on the district
court.
10 7
In accordance with its prior decisions, the Federal Circuit rejected
the proposition that a ruling by the ITC precluded a different ruling
by a district court.' While the Federal Circuit recognized that a
98. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
99. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
100. 90 F3d 1558, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1818
(1997).
101. See Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1568, 39
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492, 1500 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 1818 (1997).
102. See id. at 1562, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496.
103. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496 (affirming prior decision by administrative law
judge finding infringement under doctrine of equivalents).
104. See Texas Instruments Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1018 (Fed. Cir. 1993), af'g In re Certain Plastic Encapsulated Integrated
Circuits, Inv. No. 337-TA-S15, USITC Pub. No. 2574 (Nov. 1992).
105. See Texas Instruments, 90 F3d at 1563, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496.
106. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496 (stating that "no reasonable jury could have found
literal infringement").
107. See id. at 1568, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500 (arguing preclusive effect should be given
to decisions of federal agencies acting in theirjudicial capacity).
108. See id. at 1569, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
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decision by an administrative agency may be given preclusive effect in
a federal court if the agency acted in ajudicial capacity, that doctrine
is inapplicable "when Congress, either expressly or impliedly,
indicated that it intended otherwise."1' In reviewing the legislative
history of the Trade Reform Act of 1974 and recent modifications of
ITC procedure through various other bills, the court concluded that
Congress did not intend that decisions by the ITC on patent issues
should have preclusive effects. °10 Furthermore, the court rejected
Texas Instruments' arguments that, "by denying preclusive effect to
an ITC determination, district courts would be free to ignore the
court's appellate decisions.""' Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held
that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bind the district
court.
1 12
The Federal Circuit also addressed the limits of res judicata on a
party who alleged infringement against another party and then later
sued the same accused infringer on other patents. In Kearns v.
General Motors Corp.,"' the Federal Circuit held that the involuntary
dismissal of an infringement claim based on one patent does not
automatically bar, on res judicata grounds, claims of infringement
based on other related patents.' Previously, Kearns had brought
an action against GM in the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging
infringement of five patents.' That action was dismissed by the
Michigan court for Kearns' failure to comply with specific deadlines
and other court orders." 6 Kearns then sued GM in the Eastern
District of Virginia, alleging infringement of the original five patents
as well as sixteen others." 7 The Virginia court dismissed the entire
action, stating that "all twenty-one patents should have been litigated
in the Detroit litigation and they're barred by not having been
so."" 8
109. 1& at 1568, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
110. See id. at 1568-69, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
111. See id. at 1569, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
112. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
113. 94 F.3d 1553, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1949 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denie, 117 S. Ct. 1469
(1997).
114. SeeKeams v. General Motors Corp., 94 F.3d 1553, 1555-56,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1949,
1949-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denie 117 S. Ct. 1469 (1997).
115. See id. at 1555, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951.
116. See id. at 1554, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951. The district court dismissed the action
under FED. R. Cirv. P. 41(b), which allows for involuntary dismissal of an action if the plaintiff
fails to prosecute or comply with court rules. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Unless otherwise
specified by the court, dismissal under Rule 41(b) constitutes an adjudication upon the merits.
See id,
117. See Kearns, 94 F.3d at 1554, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1949, 1950.
118. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950.
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The Federal Circuit upheld the district court's ruling as to the first
five patents, but reversed in part the dismissal of the sixteen newly
asserted patents." 9 The court explained that each asserted patent
raised an independent and distinct cause of action deserving of the
procedural protections of due process. 2° The Federal Circuit
rejected the argument that the sixteen new patents should have been
litigated with the first five patents, pointing out that res judicata
applied only if the first case had been litigated on the merits.1
2'
Moreover, the court encouraged judicial restraint against the
application of resjudicata to bar causes of action previously dismissed
on procedural grounds. 22
G. Reexamination Procedures
During the past year, the Federal Circuit sent clear signals that
district courts were not to interfere with a patentee's right to seek
reexamination, or the manner in which the Patent Office conducted
those reexaminations. Under 35 U.S.C. § 302, "[a]ny person at any
time may file a request for reexamination" by the Patent Office of
"any claim of any patent on the basis of prior art .... ,,23  As the
Federal Circuit held in two separate cases, however, § 302 does not
allow a district court to order a patentee to seek reexamination of its
patent, or to require an accused infringer to participate in the ex
parte reexamination procedures.
In In re Continental General Tire, Inc.,24 the Federal Circuit issued
a writ of mandamus compelling a district court to vacate an order
requiring Continental (an accused infringer in a patent infringement
suit against Goodyear) to file with the Patent Office a request for
reexamination of the allegedly infringed patents." The Federal
Circuit explained that although the statute authorizing a request for
reexamination "permits any party to file a request for reexamination,
it does not empower a district court to compel a party to file such a
request or require that any party file such a request."2 ' In rejecting
analogies to powers of a court to compel parties to engage in
119. See id. at 1557, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952.
120. See id. at 1556, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952.
121. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952.
122. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952.
123. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (1994).
124. 81 F.3d 1089, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
125. See In re Continental Gen. Tire, Inc., 81 F.3d 1089, 1090, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365,
1366 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that remedy of mandamus is drastic but "is available to correct
a clear abuse of discretion or usurpation ofjudicial power") (internal citations omitted).
126. See id. at 1091, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367.
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mediation or to appoint a special master, the court concluded that
"the district court exceeded its [statutory] power by compelling
Continental General to request reexamination of Goodyear's
patents.
" 127
In Emerson Electric Co. v. Davoil, Inc.,'28 the Federal Circuit reversed
the district court's order requiring Emerson to submit materials
prepared by the accused infringer during a reexamination proceeding
of the patent-in-suit in the Patent Office. 29 During an infringement
suit brought by Emerson, a third party filed a request for reexamina-
tion of the patent at issue, and Emerson moved for a stay of the suit
until the reexamination's conclusion."S In granting the motion, the
district court ordered Emerson to include with its submissions to the
Patent Office all documents prepared by the alleged infringer as well
as any affidavits so as to enable the alleged infringer to participate
effectively in the document submission portion of the reexam.' 3'
The Federal Circuit reversed that portion of the court order,
explaining that the district court's power to stay did not authorize it
to direct Emerson to include submissions from other parties.'
32
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that such an order "went
beyond its inherent power to manage its docket and to stay proceed-
ings.""33 Moreover, Emerson's choice of what, if anything, to file
with the Patent Office in a reexamination proceeding should remain
undisturbed by the courts."3
II. PATENTABIInY AND VALIDITY
A. Patentable Subject Matter-35 U.S.C. § 101
Section 101 requires that, to be patentable, an invention must fall
within the proper subject matter for patentability and be useful.'
In the latter requirement, labeled the "utility" requirement, inventions
127. See id. at 1092-93, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368-69.
128. 88 F.3d 1051, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1474 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see infra notes 53944.
129. See Emerson Elec. Co. v. Davoil, Inc., 88 F.3d 1051, 1054, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1474,
1476-77 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (arguing that the district court exceeded its "'inherent powers to
manage [its] docket and stay proceedings'" (quoting Emerson Elec. Co. v. Davoil, Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1303, 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1995))).
130. See id. at 1052, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1474-75.
131. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475.
132. See id. at 1053-54, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476-77.
133. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476-77.
134. See id. at 1054, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477.
135. "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
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not functioning as claimed or having no useful application are
unpatentable.
The Federal Circuit discussed the utility requirement in Fujikawa v.
Wattanasin,36 when it affirmed the determination by the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences' ("Board") award of priority to
Wattanasin for a pharmaceutical compound and its method of
manufacture.137
Wattanasin began his research in 1979, and through 1984 and 1985
synthesized three inventive compounds and performed in vitroll
testing of the compounds. More inventive compounds were synthe-
sized and tested both in vitro and in vivo from January 1987 through
December 1987.139 Fujikawa asserted that the tests failed to estab-
lish the practical utility and therefore reduction to practice.' 4° The
Board held, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, that the in vitro and in
vivo testing was sufficient to establish the practical utility, and
therefore reduction to practice, of the inventive compound and
method. After also finding no suppression or concealment, the Board
awarded Wattanasin priority of invention.141
Affirming this decision, the court observed that, "[i]n the pharma-
ceutical arts ... practical utility may be shown by adequate evidence
of pharmacological activity."" Predicting whether a novel com-
pound will exhibit pharmacological activity, however, is difficult;
therefore, the court ruled that "there must be sufficient correlation
between the tests and an asserted pharmacological activity so as to
convince those skilled in the art that, to a reasonable probability, that
the novel compound will exhibit the asserted pharmacological
behavior.""4
As to the invented compound, the Board relied on testimony that
the in vitro results showed that the claimed compounds would exhibit
the desired pharmacological activity when administered in vivo."M
Finding the Board's factual determination within its discretion, the
136. 93 F.3d 1559, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1895 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
137. See Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1563-64, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1895, 1896
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
138. See id at 1561, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896-97. In vitro generally means testing
performed in a test tube. In vivo generally means testing performed in an animal or human.
139. See id. at 1561-62, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896-98. Testing resulted in significant
differences between the four compounds during in vitro tests, subsequently the three most active
compounds were tested by in vitro testing. See id, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896-98.
140. See id. at 1563, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898.
141. See id. at 1561, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896; see also infra notes 219-32 and
accompanying text.
142. Id at 1564, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1899.
143. Id. at 1564 & n.4, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1899 & n.4.
144. See id. at 1565, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1900.
1692
1996 PATENT LAW DECISIONS
court ruled that a "'rigorous correlation' need not be shown in order
to establish practical utility; 'reasonable correlation' suffices."
145
As to the invented method, Fujikawa argued that an "anomaly" in
the test data undercut the reliability of Wattanasin's in vivo tests. The
court found that each party presented evidence on this issue and the
Board had correctly resolved this disputed factual issue by finding that
the test results were sufficient to establish the asserted pharmacologi-
cal activity.' 46
1. Double patenting
The rule against double patenting is intended to prevent an
inventor from extending the term of exclusivity by the subsequent
patenting of variations not distinct from the previously patented
invention. 47 A double patenting rejection is not proper when the
patent examiner imposes a restriction requirement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 121 and the double patenting rejection is based upon a patent
issuing from the restricted application or a divisional application
resulting from the requirement."4
In Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials America,
Inc., 4 the Federal Circuit, in a divided opinion, affirmed the
district court's ruling that the restriction requirement under § 121 in
a parent application precluded a finding of double patenting of non-
elected claims pursued in a divisional application.'
50
In Applied Materials, a restriction requirement was made in the
parent application dividing the inventions into three groups: "an
oven-type radiation heated reactor," "a reactor with means for
introducing gaseous reactants," and "a gaseous epitaxial coating
process."' 5 ' Applicants elected the radiation-heated reactor and
filed divisional applications for the non-elected groups of inven-
tions.152  Three patents subsequently issued on each of the inven-
tions.'53 At trial, Advanced Semiconductor Materials America, Inc.
145. Id,, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1899-1900.
146. See id. at 1564-66, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1899-1900 (noting that Board's capacity as
fact finder includes valuing testimony of one witness above another).
147. Seeln reVogel, 422 F.2d 438,164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 619 (C.C.P-A. 1970) (involving dispute
over patent protecting alleged method of processing pork).
148. See 35 U.S.C. § 121 (1994).
149. 98 F.3d 1563, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1822
(1997); see infra notes 337-40, 425-34, 464-74 and accompanying text (discussing other aspects
of Applied Materials decision).
150. SeeAppliedMaterials, Inc.v.Advanced SemiconductorMaterialsAm., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563,
1567-69,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481,1482-85 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 1822 (1997).
151. See id. at 1567, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
152. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
153. See i., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
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(ASM) argued that the patent issued to the process was invalid on the
ground of double patenting."M
Under the third sentence of § 121, invalidity based on double
patenting is improper in view of a "patent issuing on an application
with respect to which a requirement for restriction under this section
has been made, or on an application filed as a result of such a
requirement. ... "15 ASM, however, argued that Applied Materials
was not entitled to the protection of the third sentence of § 121
because, during prosecution of the process claims, Applied Materials
broadened the scope of the process claims. "' Thus, the Federal
Circuit reviewed whether the process claims in the divisional
application were consonant with the restriction requirement in the
parent application. 57 Judge Newman held that the broadening in
question was "in consonance with" the restriction requirement and
that the claims in question were protected by the third sentence of 35
U.S.C. § 121.58 Chief Judge Archer disagreed, however, finding
instead that the claims in question were invalid for obviousness-type
double patenting.'59 Circuit Judge Mayer held that the claims in
question were invalid on different grounds, thus never reaching this
issue.16
B. Anticipation-35 U.S.C. § 102
1. Anticipation
Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) requires that for a printed
publication to be prior art, it must be published before the invention
date of the claimed invention.' In Mahurkar v. C.R Bard, Inc.,
162
the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Bard's
motion for judgment as a matter of law, based on the finding that no
reasonable jury could have found that a catalog constituted prior art
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). l"
154. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483 (arguing that benefits derived from § 121 no
longer apply due to actions of ASM).
155. 35 U.S.C. § 121 (1994).
156. See Applied Materials, 98 F.3d at 1567-68, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
157. See id. at 1568, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
158. See id. at 1569, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
159. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490 (affirmingjudgment of invalidity of patent).
160. Id. at 1579, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493.
161. See35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
162. 79 F.3d 1572,38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1288 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see infra notes 224-32,1055-63
and accompanying text.
163. See Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1579, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1288, 1292
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
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Mahurkar filed suit against Bard for infringement of his patent
claiming a double lumen catheter."6 In its defense, Bard alleged
invalidity of the Mahurkar patent as being anticipated by the Cook
catalog under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).'r6 To rebut this assertion,
Mahurkar offered corroborating evidence that he was working on the
catheter prior to the catalog's publication date and acted from
conception through the filing of the patent application in compliance
with 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). 1" The Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling that no reasonable jury could have found that Bard
proved the Cook catalog was prior art. 67
2. The public use bar
Under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (b), an inventor is entitled to a patent unless
the invention was in public use in the U.S. more than one year prior
to the filing date of the patent application.'" Public use is support-
ed by "any use of [the claimed] invention by a person other than the
inventor who is under no limitation, restriction or obligation of
secrecy to the inventor."169 The Federal Circuit reviews questions
of public use as a matter of law in light of the totality of the circum-
stances.
170
3. The experimental use exception to public use
An exception to invalidity for the public use exists where the
inventor's public use constitutes experimental use of the inven-
tion.' This exception is counterbalanced by the policies of "allow-
ing the inventor a reasonable amount of time ... to determine the
potential economic value of a patent" on the one hand and "prohibit-
ing the inventor from commercially exploiting the invention for a
period greater than the statutorily prescribed time" on the other.
7 2
A determination of public use is reviewed by the Federal Circuit as a
164. See id. at 1575, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1289.
165. See id. at 1576, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1289.
166. See id. at 1578, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290.
167. See id. at 1579, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291.
168. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
169. In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1134, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 976, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
170. SeeTone Bros., Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192,1198, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,1324
(Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1015 (1995).
171. See City of Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 135 (1877) ("[S]uch use is not a
public use, within the meaning of the statute, so long as the inventor is engaged, in good faith,
in testing its operation.").
172. See Tone Bros., Inc., 28 F.3d at 1198, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324-25.
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matter of law."78 In 1996, the Federal Circuit reviewed three cases
involving the experimental use exception.
In Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 7 the Federal Circuit refused to
extend the experimental use exception to an inventor who failed to
maintain control of the invention and obtain feedback regarding
prototypes of his invention for more than one year prior to filing a
patent application. 75 Lough had invented an improvement to an
upper seal assembly used in Brunswick inboard/outboard boats to
prevent the corrosion of the upper seal assembly.7 ' In the spring
of 1986, Lough made six usable upper seal assembly prototypes and
installed them in his own boat and in other acquaintances' boats.'77
He charged nothing for these prototypes,7 8 nor did he receive any
comments about the operability of the prototypes.'79
Lough filed a patent application on June 6, 1988 for the upper seal
assembly and a patent issued on July 18, 1989.0 Lough then sued
Brunswick for infringement of his patent and won a jury verdict of
literal infringement' 8' Brunswick filed a motion for judgment as
a matter of law, arguing that the claimed invention was invalid
because it had been in public use more than one year prior to the
filing of the patent application. 2 The district court denied the
motion without comment and awarded damages to Lough."
In this case, the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court's
decision. Specifically, the Federal Circuit considered whether Lough's
installation of prototypes constituted an experimental use,'14 recog-
nizing that individual inventors and small businesses may have less
formal and casual experiments than larger corporations." 5 Howev-
er, the court held that, at a minimum, inventors must maintain
supervision and control over the prototypes during the alleged
testing. 86 The court noted that Lough did not keep any records as
173. Petrolite Corp. v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 96 F.3d 1423, 1425, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1201,
1203 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
174. 86 F.3d 1113, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1100 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
175. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1122, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1100, 1102, 1105
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
176. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102, 1105.
177. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102, 1105.
178. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102, 1105.
179. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102, 1105.
180. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102.
181. See id. at 1118, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103.
182. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103.
183. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103.
184. See id. at 1120-21, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104-05.
185. See id. at 1121, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105.
186. See id. at 1122, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105-06.
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to the alleged testing,187 did not inspect the seal assemblies after
installation by other mechanics,"8 and did not inquire as to (or
require follow-up analysis of) the operability of the prototypes
subsequent to installation.'89 On these grounds, the Federal Circuit
held that Lough did not maintain the requisite supervision and
control over the seals during the alleged testing period.'"
The Federal Circuit, affording only minimal value to Lough's
subjective testimony during trial, stated that the prototypes were not
used for experimental purposes and in such a manner as to not have
been likely to be seen in public, especially in light of the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the alleged experimentation. 191
These factors farther supported the Federal Circuit's conclusion that
the district court erred in denying Brunswick's motion in that thejury
had no legal basis to conclude that Lough's use of the prototypes was
experimental. Therefore, the use of the prototypes constituted public
use and the patent was invalid under § 102(b). 92
In Baxter International, Inc. v. Cobe Laboratories, Inc.,'" the Federal
Circuit reviewed an inventor's defense against an allegation of public
use by a third party under § 102(b). The court analyzed whether
the use by the third party was merely experimental, thereby negating
the public use claim. 95 It found, however, that the use by the third
party was not experimental, and further affirmed the district court's
holding that "the experimental use exception is limited to the
inventor or people working for the inventor or under the direction
and control of the inventor...."196
Baxter owned a patent for a sealless centrifuge for separating blood
from its components and brought a lawsuit against Cobe Laboratories
for patent infringement.'97 In its defense, Cobe asserted that two
researchers from the National Institute of Health ("NIH") developed
and designed a sealless centrifuge for their own purposes more than
187. See id, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106.
188. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106.
189. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106.
190. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106.
191. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106.
192. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1107.
193. 88 F.3d 1054, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
194. SeeBaxter Int'l, Inc. v. Cobe Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1058,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437,
1439 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
195. See id. at 1057, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439.
196. I, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439.
197. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438-39.
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one year prior to Baxter's filing date.'98 Baxter countered that the
researcher's use was experimental. 19
In reviewing the facts of the case, the court noted that the NIH
researchers' laboratory was publicly accessible, the lab work was not
subject to a confidentiality policy, the centrifuge designed and used
by the researchers worked for its intended purpose, and there was a
free flow of people into and out of the lab.2" Moreover, the court
recognized that the researchers' refinement of the centrifuge for their
own purposes did not negate its public use.2"' Finally, the court
noted that for the experimental use exception to apply, the inventor
must exercise direction and control over the invention. 2
In view of the totality of the circumstances, the majority affirmed,
stating:
[P]ublic testing before the critical date by a third party for his own
unique purposes of an invention previously reduced to practice and
obtained from someone other than the patentee, when such testing
is independent of and not controlled by the patentee, is an
invalidating public use, not an experimental use.
23
In her dissentJudge Newman contended that this decision permits
public use by a third party that is unknown or unknowable to
patentees, supporting the use of "secret prior art" to invalidate a
patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).104 The effects of this decision,
according to Judge Newman, "produces a perpetual cloud on any
issued patent, defeating the objective standards and policy consider-
ations embodied in the § 102 definitions of prior art.
2 5
After the Lough and Baxter decisions, the Federal Circuit returned
to the question of experimental use in Petrolite Corp. v. Baker Hughes
Inc.2 11 Petrolite acquired a patent for a hydrogen sulfide scavenger
process useful in cold weather from Quaker Petroleum Chemicals Co.
Inc. and sued Baker on the patent.2" 7 The district court granted
Baker's summary judgment motion for patent invalidity because the
198. See id. at 1059, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440.
199. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.
200. See id. at 1058-59, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440.
201. See id. at 1059, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.
202. See id. at 1060, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
203. Id at 1060-61, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
204. See id. at 1061, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442 (Newman, J., dissenting).
205. lId at 1062, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443 (Newman, J., dissenting).
206. 96 F.3d 1423, 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
207. Petrolite Corp. v. Baker Hughes Inc., 96 F.3d 1423, 1424, 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1201,
1202 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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claimed invention was publicly used or sold more than one year prior
to filing the patent application."° The Federal Circuit affirmed.0 9
Petrolite argued that it had not publicly used the claimed invention
because it had not been shown to work for its intended purpose and
the uses and sales were experimental.2 10 The Federal Circuit found
that the objective evidence showed the invention worked for its
intended purpose and in its intended environment The Federal
Circuit rejected the subjective evidence of the inventors that they were
not completely satisfied the invention would work in cold tempera-
tures.
211
The Federal Circuit distinguished Petrolite from Manville Sales Corp.
v. Paramount Systems, Inc.,212 where an experimental use was found
because the inventor had not yet tested the invention in the winter
season.213  Here, however, Quaker had used its invention in its
intended environment and found no objective evidence that the
invention was ineffective in cold temperatures.1 4
The Federal Circuit also considered the district court's finding that
Quaker did not maintain exclusive control of the invention, an
important but non-determinative factor in the experimental use
question."' The evidence presented by Quaker were security
measures required by a third party in analyzing the invention and not
related to the experimental nature of the invention.216 Moreover,
there was no evidence that Quaker informed purchasers that the
invention was still experimental.217 The Federal Circuit, therefore,
affirmed the decision that Quaker publicly used and sold the claimed
invention prior to the statutory bar date.218
4. Previous inventor
Section 102 (g) prohibits an inventor from obtaining a patent if the
claimed invention "was made in this country by another who had not
208. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1203.
209. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1202.
210. See id. at 1426, 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1204.
211. See id, at 1427, 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1205.
212. 917 F.2d 544, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
213. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 550, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1587, 1592 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
214. Petrolite, 96 F.3d at 1427, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204-05.
215. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205 (citing U.S. Environmental Prods. Inc. v. Westall,
911 F.2d 713, 717, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1898, 1902 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
216. See id. at 1428, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205.
217. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205.
218. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206.
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abandoned, suppressed or concealed it."2"' To establish priority of
inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g),220 an applicant must show
either that he (1) reduced the invention to practice 21 before the
other inventor or (2) conceived 222 the invention before the other
inventor, even though he reduced the invention to practice later, if
coupled with a reasonably diligent effort to reduce the invention to
practice from the date of conception until the reduction to practice
is achieved. 23
In Mahurkar v. C.R Bard, Inc.,224 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision granting a patentee's motion forjudgment as
a matter of law that a catalog (published after the invention was
conceived and reduced to practice) was not prior art.2 1 At trial,
patentee Mahurkar testified that he conceived and began working on
the claimed invention in 1979 and then constructed and tested
prototypes from late 1980 through early 1981 in his kitchen.2 26
Noting that reduction to practice 227 typically requires evidence of
test results under conditions of actual use,228 the Federal Circuit
observed that less complicated inventions do not demand such
stringent testing.2 29 The court ruled that Mahurkar had showed
219. A person shall be entitled to a patent unless "(g) before the applicant's invention
thereof the invention was made in this country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed,
or concealed it." 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994).
220. "[Ain applicant for a patent, or a patentee, may not establish a date of invention by
reference to knowledge or use thereof, or other activity with respect thereto, in a foreign
country other than a NAFTA country or a WTO member country, except as provided in sec-
tions 119 and 365 of this title." Id. § 104(a) (1).
221. An inventor can reduce an invention to practice by making a tangible embodiment of
the invention and demonstrating a practical utility, or by filing a patent application. See Popeil
Bros., Inc. v. Schick Elec. Inc., 356 F. Supp. 240, 244, 176 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 101, 102 (N.D. Ill.
1972) (noting ways an invention may be reduced to practice).
222. An inventor can establish that he conceived the invention by showing that he had in
his mind a complete idea of the invention. See Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 224 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 857 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citing Gunter v. Stream, 573 F.2d 77, 80, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 482,
484 (C.C.P.A. 1978)).
223. "In determining priority of invention there shall be considered not only the respective
dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence
of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception
by the other." 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
224. 79 F.3d 1572, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1288 (Fed. Cir. 1996). See supra notes 162-67 and
infra notes 1055-63 and accompanying text.
225. See Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1577, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1288, 1291
(Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Under section 102(a), a document is prior art only when published before
the invention date.").
226. See id. at 1578, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291.
227. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291.
228. See Gordon v. Hubbard, 347 F.2d 1001, 1006, 146 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 303, 307 (C.C.P.A.
1965) (noting that different testing methods may be required depending on nature of
invention).
229. See Mahurkar, 79 F.3d at 1578, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291.
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reduction to practice adequately because his invention was less
complicated.2s
The Federal Circuit also found that Mahurkar exercised reasonable
diligence from his conception date through the date when he filed his
patent application.23 ' Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded
that no reasonable jury could have found clear, and convincing
evidence that the catalog was prior art because Mahurkar was the first
inventor to conceive and reduce the invention to practice.
23 2
C. Obviousness-35 U.S.C. § 103
The determination of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103233 is
based upon four factual inquiries.M These inquiries are "(1) the
scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the
claims and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent
art; and (4) secondary considerations, if any, of nonobviousness."2 5
The secondary considerations, sometimes referred to as "objective
evidence of nonobviousness,"2s include commercial success of the
invention, satisfying a long-felt need, failure of others to find a
solution to the problem, and copying of the invention by others.37
A suggestion or motivation to combine the teachings of a reference
is required to support a prima fade case of obviousness. 2 s  The
suggestion to modify may be stated expressly from the references
230. SeeMahurar, 79 F.3d at 1578,38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292 ("Dr. Mahurkar adequately
showed reduction to practice of his less complicated invention.").
231. See id. at 1579, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292.
232. See id, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292.
233. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994). Section 103 states:
A patent may not be obtained... if the differences between the subject matter sought
to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Id.
234. See Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 467 (1966)
(noting that while the question of validity is one of law, the § 103 condition of nonobviousness
leads to the factual inquiries discussed above).
235. SeeUniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044,1050,5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1434,
1438 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating obviousness is a legal conclusion involving a determination of
these four factors).
236. See In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 138,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
see also infra notes 249-59, 294-300, & 341-46 and accompanying text.
237. See Huang, 100 F.3d at 138, 40 U.S.P.Q,2d (BNA) at 1689; Pandut Corp. v. Dennison
Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1593, 1595 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that
these secondary considerations are facts to be taken into account in a § 103 determination).
238. SeeACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577,221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
929, 932-33 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (asserting that under § 103, teachings of prior art to produce the
claimed invention cannot be combined unless there is a suggestion or incentive to do so).
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themselves211 or it may be implied.2' A suggestion may also come
from the knowledge of those skilled in the art that certain disclosures
in the references are known to be of special interest or importance
in the particular field.24' Further, the motivation may come from
the nature of the problem to be solved.2  In any event, the Federal
Circuit reviews the question of obviousness under a de novo stan-
dard2l while it reviews the question of what a reference teaches is
a question of fact under the clearly erroneous standard.2 4
1. Scope and content of the prior art
A finding of obviousness is premised on finding that each element
of the claimed invention is either taught or suggested by the prior
art.2  The Federal Circuit, for example, reviewed this issue in Roton
Barrie, Inc. v. Stanley Works,21 in which it upheld the district court's
finding that none of the prior art relied on by Stanley to invalidate
the patent disclosed the claimed bearing means set forth in Roton's
patent. 247  Therefore, no finding of obviousness was warranted by
the district court as a matter of law.2'
Additionally, in In re Huang,249 the Federal Circuit noted the
asserted differences between the prior art and the claimed invention,
the latter being a shock absorbing grip comprising a polyurethane
layer and a textile layer." The inventor asserted the importance
239. See, e.g., In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 994, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 5 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
240. See Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1025, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
881, 886 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that a suggestion may be implied from what the combined
teachings of references would have suggested).
241. See Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1573,37 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1626, 1630 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
242. See In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1054, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 143, 149 (C.C.PA. 1976)
(considering problem to be solved in determining obviousness).
243. See In reKemps, 97 F.3d 1427, 1429,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1309, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
("The ultimate determination of obviousness is a question of law that we review de novo .... ");
Jervis B. Webb Co. v. Southern Sys., Inc., 742 F.2d 1388, 1393, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 943, 946
(Fed. Cir. 1984) ("A determination of obviousness is a question of law that is subject to a full
and independent review by an appellate court.").
244. See Jenis B. Webb, 742 F.2d at 1393, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 946 (stating that a
determination of obviousness under § 103 must be based on a set of factual inquiries which may
not be overturned unless clearly erroneous).
245. See Pro-Mold & Tool Co., 75 F.3d at 1573, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629-30 (reasoning
that an inquiry into the existence of a suggestion by the prior art is needed when the invention
is different from what is described in one reference, but a combination with another reference
would lead to what is claimed).
246. 79 F.3d 1112, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1816 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
247. Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1127-28,37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1816,
1828 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
248. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1828.
249. 100 F.3d 135, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
250. See In reHuang, 100 F.3d 135, 138,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(noting that inventor argued he discovered the fact that the polyurethane layer may be used to
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of the rationale of the thickness of these layers as his contribution to
the art.2"' However, the Court stated that the mere assertion that
improvements over the prior art were important due to the reduced
thickness of the textile layer to improve shock absorption were
essentially irrelevant when the inventor's claims do not recite any
limitation with regard to a decrease in the textile layer.22  As a
result, the Court ruled that there existed a prima facie case of
obviousness because one of ordinary skill would have experimented
with various thicknesses to achieve an optimum range.258
The Federal Circuit also noted the differences between the prior art
and the claimed invention in its analysis in In re Brouwer, where an
inventor claimed a process for the preparation of a novel, nonobvious
compound.2' The examiner rejected the claims over Brouwer's
own prior patent directed to the novel, nonobvious compound, and
the Board of Patent Appeals and Inferences affirmed the rejec-
tion.25
The Federal Circuit reiterated the standard set forth in In re
Dillo 56-- that method claims should be examined in light of all the
relevant factors, "free from any presumed controlling effect of
Durden,"17-- and reversed the Board's finding.28 The court noted
that "[w]ithout first knowing Brouwer's claimed process steps or the
composition resulting from those steps, there is simply no suggestion
in the references cited by the examiner to practice the claimed
process."2 9 Accordingly, the rejection was reversed.
2. Requisite motivation
In B.E Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Systems Corp.,2 ° the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of invalidity under
§ 103.261 B.F. Goodrich ("BFG") owned a patent directed to a brake
assembly having alternating thick and thin disks. 62 The patented
absorb shock while the prior art only used the layer for tackiness).
251. See id. at 139, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
252. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
253. See id. at 139, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689.
254. See In re Brouwer, 77 F.3d 422, 424, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1663, 1665 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
255. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665.
256. 919 F.2d 688, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (in banc).
257. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 695, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897, 1903 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (in
banc).
258. See Brouwer, 77 F.d at 426, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1666.
259. Id at 425, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1666.
260. 72 F.3d 1577, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
261. SeeB.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Sys. Corp., 72 F.3d 1577, 1579, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1314, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
262. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315.
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brake assembly allowed only half of the disks to be replaced at each
maintenance. 2" Prior art brakes used disks of uniform thick-
ness.2" BFG sued Aircraft Braking Systems Corp. and Allied-Signal
("ABS") on the patent.2" ABS counterclaimed asserting that the
BFG patent was invalid under § 103 because the invention was obvious
over a paper published by Dunlop, which ABS asserted was material
to the patentability of the BFG patent.2" The district court held
that certain claims of BFG's patent were invalid over the reference as
being obvious under § 102(b).2"
On appeal, the Federal Circuit dismissed BFG's arguments that
there was no motivation or suggestion to modify the teachings of
Dunlop and that the district court failed to give sufficient weight to
the secondary considerations of commercial success, copying by
others, long-felt need, and significant, unexpected advantages. 21
The Federal Circuit, however, found the differences between the
disclosure in the Dunlop paper and BFG's claimed invention to be
minor, and that Dunlop provided the suggestion for an initial
thick/thin carbon brake assembly.269 Moreover, the district court's
review determined that the secondary considerations did not outweigh
the strong teachings of the prior art.27° Thus, the Federal Circuit
held that the district court did not err in its factual findings or in its
finding of obviousness, and affirmed the district court's decision
regarding obviousness.Y
The Federal Circuit further reviewed the issue of motivation to
combine references in Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd.272 In
Lamb-Weston, the Federal Circuit found that the extensive prior art
disclosing the desirability of the potato products resulting from the
patented product and the disclosure of these type of potato products
provided the requisite motivation to render the Lamb-Weston process
patent obvious and thus invalid.273
263. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315.
264. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315.
265. See id. at 1582, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317-18.
266. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317.
267. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317.
268. See id. at 1583, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318.
269. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1319.
270. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1319.
271. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1319.
272. 78 F.3d 540, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1856 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
273. See Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 78 F.3d 540, 545, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1856, 1860 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1704
1996 PATENT LAW DECISIONS
Lamb-Weston owned a patent directed to a frozen, parfried, waffle-
shaped potato product and sued McCain Foods, Ltd. on the pat-
ent.274 McCain counterclaimed for patent invalidity. During trial,
Lamb-Weston conceded that waffle-cut potato products have been in
the public market since the early 1900s.275 The district court also
examined a prior art patent directed to a parfry process comprising
parfrying and freezing potato slices similar to the Lamb-Weston
process. 627  The district court found motivation to combine the
references for parfiied frozen potato technology with the waffle fry
slicing devices that were disclosed earlier to Lamb-Weston for
licensing purposes.277
The Federal Circuit upheld the finding of obviousness, but did not
review the appropriateness of the district court's use of the confiden-
tial waffle fry slicing devices disclosed to Lamb-Weston .2  Rather,
the court held that the potato products resulting from these confiden-
tial products, which were not subject to the non-disclosure agree-
ments, provided the requisite motivation to cook potato products of
various shapes using a parfry process. 279 Because the district court
reached the correct conclusion of obviousness, its error in considering
the confidential devices was harmless.
280
Similarly, the Federal Circuit affirmed a finding of obviousness in
In re Kemps,211 wherein two references cited by the examiner taught
the aspects of the claimed invention of removing old asphalt concrete
containing a stone fraction using a two-step process. 2  The Federal
Circuit also found that the references themselves produced the
motivation to combine the references.21 The court also noted that
the motivation to combine the references does not have to be
identical to that of the applicant in order to establish obviousness.2s
In Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp.,2  the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court's finding of validity on a patent directed to a device
that provided advantages over the prior art, including easier manufac-
274. See id. at 542-43, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857-58.
275. See id. at 543, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858.
276. See id. at 544, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858.
277. See id. at 544-45, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858.
278. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858-59.
279. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859.
280. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859-60.
281. 97 F.3d 1427, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
282. See In re Kemps, 97 F.3d 1427, 1429-30, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1309, 1311-12 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
283. See id. at 1430, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
284. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
285. 81 F.3d 1566, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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ture, more accurate measurements, easier adjustments, and less
expense.8 6 Sensonics owned the patent and sued Aerosonic for
patent infringement.287
In its defense, Aerosonic asserted invalidity for obviousness over the
inventor's earlier patent, asserting that the mere design change of an
adjustable screw rendered the claimed invention obvious.2" The
Federal Circuit found, however, the claimed device provided
significant advantages and remedied deficiencies of prior devices,
which supported the district court's finding of non-obviousness.289
Moreover, the Court noted that "simplicity does not establish
obviousness; indeed, simplicity may represent a significant and
unobvious advance over the complexity of prior devices."" °
The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court's holding that
additional references cited by Aerosonic do not lead one of ordinary
skill in the art to the claimed invention.29' The court acknowledged
that "[t] he invention must be viewed not after the blueprint has been
drawn by the inventor, but as it would have been perceived in the
state of the art that existed at the time the invention was made."
292
Thus, the appellate court affirmed the district court's finding of non-
obviousness.
3. Unexpected results
The Federal Circuit has also reviewed cases in which the asserted
improvements "produce a new and unexpected result which is
different in kind and not merely in degree from the results of the
prior art," rendering an otherwise obvious invention patentable.
293
In In re Huang,21 the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's finding
that the use of a polyurethane layer and textile layer in a shock
absorbing grip was taught by the reference, rendering the claimed
286. See Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1569-70, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1551, 1553-54 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
287. See id. at 1568, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552-53.
288. See id. at 1569, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553.
289. See id. at 1569-70, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553-54.
290. Id. at 1570, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554.
291. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554.
292. I., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554 (citing Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d
1132, 1138, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 543, 547 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
293. See In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456, 105 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 233, 235 (C.C.PA 1955)
(afflirming decision of Board of Appeals rejecting patent for process for production of phenol,
finding merely a difference in degree and not in kind from the reference process).
294. 100 F.3d 135, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see supra notes 249-59 and
accompanying text; infra notes 341-46 and accompanying text.
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invention obvious.29 The inventor asserted, however, that the
specific thickness ratios claimed in the application were not
taught.296 In reviewing the obviousness rejection, the court acknowl-
edged that the prior art taught the shock absorbing nature of the
polyurethane.297 Based upon this teaching, the court held that one
of ordinary skill in the art would logically infer that increasing this
layer would increase the amount of shock absorption and would
experiment with various ranges of thickness to obtain the optimum
range. 98 It may still have been patentable if the ranges produced
a new and unexpected result which is different in kind and not
merely in degree. 299 The inventor did not contend that unexpected
results were achieved by increasing the thickness of the polyurethane
layer,3" however, and the prior art thus rendered the claimed
invention obvious.
4. Secondary considerations
Secondary considerations, including commercial success, long-felt
but unsolved need, and failure of others,3"' are based on factual
inquiries and must be considered in determining obviousness.
30 2
The Federal Circuit reviewed the importance of these considerations
in Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc.30 3  There, the
Federal Circuit vacated the district court's grant of sunmaryjudgment
holding a patent invalid under § 103 .31 Pro-Mold manufactured
and sold a patented card holder used for storing sports trading cards
and sued Great Lakes Plastic on the patent"0° The district court
granted Great Lakes' motion for summaryjudgment holding that the
patent was invalid in view of the Squeeze Tite card holder and the
Classic Line Thick and Thin card holders, while apparently discount-
295. See In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 138-39, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685, 1687-88 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
296. See id. at 138, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
297. See id. at 139, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
298. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688-89.
299. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688 (citing In re Aler, 220 F.2d 454, 456, 105
U.S.P.Q.2d 233, 235 (C.C.PA 1955)).
300. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689.
301. SeeUniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044,1050,5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1434,
1438 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
302. See id. at 1053, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438.
303. 75 F.3d 1568, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1626 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
304. See Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1574,37 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1626, 1627 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
305. See id. at 1571, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628.
1997] 1707
THE AMERICAN UNIvERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1675
ing Pro-Mold's evidence of secondary considerations without explana-
tion.3
06
In reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo, the Federal
Circuit was compelled to determine whether a "'reasonablejury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party."'30 7 The Federal Circuit
confirmed that the combination of prior art references contained all
the elements of the claimed invention as well as the requisite
motivation to combine."08 However, the district court's dismissal of
Pro-Mold's evidence of commercial success, which created a genuine
issue of material fact precluding a grant of summaryjudgment, was an
error as a matter of law."° There were genuine issues of material
fact as to whether there was a nexus between the commercial success
of the invention and its patented features.10
In reviewing the decision on summary judgment and drawing
inferences in favor of the non-movant, Pro-Mold, the Federal Circuit
reversed.31' The evidence of commercial success included card
holders' sales, the testimony of the inventor attesting to the requisite
nexus between the sales and the claimed invention, Pro-Mold's lack
of experience in the field (further suggesting a nexus), a lack of
market power, and affidavits from fourteen distributors attesting to
the popularity of the card holders l.3 " As a result, the district court
was to consider the secondary considerations, including Pro-Mold's
evidence of commercial success, on remand."'
306. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628-29 (holding the patent invalid under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious in light of the prior art and holding there was insufficient evidence of bad faith
by Pro-Mold and thus dismissing Pro-Mold's patent claim and Great Lakes' unfair competition
counterclaim).
307. See id. at 1572, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
308. See id. at 1572-73, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629-30 (stating that Squeeze Tite Card
Holder contained all elements of classic line thin except size and the motivation to combine
arose from the size of the card intended to be enclosed).
309. See id. at 1573, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630.
310. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630.
311. See id. at 1573-74, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630-31 (stating that Pro-Mold submitted
evidence of commercial success to prove nonobviousness).
312. See id, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630-31. Pro-Mold sold approximately 3.2 million
cardholders between June 1992 and issuance of patent in July 1993. Neugebauers, Sr.'s
deposition testimony asserted Pro-Mold's high sales of the cardholder combined with lack of
previous market experience suggests the patented cardholder lead to commercial success.
Furthermore, fourteen sports card distributors stated the patented cardholder was extremely
popular).
313. See id. at 1574, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1631 (stating it is the fact-finder's province to
resolve factual disputes regarding the nexus between commercial success and patented features
and to determine probative value of Pro-Mold's secondary evidence).
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In Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywel, Inc.,3 14 the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court's grant of a motion for judgment as a
matter of law, overturning the jury's verdict of infringement and
validity of a reissue patent. 15 In Litton, the patent related to a
method for using ion beams to coat a substrate with several layers of
material to form an optical component. 16 The result is an almost
perfectly reflective mirror, an essential part of sophisticated ring-laser
gyroscopes (RLGs) used in navigational control of aircrafL17
Louderback, a former employee of Litton, formed his own optical
coating company, Ojai Research Inc., in 1981 and entered an
exclusive consulting agreement with Litton."' This agreement
authorized Louderback to practice the patented method, but
prohibited Louderback from using the patented process to make RLG
mirrors for anyone other than Litton or disclosing the method.319
Litton also gained ownership of any inventions, developments, or
discoveries that Louderback made on the licensed technology.
3 °
While the consulting agreement was in force, Louderback improved
and modified the Litton process, without disclosing these improve-
ments to Litton.3 21 Louderback also provided Honeywell with RLG
mirrors made with the patented process.
3 22
In 1990, Litton sued Honeywell, Louderback, and Ojai for
infringement of its patent3 23 Ajury found that the asserted claims
were infringed and not invalid.324  However, the district court
granted Honeywell's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law
and held the claims obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103."
In reviewing the obviousness issue, the Federal Circuit emphasized
that "the obviousness inquiry is highly fact-specific and not susceptible
314. 87 F.3d 1559, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 1240
(1997).
315. See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 87 F.3d 1559, 1563,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,
1322 (Fed. Cir. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 1240 (1997).
316. See id. at 1563, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322.
317. See id. at 1563-64, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322 (stating that without nearly perfect
mirrors the RLG navigational device will not perform).
318. See id. at 1564, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322 (stating that Louderback and Wei were
designated as inventors of patented optical method with Litton as assignee and when
Louderback left, he preserved his relationship with Litton regarding patented optical process).
319. See id, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322-23 (stating that Louderback's exclusive consulting
contract lasted until Feb. 25, 1983).
320. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
321. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323 (stating that Louderback improved the Litton
process and under the terms of the consulting agreement Litton owned the improvements and
Louderback violated the agreement by withholding improvement from Litton).
322. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
323. See id. at 1565, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
324. See id. at 1565-66, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
325. See id. at 1566, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
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to per se rules."326 The court then considered the scope and
content of the prior art focusing on an article, the Molitor article,
which the Patent Office did not consider during examination,
3 1
7
and found substantial evidence that the Molitor article was not
analogous art relevant to the problems of RLG mirrors.3 28  More-
over, the court looked to differences between the patented claims and
the prior art and found that none of the references taught or
suggested the limitations in the claimed method, 29 or any evidence
for combining the references."s Finally, the Federal Circuit re-
viewed the objective indicia of nonobviousness and found evidence
that Honeywell copied the process disclosed in Litton's patent.
33 1
The patented method was highly praised by others skilled in the art
for its contribution to the pertinent technology,332 which was
confirmed by its highly lucrative commercial success.33 3  In fact,
numerous other companies tried to meet the high demand for stable
mirrors, but Litton was the only one to develop a successful meth-
od .3  The Federal Circuit found this evidence substantial enough
to support the jury's verdict that the claims were not invalid for
obviousness.3 5
The court also reviewed secondary considerations of
nonobviousness in Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor
Materials America, Inc.336 In this case, the Federal Circuit reiterated
that the obviousness analysis must consider all the evidence togeth-
er,337 including objective evidence of commercial success of the
radiant energy process compared with the radio frequency process,
the unexpected results including enhanced thermal stability and
uniform deposition layers, and the evidence of unsuccessful attempts
326. Id. at 1567, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325 (stating that court expressly recognized
obviousness inquiry as highly fact-specific in In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565, 1569, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1127, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
327. See id. at 1567-68, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325. The Molitor article is a paper
presented at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautic International Electric
Propulsion Conference in Nov. 1976, describing possible propulsion systems for space vehicles.
See id.
328. See id. at 1568, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
329. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
330. See id at 1569, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 (explaining that absence of suggestion to
combine is critical in an obviousness determination).
331. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
332. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
333. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
334. See id. at 1570, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
335. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
336. 98 F.3d 1563, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
337. SeeApplied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563,
1570, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1486 (Fed. Cir. 1996); supra notes 149-60 and infra notes 425-
34, 464-74 and accompanying text.
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of other companies to achieve enhanced temperature uniformity and
improved chemical deposition.3 18
In addition, the appellate court further considered the scope of the
claims as compared to the objective evidence holding that a patentee
need not show that all possible embodiments of the claimed invention
were successfully commercialized to rely on evidence of commercial
success. 39 Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court's finding that Applied Material's patent was not invalid for
obviousness.o
In In re Huang, the Federal Circuit reviewed an inventor's attempt
to overcome an obviousness rejection by providing a personal
affidavit." 1 The affidavit alleged that the claimed invention was
commercially successful because several hundred thousand units were
sold.' The court noted, however, that evidence based solely on
the number of units sold is a weak showing of commercial suc-
cess.A In addition, the court held that, the nexus between the
sales and the merits of the claimed invention had not been estab-
lished, even if commercial success were demonstrated.'  Indeed,
the Federal Circuit reiterated the rule of commercial success: "success
is relevant in the obviousness context only if there is proof that the
sales were a direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed
invention-as opposed to other economic and commercial factors
unrelated to the quality of the patented subject matter." ' Since
the nexus had not been proven, the Federal Circuit upheld the
Board's finding of obviousness of the claimed invention.'
D. Design Patents-35 U.S.C. § 171
Under 35 U.S.C. § 171, a patent is available for a "new, original and
ornamental design for an article." 7 Design patents are subject to
the same conditions of patentability as patents for inventions also
known as "utility patents.""
338. See id. at 1569-70, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
339. See id. at 1570, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
340. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
341. SeeInreHuang, 100 F.3d 135, 137,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685,1687-89 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
see also supra notes 249-59, 294-300 and accompanying text.
342. See id. at 137, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687.
343. See id. at 140,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689; see also Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark,
Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1026-27, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 881, 888 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
344. See Huang, 100 F.3d at 140, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689.
345. Id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689 (internal citations omitted).
346. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689.
347. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1994).
348. See LA. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 112425, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1913, 1917 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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1. Ornamental vs. utility designs
A design patent must claim a design that is ornamental or
aesthetically pleasing and that is not dictated by the function of the
article of manufacture alone.) 9 Alternative designs for the article
of manufacture imply that a design is not dictated solely by its func-
tion.
350
In Best Lock Corp. v. Ico Unican Corp.,"51 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding that Best Lock's design patent
was invalid." 2 Best Lock owned a design patent for a key blade
shape. 353  Ilco, a manufacturer of duplicate and replacement keys
for existing locks, copied Best Lock's patented key blade shape."s
Best Lock sued flco for infringement and Ilco counterclaimed,
seeking a declaratoryjudgment of invalidity and noninfringement. s"
The district court held that the design patent was invalid because the
key blades were not of ornamental concern to the buyer or the user
of the key and because the shape of the key blade was dictated solely
by its function. 56
On appeal, the Federal Circuit disagreed with Best Lock's assertions
that although a particular key and its corresponding lock must mate
to operate the lock, choice of any design is arbitrary, and therefore
not dictated solely by function.357 The court noted that it was
undisputed that the key blade must be designed as such to perform
its intended function.358  For example, creating a differently de-
signed key blade would fail to fit into the corresponding lock.35 9
In addition, the variety of possible shapes of keys and locks did not
alter the decision of the Federal Circuit."6  The design patent
claimed only the key and not the combination of the lock and key set;
because the design patent was limited only to the key blade, the blade
349. See In re Carletti, 328 F.2d 1020, 1022, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 653, 654 (C.CP.A. 1964).
350. See L.A. Gear, 988 F.2d at 1123, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917 (explaining that if there
are several ways to achieve the function of an article, a particular design is more likely to be seen
as ornamental rather than functional).
351. 94 F.3d 1563, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
352. SeeBest Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563,1564,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1048
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
353. See id at 1565,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1048. A key blade is the portion of a key which
is inserted into a lock and key blades are originally blank blades that fit into certain types of
locks which once cut to the combination of an individual lock will operate the lock. See id.
354. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049.
355. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049.
356. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049.
357. See id. at 1566, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1048.
358. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
359. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
360. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
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must be designed according to that described in the design patent in
order to perform its intended function. 6' The existence of a
separate patent on the keyway did not affect the Federal Circuit's
analysis since the validity of a patent must be evaluated based on what
is claimed, and not on the totality of claims of multiple patents. 362
Thus, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that
the claimed design was solely dictated by its function and therefore,
invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 171 for failing to satisfy the ornamentality
requirement.36
2. Obviousness of designs
For design patents, the central obviousness inquiry is whether the
design would have been obvious to a "'designer of ordinary capability
who designs articles of the type presented in the application. '
This inquiry focuses on the visual impression of the claimed design as
a whole and not on selected individual features. 3' A basic design
reference must describe basically the same design characteristics of
the claimed design and may be supplemented by secondary references
in determining obviousness." 6  Of course, there must be some
suggestion in the prior art to modify the basic design with features of
the secondary references. 67
In In re Borden," the Federal Circuit reviewed an ornamental
design for a twin neck dispensing container for obviousness.169 The
court affirmed the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences' finding
that the examiner's rejection of the claimed design was unpatentable
over a combination of references.370 The court noted the Board's
finding that the secondary references were so closely related to the
design in the primary reference to suggest modifying the primary
361. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
362. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
363. See id. at 1567,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050. Judge Newman's dissent, however, noted
that "the fact that the key blade is the mate of a keyway does not convert the arbitrary key
profile into a primarily functional design. It is not the design of the key profile that is
functional, but the key itself." Id. at 1569, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1052.
364. Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. LA. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1564, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1548,1554 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quotinglnreNalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214,1216,211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
782, 784 (C..PA-. 1981)).
365. See Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541, 1548-49, 222 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 562, 567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
366. See In re Rosen, 673 F.2d 388, 390, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 347, 349-50 (C.C.PA. 1982).
367. See id. at 391, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 350.
368. 90 F.3d 1570, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
369. See In reBorden, 90 F.3d 1570, 1574-76, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524, 1526-27 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
370. See id. at 1575, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
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design to make it identical to the Borden design. 7' Accordingly,
upon de novo review of the prior art's teachings, the Federal Circuit
saw no clear error in finding an implicit suggestion to combine
references in the prior art, rendering Borden's design unpatentable
for obviousness.
3 72
In Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 73 the Federal Circuit reversed
the district court's holding of invalidity for obviousness. 4  The
Federal Circuit reviewed whether the design for a sectional sofa group
was obvious over references not considered by the examiner during
prosecution.3 ' Durling obtained a patent for the sofa design and
sued Spectrum for infringement of the patent3 76 The district court
held that, because the differences between the prior art and Durling's
patent were insignificant, and Durling had not established commercial
success relating to the patented design, the patent was invalid as
obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
In reviewing the district court's decision, the Federal Circuit noted
that the initial step for obviousness is the search of a primary
reference, which (1) discerns the correct visual impression by the
claimed design, and (2) creates "basically the same" visual impres-
sion. 78 Moreover, the Federal Circuit stated that the "focus in a
design patent obviousness inquiry should be on visual appearances
rather than design concepts.3 79
Applying these rules to the obviousness question, the Federal
Circuit found that the district court erred in construing Durling's
claimed design too broadly,8 ' as it had considered only the general
concept of a sectional sofa with integrated end tables. A proper
construction of the claims, the Federal Circuit noted, would focus on
the visual impressions created by the design. 1 The Federal Circuit
then pointed out the distinctions between the design of the claimed
invention and the prior art, holding that significant differences
precluded a finding of obviousness.' 2 Based upon this analysis, the
371. See at. at 1575-76, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
372. See id. at 1576, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
373. 101 F.3d 100, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1788 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
374. See Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 101, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1788,
1789 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
375. See id. at 102, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789.
376. See id,., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789.
377. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789-90.
378. See id. at 103, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1790.
379. 1& at 104, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1791.
380. See id. at 103-04, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1791.
381. See id. at 104, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1791.
382. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1791, revg 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16848 (M.D.N.C. Oct.
25, 1995).
1714
1996 PATENT LAW DECISIONS
Federal Circuit held that no primary reference existed and therefore
reversed the district court's finding of invalidity
383
E. Disclosure-35 U.S.C. § 112
1. Written description under f 1
When drafting a patent application, the practitioner must adequate-
ly describe in the specification the claimed subject matter.384 The
specification need not utilize any particular form to describe the
claimed subject matter, but it must convey with reasonable clarity to
the skilled artisan that, as of the filing date, the inventor was in
possession of the invention.' The written description requirement
of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1, often is a concern when claims not presented
in the original application are later presented.8 6
The Federal Circuit considered the written description requirement
in In re Alton,387 holding that the Patent Office failed to show that
the claims were not adequately described in the specification and
therefore vacated and remanded the Board's rejection of claims
under paragraph one of 35 U.S.C. § 112.' The Board had re-
versed the examiner's rejection of the claims under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102
and 103, but rejected sua sponte the claims under the written
description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112.:s The applicant then
submitted a declaration providing evidence of what a person with
ordinary skill in the art would have understood the specification to
have disclosed. 9  The examiner maintained the rejection under
paragraph one of 35 U.S.C. § 112, stating that little weight was given
to an opinion declaration on the legal question at issue.39' The
Board upheld this rejection.392
383. See id. at 104-05, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1791.
384. The written description requirement is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 1: "The
specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process
of making and using it...." 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 1 (1994).
385. See Vas-Cath, Inc. v Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (reversing district court's decision that patents did not comply with requirements of
United States Code); In reWertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262, 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 90, 96 (C.C.P.A.
1976) (noting that function of written description requirement is to ensure that inventor had
possession as of date of application).
386. See In reWright, 866 F.2d 422, 424, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1649 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
387. 76 F.3d 1168, 1170, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1578, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
388. See In reAlton, 76 F.3d 1168, 1170, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1578, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
389. See id. at 1171, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580.
390. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580. The appellant may submit this declaration upon
rejection by the Board of PatentAppeals pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.196(b) (1994). See id. at 1171
n.4, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580 n.4.
391. See id. at 1171, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580.
392. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580.
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The Federal Circuit held that the Patent Office erred in viewing the
question of whether the specification adequately describes the claimed
subject matter as a question of law. 93 The court held that it is a
question of fact, not law." Moreover, the Federal Circuit found
the submitted declaration, even though it used the words "[i] t is my
opinion," was a factual declaration offering evidence to show the
claimed invention had support in the specification."95
The Federal Circuit also held that the Patent Office erred by
summarily dismissing the declaration without adequately explaining
why it failed to rebut the Board's rejection. 9 The declaration
addressed why the claimed subject matter, although not identical to
the description in the specification, was in the inventor's possession.
Therefore, to meet its burden of proof, the Patent Office had to
provide reasons why the skilled artisan would not consider the
description sufficient;39 conclusory statements by the Patent Office
explaining why the declaration did not show that the skilled artisan
would realize that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject
matter were insufficient 98
In Fujikawa v. Wattanasin,8" the Federal Circuit also relied on the
written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 to affirm the
Board's denial of Fujikawa's motion, which sought to add a sub-genus
count to an interference on the ground that Wattanasin's disclosure
did not sufficiently describe the proposed sub-genus count."10
The Federal Circuit rejected the argument that the proposed count
was disclosed ipsis verbis in Wattanasin's application. 40 1  Although
Wattanasin disclosed a specie within the scope of the proposed sub-
393. See id at 1174, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580.
394. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580. The court noted that the declaration offered
factual evidence in an attempt to explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would have
understood the specification. They also recognized that the phrase "it is my opinion" as a
preface to what the skilled artisan would have known, does not transform the factual statements
contained in the declaration into opinion testimony. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582.
395. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581-82.
396. See id at 1175, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583 (holding that examiner, or Board, has
burden of showing prima fade unpatentability).
397. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583 (noting that burden changes depending on what
appellant asserts); see also In reWertheim, 541 F.2d 257,264, 191 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 90,98 (C.C.PA.
1976) (acknowledging Patent Office has initial burden of proof and holding Patent Office met
this burden as pertains to one claim on appellant's application).
398. See Altn, 76 F.3d at 1176, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584.
399. 93 F.3d 1559, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1895 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see infra notes 546-69 and
accompanying text.
400. See Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1569-70, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1895, 1904
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (reviewing Board's decision under clear error standard and finding its decision
was not "clearly erroneous").
401. See id. at 1571, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905 (rejecting Wattanasin's argument because
his disclosure would not lead "those skilled in the art" to a particular species).
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genus, the court reasoned that disclosing a single specie did not
amount to ipsis verbis support for every specie within the scope of sub-
genus."' Under the circumstances, "such a disclosure would not
'reasonably lead' those skilled in the art to any particular species."4 °3
While agreeing that ipsis verbis disclosure was not necessary to satisfy
the written description requirement, the Federal Circuit still found
Wattanasin's disclosure insufficient.' The court ruled that unless
an application contained "blazemarks" to indicate what compounds
might be of special interest, "simply describing a large genus of
compounds" will not be sufficient "to satisfy the written description
requirement as to particular species or sub-genuses."' 5 Modifying
the "trailblazing" metaphor of In re Ruschig,"6 the Federal Circuit
concluded that Wattanasin's preferred embodiments blazed a trail
through the forest near Fujikawa's proposed tree, but did not direct
the skilled artisan to the proposed tree by teaching the point at which
the skilled artisan should deviate from the trail to find the proposed
tree. o7
2. Enablement under f11
For claims to be patentable, they must also pass muster under the
enablement requirement contained in paragraph one of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112." The enablement requirement assures that the inventor
discloses sufficient information about the claimed invention to allow
the skilled artisan, relying on the specification and the knowledge in
the art, to make and use the invention without undue experimenta-
tion. Some experimentation is acceptable; the issue is whether the
402. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905.
403. Id, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905.
404. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905.
405. I., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905.
406. 379 F.2d 990, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 118 (Fed. Cir. 1967). In discussing whether some
of the claimed compounds could be found using "guides" in the specification, the court said.
It is an old custom in the woods to mark trails by making blaze marks on the trees.
It is no help in finding a trail or in finding one's way through the woods where the
trails have disappeared-or have not been made, which is more like the case here-to
be confronted simply by a large number of unmarked trees.... We are looking for
blaze marks which single out particular trees. We see none.
In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 994-95, 154 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 118, 122 (1967).
407. See Fujikawa, 93 F.3d at 1571, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905 (affirming Board's denial
of Fujikawa's motion).
408. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 (1994) ("The specification shall contain a written description of
the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same .... ").
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amount of experimentation amounts to undue experimentation.4"
It is well-settled since In re Fisher41° that the scope of a patent claim
must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement
provided by the specification; otherwise, practicing the broad scope
of the claimed invention would require undue experimentation.
The question of enablement was considered in PPG Industries, Inc.
v. Guardian Industries Corp.,412 where the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court's finding that broad generic claims to a solar control
glass were not invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1, even though some
experimentation was necessary.
413
During development, PPG used flawed testing equipment software
that reported the transmittance of the claimed invention at thirty-one
percent, when the actual value was somewhat lower, specifically, at
twenty-eight percent. 414 At trial, Guardian asserted that PPG's
patent claims must be held invalid as non-enabled for those embodi-
ments with an actual transmittance of less than thirty-one percent, but
for which PPG's flawed software would have reported as having
transmittance of more than thirty-one percent.
415
The Federal Circuit was unpersuaded that the calculation error and
disclosure in the specification violated the enablement require-
ment 416 Based on the district court's finding that PPG's calculation
error was "harmless, inconsequential, and easily detectable by anyone
who was skilled in the art,"417 the Federal Circuit concluded that the
district court found that PPG's error would be discovered without
409. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(defining undue experimentation based on standard of reasonableness, "having due regard for
the nature of the invention and the state of the art").
410. 427 F.2d 833, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 18 (C.C.PA 1970).
411. See In reVaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding
that "limited disclosure" by applicants did not enable "one of ordinary skill to make and use the
invention... without undue experimentation").
412. 75 F.d 1558, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see infra notes 493-501, 998-
1002 and accompanying text.
413. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1564-65, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1618, 1623-24 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
414. See id. at 1561, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621.
415. See i. at 1562, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621. Guardian pointed to a disclosure in PPG's
specification suggesting that it would be necessary to employ a particularly low redox ratio (the
ratio of iron in the ferrous state to total iron) to manufacture a product meeting the
transmittance limitation without cerium present. See iU, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621. Based
on this disclosure, Guardian alleged that it would be necessary to use more iron and a lower
redox ratio to make the claimed invention with an actual transmittance of 31%-a practice that
Guardian argued was not enabled in the patent. See id. at 1564, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622-
23.
416. See i. at 1564, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623 (noting that "careful reader of the
specification" might notice the calculation).
417. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623.
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undue experimentation and the enablement requirement was
satisfied.18
In reviewing the district court's decision, the Federal Circuit held
that "'where the specification provide[d] guidance in selecting the
operating parameters that would yield the claimed result,'" the
experimentation required to make a particular embodiment was not
"undue."419  Even with the software error in the specification, the
court observed that it was clear that the claimed composition could
be made and the specification indicated to the skilled artisan how to
maintain low transmittance while minimizing cerium content.40
Thus, considerable direction and guidance on how to practice the
invention existed and the claims were enabled." 1
The Federal Circuit distinguished its decision from those in which
it had refused to find broad generic claims enabled by specifications
disclosing only one or a few embodiments.' The court held such
broad generic claims were invalid because they did not "demonstrate
with reasonable specificity how to make and use other potential
embodiments across the full scope of the claim.""8
Enablement was also addressed in Aplied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced
Semiconductor Materials America, Inc.,42 4 where a divided panel of the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion of patent
invalidity42
The claimed invention was directed to a method for heating single
crystal with "substantially no crystallographic slip." 6  The '313
patent, a continuation-in-part (CIP) application of the '712 patent,
added new disclosure about how to avoid crystallographic slip.
4 7
418. See id, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623.
419. Id. at 1565,37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1624 (quoting In reColianni, 561 F.2d 220,224, 195
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 150, 153 (C.C.PA 1977) (MillerJ, concurring)).
420. See id. at 1564-65, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623-24.
421. See id. at 1565, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1624 (affirming district court's decision that
patent could be considered validly enabled).
422. See id. at 1564, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623-24 (finding that specifications at issue
disclosed embodiments and that undue experimentation "is a matter of degree").
423. See id, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623; see also In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1050-52,29
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2010, 2013-15 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that patent was not enabled where
specification listed only one example of production); In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that patent applications must provide
"sufficient disclosure, either through illustrative examples or terminology"); Amgen, Inc. v.
Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200,1212-14,18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1016,1026-28 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(holding disclosure inadequate for enablement).
424. 98 F.3d 1563, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
425. SeeApplied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563,
1566, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also supra notes 149-60, 337-40 and
infra notes 464-74 and accompanying text.
426. I& at 1576, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491 (Archer, C.J., concurring in part).
427. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491 (Archer, C.J., concurring in part).
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The district court held that the '313 patent was enabled by the
disclosure of the '712 patent2 8
Chief Judge Archer concluded that the '313 patent claims were not
entitled to priority under 35 U.S.C. § 120 of the filing date of the '712
patent because its disclosure did not enable the '313 patent
claims.' He reasoned that the district court erred in holding that
the '712 patent inherently enabled the '313 patent-there was no
evidence in the '712 patent that reducing crystallographic slip would
"inevitably" result from "same side" lamp heating.' s He also found
that the '712 patent failed to show expressly how to produce the
claimed material with "substantially no crystallographic slip."
431
Judge Newman dissented, reasoning that so long as the new matter
in the CIP application was not added to enable the claims, the '313
patent was fully entitled to the benefits of 35 U.S.C. § 120 priori-
ty.12 She noted that the general explanatory text added in the CIP
application broadened neither the subject matter nor the claims.433
3. Best mode under f1
A further requirement for patentability is that a patent must
disclose the best mode of practicing the invention.M3 Whether a
patent complies with this best mode requirement involves two
underlying factual inquiries. First, a subjective inquiry: when the
patent application was filed, did the inventor contemplate a best
mode of practicing the claimed invention? This question comple-
ments an objective inquiry: if the inventor contemplated a best
mode, did the specification adequately disclose this best mode so that
the skilled artisan could practice it?'
The Federal Circuit focused on the first part of this two-part inquiry
in Great Northern Corp. v. Henry Molded Products, Inc." The court
428. See id. at 1575, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490 (Archer, CJ., concurring in part)
(critiquing district court opinion).
429. See id, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490 (Archer, CJ., concurring in part).
430. See id. at 1575-76, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490-91 (Archer, C.J., concurring in part).
431. See i&, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490-91 (Archer, GJ., concurring in part).
432. See id. at 1581-82, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496 (Newman,J., dissenting).
433. See id. at 1583, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1497 (NewmanJ., dissenting).
434. "The specification shall... set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of
carrying out his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 1 (1994).
435. See Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923,930,16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033,
1039 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding patent application invalid because applicant did not disclose the
best mode for carrying out invention).
436. 94 F.d 1569, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1997 (Sed. Cir. 1996).
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affirmed the district court's holding that the patent did not disclose
the best mode of the invention. 7
The Federal Circuit further divided the first subjective inquiry into
two separate sub-parts: whether there was a best mode for practicing
the invention, and if so, whether the inventors contemplated this best
mode when they filed their patent application.
438
As to the first sub-part, the court recognized the distinction between
production details and the best mode, 9 and focused on whether
the feature at issue related to the claimed invention or to commercial
considerations. °  Because the claimed invention could not be
produced without this particular feature, the court concluded that the
feature was critical to practicing the claimed invention, and therefore
was the best mode of practicing the invention."
As to the second sub-part, the Federal Circuit found substantial
evidence supporting the conclusion that the inventors had contem-
plated this best mode when they filed their application."' Consider-
ing the second objective inquiry of the two-part inquiry, the court
held that the specification did not disclose the best mode.' Both
patentee and the alleged infringer conceded that the specification did
not disclose the best mode, and the Federal Circuit refused to
consider patentee's arguments to the contrary on appeal when they
had not been presented to the district court."'
The Federal Circuit focused on the second part of this two-part
inquiry in United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co.,' when
it affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment that the
patent did not disclose the best mode of practicing the invention,
even though the patentee later sold a commercial product embodying
437. See Great Northern Corp. v. Henry Molded Prods., Inc., 94 F.3d 1569, 1571, 39
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1997,1998 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (invalidating patent for not disclosing best mode
of invention).
438. See id. at 1571-72, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999-2000.
439. See id. at 1572, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999. The court noted that a "production
detail" is a commercial consideration, "such as the equipment on hand, or prior relationships
with suppliers that were satisfactory." Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999; see Wahl Instruments,
Inc. v. Acvious, Inc., 950 F.2d 1575, 1581, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(differentiating between best mode and production detail). In Great Northern, the court
distinguished production detail from best mode because production detail does not relate to
the quality or nature of the invention. "Production details" also encompass details relating to
the quality or nature of the invention, butwhich need not be disclosed because they are routine.
See Great Northen, 94 F.3d at 1572, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999.
440. See Great Northern. 94 F.3d at 1572, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999.
441. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999.
442. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000 (finding that inventors contemplated best mode
before filing of application based on production drawings and parties' testimony).
443. See id. at 1572-73, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999-2000.
444. See id. at 1573, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000.
445. 74 F.3d 1209, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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the invention."6 The district court ruled, and the Federal Circuit
agreed, that the alleged infringer had brought forward clear and
convincing evidence that the inventor believed that there was a best
material for use in the invention." 7 The material, made by a third
party, was not identified by chemical description, method of manufac-
ture, supplier, or tradename."8 As a result, the Federal Circuit held
that the specification did not provide an adequate description of this
material." 9
The Federal Circuit rejected an argument that the material could
be determined from a commercial product embodying the invention
because compliance with paragraph one of 35 U.S.C. § 112 cannot
depend on whether a patentee later commercializes the inven-
tion." ° The court further maintained that, even though the inven-
tor had no intent to conceal the best mode, failure to find intentional
concealment does not preclude a finding that the best mode
requirement had been violated." 1
In Zygo Cop. v. Wyko Corp.," 2 however, the Federal Circuit af-
firmed the district court's holding that the patent at issue was not
invalid for failure to disclose the best mode and focused on whether
the best mode requirement required disclosure of commercialized fea-
tures.45
3
446. See United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209, 1210-14, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1388, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (rejecting validity of patent where application
failed to disclose chemical descriptions and method of manufacture).
447. See id at 1212,37 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1391. Citing WahlInstruments, Inc. v. Acuous, Inc.,
950 F.2d 1575, 1581, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1991), the patentee argued that
this material was not part of the best mode, but merely preferred for purposes of developing
a commercial product. The court disagreed, reasoning that the selection of the material was
not a routine manufacturing choice due to the expected volume of production or cost consider-
ations. See Gypsum, 74 F.3d at 1213, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391.
448. See id. at 1212-13, 37 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1391.
449. See i&t at 1213-14, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391-92. The court noted that even though
the make-up and method of manufacture of the best mode material were trade secrets, and
unknown to the inventor, this did not excuse compliance with the best mode requirement The
court noted that the specification should have identified the best mode material by supplier or
trade name. See id. at 1214,37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391; see also Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus.
Corp., 913 F.2d 923,929, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1032, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (invalidating patent
applicant for failure to disclose best mode).
450. See Gypsum, 74 F.3d at 1215, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393.
451. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393.' The court reasoned that violation of the best
mode requirement can occur if the disclosure of the best mode is "so objectively inadequate as
to effectively conceal the best mode from the public." I, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393.
Moreover, the second inquiry concerning best mode compliance is objective, and an intent to
conceal, being a subjective inquiry, is inconsistent with this objective nature. See id. at 1215-16,
37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393.
452. 79 F.3d 1563, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see infra notes 805-15.
453. See Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1568, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, 1284
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
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The invention as set forth in the claims was an interferometer.4
One embodiment of the claimed invention, a commercial embodi-
ment, was encased in a box. 5 The court rejected the infringer's
argument that the failure to disclose a box in the specification
violated the best mode requirement 45 6 The parameters of the best
mode inquiry are set by the claims, however, not a commercial
embodiment.17 Here, the claims did not require a box, and the
parties agreed that the disclosure was sufficient to practice the
invention as set forth in the claims.5
s
The Federal Circuit decision in Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Engineering,
Inc.,59 also illustrates the difference between the best mode of
practicing the invention and production details. There the Federal
Circuit found no violation of the best mode requirement and
affirmed the district court's finding of validity and infringement 46°
In Minco, the inventors disclosed and claimed a two-crane support
furnace system in their patent for a rotary furnace. Prior to filing the
patent application, however, Minco, the inventors' company, operated
a furnace based on the claimed invention using a superior three-crane
support system.461
At trial, the record showed that the change in configuration
between the two-crane and three-crane systems was merely a modifica-
tion to impart stability and therefore a production detail.462 Accord-
ingly, the Federal Circuit found no evidence that the inventors
appreciated the superiority of the three-crane support system, and
therefore could not have concealed the best mode.
41
In Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials America,
Inc., the best mode requirement was one reason that the divided
panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of
invalidity.4" The claimed invention was a method for heating single
454. See id. at 1565-66, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1283 (describing invention).
455. See id. at 1567, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283.
456. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283.
457. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283.
458. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283.
459. 95 F.3d 1109, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see infra notes 1042-53 and
accompanying text.
460. See Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 1112, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
461. See id. at 1113-14, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003-04.
462. See id. at 1116, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
463. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
464. 98 F.3d 1563, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (plurality opinion), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1822 (1997); see supra notes 149-61, 337-40, 425-34 and accompanying text.
465. SeeApplied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563,
1566, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 1822 (1997).
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crystal with "substantially no crystallographic slip."46 The '313
patent, a continuation-in-part (CIP) application of the '712 patent,
added new disclosure about crystallographic slip and how to avoid
it.467 The district court held that the '313 patent was invalid for
adding substantial new matter to the application without updating the
best mode for practicing the newly claimed invention.4"
In the plurality opinion, Judge Mayer concluded that the '313
patent failed the best mode requirement because the inventors did
not update their best mode disclosure when filing the CIP application
containing new matter pertinent to the best mode of practicing the
claimed invention.69 Judge Mayer reasoned that the duty to update
the best mode was not absolved even though the earlier '712 patent
enabled the invention claimed in the '313 patent,4 7 and ruled that
the language in Transco71 regarding continuing applications could
not abrogate the statutory requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112.472
To hold otherwise would encourage inventors to disclose only
minimal parts of their inventions, and file continuations-in-part to
claim the rest, thereby hiding the commercial value while also
residing in the best mode and gaining the benefit of both the
exclusionary right of the patent and the "quasi trade secret" of the
best mode.4 73
Judge Newman dissented, considering the district court's best mode
requirement that all features of the commercial reactor must be
disclosed in the CIP application, regardless of whether they contribut-
ed to the claimed slip-free performance, to be unwarranted as
entrapping the inventor.474
4. Definiteness under If 2
The attorney must ensure that patent claims also satisfy 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, 2, which requires that the claims particularly point out and
distinctly assert the subject matter which applicant regards as the
466. Id. at 1576, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491 (plurality opinion).
467. See id. 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1491 (plurality opinion).
468. See id. at 1580, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1494-95 (plurality opinion).
469. See id. at 1579, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493 (plurality opinion).
470. See id. at 1580-81, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495 (plurality opinion).
471. Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551,32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1077 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied; 513 U.S. 1151 (1995).
472. See Applied Materials, 98 F.3d at 1579-80, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1494, (plurality
opinion).
473. See id. at 1581, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495 (plurality opinion).
474. See id. at 1583, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1497 (plurality opinion).
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invention.475 Whether a claim satisfies this requirement or is
definite, depends on whether the skilled artisan would understand the
scope of the claim when read in light of the specification.476 If the
claim language reasonably apprises the skilled artisan of the scope of
the invention, and the language is as precise as the subject matter
permits, nothing more is required. 7  When interpreting the claims,
the skilled artisan should look to all relevant sources of meaning
within the patent, including the claim language, the specification, the
prosecution history, and the doctrine of claim differentiation.
In Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Manufacturing, Inc.,478 the
Federal Circuit, after looking to all these sources and finding two
plausible interpretations for the claim meaning, adopted the narrower
interpretation, and therefore affirmed the district court's decision
granting summary judgment of noninfringement against the paten-
tee.
479
The Federal Circuit found that the claim language, specification,
prosecution history, and the doctrine of claim differentiation did not
shed any light as to which interpretation of claim 1 must be adopt-
ed.4" Reaching this impasse, the court reasoned that allowing the
patentee to assert the broader of the two interpretations would
undermine the fair notice function of the statute.41  Accordingly,
the court held that if there is an equal choice between a broad and
narrow reading of a claim, the notice function of the claim is best
served by adopting the narrower meaning.
482
Although concurring in the decision of noninfringement, Judge
Nies disagreed that a new basis for construing a claim was neces-
sary." She argued that adopting the narrower of two equally
475. "The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 1 2 (1994).
476. See Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1081 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
477. See Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 225 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 634, 641 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
478. 73 F.3d 1573, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
479. SeeAthletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1574, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1365, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
480. See id. at 1581, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372.
481. A policy underlying 35 U.S.C. § 112,1 2, was "to guard against unreasonable advantages
to the patentee and disadvantages to others arising from uncertainty as to their respective
rights." Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372.
482. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372.
483. See id. at 1583, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374.
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plausible interpretations does not flow from 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2,
because narrowness can not be equated with definiteness.
4s4
Shortly after Athletic Alternatives, the Federal Circuit once again
chose between alternative claim interpretations in Modine Manufactur-
ing Co. v. United States International Trade Commission.4" The Federal
Circuit affirmed a final determination by the International Trade
Commission ("ITC") that certain claims of patent had not been
proven invalid for indefiniteness. 86
In Modine, the patent claims recited a limitation for "flow paths
being of relatively small hydraulic diameter which is defined as the
cross-sectional area of the corresponding flow path multiplied by four
(4) and divided by the wetted perimeter of the corresponding flow
path." 7 The administrative law judge interpreted this limitation to
require hydraulic diameters no larger than exactly 0.040 inch, and
concluded that the claims were invalid for indefiniteness because
other limitations reciting "about" and "relatively small" in the claims
could read on flow paths having hydraulic diameters larger than
exactly 0.040 inches.41 Upon review of the judge's initial determi-
nation, the Commission rejected this interpretation and held that the
claims had not been proven to be invalid.489
The Federal Circuit, upholding the Commission's final determina-
tion on validity, ruled that technical terms are not per se indefinite




Because nothing in the prosecution history suggested that the
patentability of the claims required an exact numerical limit, the
court reasoned that mathematical precision should not be imposed.
To the contrary, the court ruled that a patentee has the right to claim
the invention in terms that would be understood by the skilled
artisan.49 ' The court further held that when claims are amenable
to more than one construction, they should be interpreted to preserve
their validity.492 Interestingly, the court did not discuss the earlier
decision in Athletic Alternatives with respect to 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2.
484. Judge Nies relied on In re Robins, 429 F.2d 452, 458, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 552, 556
(C.C.P.A. 1970), and In re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786, 788, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 138, 140 (C.C.P.A.
1970), for this position. See Athletic Alternatives, 73 F.3d at 1583, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374.
485. 75 F.3d 1545, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
486. See Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Conm'n, 75 F.3d 1515, 1549, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1617 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
487. Id. at 1549, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
488. See id. at 1550, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612, 1613.
489. See id. at 1550-51, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
490. See id. at 1551, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
491. See id. at 1557, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
492. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
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Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2, the Federal Circuit has focused on the
practical requirement that the skilled artisan need only understand
the claims only when they are read in light of the specification. For
example, in PPG Industries, Inc. v. Guardian Industries Corp.,493 the
Federal Circuit affirmed the grant of a preliminary injunction over
Guardian's validity challenge under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2. Guard-
ian argued that the patent claims failed to meet the requirements of
particularity and definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2. Alterna-
tively, Guardian argued that the claims were invalid because they did
not state the method used to measure the transmittance of the
invention.4 96  The district court and the Federal Circuit both
disagreed.497
Responding to the first argument, the Federal Circuit held that the
claims precisely quantified the essential ingredients and transmittance,
and that such precision reasonably apprised the skilled artisan of both
the utilization and scope of the invention.49 The court ruled that
an issue of indefiniteness is not raised where the claim language is as
precise as the subject matter permits.
As to Guardian's alternative argument, the Federal Circuit observed
that the record demonstrated that conventional methods of testing
transmittance produce essentially identical results.5" Accordingly,
the court held that the transmittance claim limitation, in conjunction
with the other claim limitations, sufficiently put the public on fair
notice of the scope of the claims and, therefore, satisfied 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, 2.501
5. Means-plusfunction under [ 6
Paragraph six of § 112 permits an element of a claim for a
combination to be expressed as a "means for performing a specified
function," without reciting structure in support thereof, thereby not
limiting the claim to a single structure. °2 A claim limitation written
493. 75 F.3d 1558, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see supra notes 412-23 and
infra notes 998-1002 and accompanying text.
494. SeePPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558,1560,37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1618, 1620 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
495. See id. at 1562, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621.
496. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621.
497. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620.
498. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622.
499. See id at 1562-63, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622 (citing Shatterproof Glass Corp. v.
Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 624, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 634, 641 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
500. See id. at 1563, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622.
501. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622.
502. See 35 U.S.C. 112, 1 6 (1994).
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in "means-plus-function" language is interpreted to cover correspond-
ing structures disclosed in the specification and equivalents there-
of.5
0
In York Products, Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Center,504 the
Federal Circuit held that a claim did not contain a "means plus
function" limitation and therefore could invoke the benefits of U.S.C.
§ 112, 6.5 Claim 1 of the litigated patent recited that a truck
bed's vertically extending ridge members must protrude from the
linear sidewall portions "for at least a substantial part of the entire
height thereof."" 6 Claim 32 did not include this limitation, but
instead recited a "means formed on the ... sidewall portions
including ... ridge members ... forming load locks ... having a
depth sufficient to anchor a structure... in the cargo bed."5" The
district court interpreted both claims 1 and 32 to require that the
ridge member should "extend from near the bottom of the sidewall
to near the top of the sidewall. 5 °3
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's construction of the
claim 1 limitation as requiring that the ridges must cover nearly the
entire height of the sidewall portion."°  The Federal Circuit,
however, reversed the district court's construction of claim 32.510
Determining whether the "means" language in this claim fell within
the scope of the means-plus-function clauses of 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6,nn the court concluded that because claim 32 did not sufficient-
ly link the term "means" to a function and instead recited detailed
structure, it did not fall within the ambit of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6.12
Thus, the Federal Circuit construed claim 32 without reference to
§ 112, 6, and remanded for revised findings on infringement in
light of the proper claim construction.513
503. SeeValrnont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039,25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1451
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
504. 99 F.3d 1568, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
505. See York Prods., Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1574, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619, 1624 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
506. Id. at 1572, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622.
507. Id at 1573-74, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623.
508. Id at 1572-74, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622, 1624.
509. See id. at 1573, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622, 1624.
510. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623.
511. See id. at 1574, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1624.
512. See id. at 1575, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1624.
513. See id. at 1576, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1624.
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F Other Patentability Proceedings
1. Reissue
Section 251 permits an applicant who have mistakenly claimed
more or less than to which they are entitled to reenter prosecution of
the patent application and, where possible, obtain claims of a broader
scope in a reissue patent."4 The claims in the reissue patent have
the same rights and privileges5 15 as the claims in the original
patent
516
In Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp.,517 the
Federal Circuit reviewed the district court's ruling that a competitor's
product did not infringe the claims in a patent.'18 Construing a
claim of the reissue patent, the district court found it ambiguous, and
adopted the competitor's narrower claim interpretation, precluding
infringement.1 9 The district court reasoned that since the patentee
sought reissue to encompass the competitor's product, an unambigu-
ous indication of that coverage should be found in the reissue
claim.
520
The Federal Circuit reviewed the district court's claim construction
and rejected the district court's reasoning. The Federal Circuit
interpreted the claims, but found no literal infringement by U.S.
Surgical.
5 21
514. Whenever any patent is, through error without any deceptive intention, deemed
wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective specification or drawing,
or by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right to claim in the
patent, the Commissioner shall, on the surrender of such patent and the payment of
the fee required by law, reissue the patent for the invention disclosed in the original
patent, and in accordance with a new and amended application, for the unexpired part
of the term of the original patent.
35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994).
515. The rights and privileges of claims in a reissue patent will be limited by the "intervening
rights" of an alleged infringer set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 251. See id.
516. Section 252 provides that "every reissued patent shall have the same effect and
operation in law, on the trial of actions for causes thereafter arising, as if the same had been
originally granted in such amended form." Id. § 252.
517. 93 F.3d 1572, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see infra notes 659-69 and
accompanying text.
518. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 93 F.d 1572, 1578-79,
40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1019, 1023-24 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
519. See id. at 1579, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1024.
520. See id, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1024.
521. See id. at 1581-83, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1024.
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2. Reexamination
A patentee pursuing an infringement action may confront a
counterclaim of invalidity on the grounds of lack of novelty or
obviousness. To eliminate the proffered evidence from presenting an
invalidity challenge, the patentee may request reexamination of the
application under 35 U.S.C. § 302 based on this evidence. 22 The
Patent Office may order reexamination of the patent if it determines
that this evidence raises a "substantial new question of patentability"
under 35 U.S.C. § 303(a).5"
An apparent inconsistency was resolved in In re Recreative Technologies
Corp.,524 between the statute and the Manual of Patent Examing
Procedures (MPEP). In Recreative, the potential infringer requested
reexamination based on eight references not considered during the
original examination. Because these eight references raised a
substantial new question of patentability, the Patent Office granted
reexamination." The examiner then rejected the claims over the
same reference using the same basis, obviousness, as in the original
examination. In the original examination, however, the claims had
been held patentable over this reference. 26 On appeal, the Board
reversed the examiner as to the lack of obviousness, but sua sponte
rejected the claims over the same reference as lacking novelty.
27
On appeal, the Commissioner cited to the MPEP that once the
reexamination has been ordered, the Patent Office could consider
any pertinent patents, printed publications, or issues previously
addressed by the Patent Office. 28 The Federal Circuit reversed,
holding that it was improper to conduct reexamination on an issue
that had been finally resolved during the original examination. 29
522. "Any person at any time may file a request for reexamination by the Office of any claim
of a patent on the basis of any prior art cited under the provisions of section 301 of this title.
... The request must set forth the pertinency and manner of applying cited prior art to every
claim for which reexamination is requested." 35 U.S.C. § 302 (1994).
523. Section 303(a) requires that "the Commissioner will determine whether a substantial
new question of patentability affecting any claim of the patent concerned is raised by the
request, with or without consideration of other patents or printed publications." Id. § 303(a).
524. 83 F.3d 1394, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1776 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
525. See In reRecreative Techs. Corp., 83 F.3d 1394, 1395, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1776, 1777
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
526. See ia, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777.
527. See id. at 1396, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777.
528. See M.P.E.P. § 2258, before revision of July 1996. The MPEP has been amended to
reflect the decision in In re Recreative Technologies.
529. The Patent Office argued that proposed legislative changes would broaden the Patent
Office's reexamination authority to encompass such an action. The Federal Circuit dismissed
this argument, reasoning that until changed by Congress, the Patent Office and the courts are
bound by the statute as it exists. See hi, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777.
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The court found that the legislative history of 35 U.S.C. § 303(a),5"
as well as policies underlying the reexamination statute,53 1 supported
this holding.532
The Federal Circuit held that M.P.E.P. § 2258 was void to the
extent it conflicted with 35 U.S.C. § 303."' The Federal Circuit did
not consider whether the Board's rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 was
a "substantial new question of patentability" because allowing the
Board to cure an otherwise improper reexamination with the creation
of a new issue at the appellate stage would undermine statutory
safeguards.
534
Often an alleged infringer will request the reexamination to
invalidate the patent under 35 U.S.C. § 302. But may the alleged
infringer be compelled to request reexamination? The Federal
Circuit answered this question in the negative in In re Continental
General Tire, Inc.
535
At trial, the patentee moved to compel the alleged infringer to file
a request for reexamination of patentee's claims. 36  Granting
patentee's motion, the district court reasoned that a request for
reexamination would expedite disposition of the infringement action
and conserve the limited resources of the court. 7 The Federal
Circuit held that the plain language of 35 U.S.C. § 302 permitted, but
did not require, any party to file a request for reexamination."
530. The legislative record reflected the serious concern that reexamination not create new
opportunities for abusive tactics and burdensome procedures. Thus, reexamination, as enacted,
was carefully limited to new prior art, that is, "'new information about pre-existing technology
which may have escaped review at the time of the initial examination of the patent application.'"
See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, at 3 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.CAN. 6460, 6462). The matters to be decided in the original examination were
barred from reexamination. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777 (citing H.R. REP. No. 96-1307,
at 7).
531. Reexamination procedures may yield three principal benefits. First, reexamination
based on references not previously considered in the original examination can resolve validity
disputes with greater speed and less expense than litigation. Second, courts benefit from the
technical expertise of the Patent Office for references not previously of record. Third,
reexamination strengthens "confidence in patents whose validity was clouded because pertinent
prior art had not previously been considered by the Patent Office." See id. at 1396, 38
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778.
532. See id. at 1396-97, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777-78.
533. See id. at 1397-98, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778-79.
534. See id. at 1398, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779.
535. 81 F.3d 1089, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
536. See In reContinental Gen. Tire, Inc., 81 F.3d 1089, 1089-90, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365,
1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
537. See id. at 1090, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366-67.
538. "Any person at any time may file a request for reexamination by the Office of any claim
of a patent on the basis of any prior art cited under the provisions of section 301 of this title."
Id at 1091, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 302 (1994)) (emphasis added).
While not extensively discussed, the Federal Circuit was probably influenced by one critical
equitable consideration: A patentee has the right to seek reexamination if it considers such an
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Similar reasoning produced the result in Emerson Electric Co. v.
Davoil, Inc.,"3 9 where the Federal Circuit held that the district court
may not order the patentee to file the alleged infringer's papers in a
reexamination requested by a third party."4
In Emerson Electric, the patentee moved for a stay after the Patent
Office granted a third party's request for reexamination."' Grant-
ing the stay, the district court ordered that in the reexamination, the
patentee must provide the Patent Office with documents prepared by
the alleged infringer along with documents filed by the patentee. 42
The Federal Circuit relied on In re Continental General Tire, Inc.,
543
to rule that determining "what documents to file in a reexamination
proceeding is no less committed to the discretion of the patentee
than the decision by the alleged infringer" of "whether to file a
reexamination request."' 44
3. Inteferences
Under the confidential procedures of the Patent Office, a patent
applicant may not be aware that another has filed an application for
the same invention. When there are two parties with the same
invention, both parties are not entitled to a patent for the same
invention. Rather, an interference proceeding must be entered
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) to determine which party is the first
inventor and will be awarded the patent-5
option to be a desirable expedient, see id. at 1093, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1369, but the
patentee maintains no right to force its opponent to take an action which it has declined to
pursue. See it. at 1093, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1369.
539. 88 F.3d 1051, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1474 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see supra notes 128-34 and
accompanying text.
540. See Emerson Elec. Co. v. Davoil, Inc., 88 F.3d 1051, 1051, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1474,
1474 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
541. See id. at 1052, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475.
542. The district court relied on two published decisions of the Patent Office, namely In re
Blaee, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1232 (Comm'r Pat. 1991) (treating alleged infringer's papers
submitted by the patentee in reissue proceeding, pursuant to an order of the district court, as
having been submitted by the patentee); and In re Chambers 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470
(Comm'r Pat. 1991) (court should "treat papers of the non-applicant filed pursuant to an order
of the bankruptcy court, as filed by the applicant for reexamination"). See Emerson Elec. Co., 88
F.3d at 1052, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475.
543. Continental Gen. Tir 81 F.3d at 1093, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1369.
544. See Emerson Elec. Co., 88 F.3d at 1054, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476.
545. "Whenever an application is made for a patent which, in the opinion of the
Commissioner, would interfere with any pending application, or with any unexpired patent, an
interference may be declared .... The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences shall
determine questions of priority of the inventions and may determine questions of patentability."
35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (1994).
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In Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 6 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
Patent Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences' ("the
Board") determination that Wattanasin was the first inventor of a
pharmaceutical compound and its method of manufacture.
547
Wattanasin began his research in 1979, and in 1984-1985 synthe-
sized three compounds within the scope of the compound count 4s
and performed in vitr 49 testing of those compounds. Then from
January 1987 through December 1987, more compounds within the
scope of the compound count were synthesized and tested both in
vitro and in vivo. The decision to file a patent application was made
in January 1988, but a completed application was not filed until
March of 1989.550
Fujikawa's inventive activity occurred overseas. Therefore the
earliest date on which he could rely to show priority of invention
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)55 was his effective filing date of August
20, 1987.552
Fujikawa did not challenge the Board's holdings as to Wattanasin's
conception or diligence and, therefore, the Federal Circuit focused
on Wattanasin's actual reduction to practice.55 To establish an
actual reduction to practice, the Federal Circuit confirmed that
practical utility for the compound must be shown.5' The court also
acknowledged that, in the pharmaceutical arts, practical utility may be
shown by adequate evidence of pharmacological activity.5 5 Combin-
ing these concepts, the court ruled that testing that is "reasonably
indicative of the desired [pharmacological] response may establish
practical utility and hence, actual reduction to practice. "556
546. 93 F.3d 1559, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1895 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see supra notes 399-407 and
accompanying text.
547. See Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1561, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1895, 1896 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
548. In an interference, an applicant must copy the overlapping subject matter that is
claimed in the opposing application or patent. See 37 C.F.,. § 1.601(i) (1996). This
overlapping subject matter is presented as a hybrid claim, called a count, that defines the scope
of the interfering subject matter. See id. § 1.601 (f).
549. In vitro generally means testing performed in a test tube as compared to in vivo which
generally means testing performed in an animal or human.
550. See Fujikawa, 93 F.3d at 1561-62, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896-98.
551. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994).
552. See Fujikawa, 93 F.3d at 1561, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.
553. See id. at 1563, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898.
554. See iU, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898; see also Cross v. lizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1044, 224
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 739, 742 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
555. See Fujikawa, 93 F.3d at 1564, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1899; see also Nelson v. Bowler,
626 F.2d 853, 856, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 881, 883 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
556. See Fujikawa, 93 F.3d at 1564, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1899 (citing Nelson, 626 F.2d at
856, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 884). In other words, tests and an asserted pharmacological activity must
be sufficiently correlated so that a skilled artisan would recognize, to a reasonable probability,
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Relying on the principle that a desired pharmaceutical response
may be shown by positive in vitro tests, when combined with a known
correlation between in vitro results and in vivo activity, the court found
that Wattanasin established an adequate correlation between in vitro
tests and in vivo results. 7  Therefore, the court held that
Wattanasin showed the desired phannaceutical response for practical
utility using the in vitro tests and that Wattanasin actually reduced to
practice the compound.5'
With regard to the method count, the court agreed with the Board
that Wattanasin reduced the method to practice in December
1987.119 The court found that Wattanasin completed successful in
vivo testing of the compound by this date, despite an anomaly in the
test data that allegedly undercut the reliability of the in vivo tests."6°
Accordingly, Wattansin was awarded priority of inventorship.
Having established that Wattanasin was the prior inventor, the
Federal Circuit then considered whether he forfeited his priority of
invention by suppressing or concealing the invention between his
reduction to practice and filing of the patent application.561 The
court found that Wattanasin did not intentionally suppress562 his
invention, despite the approximate year-and-a-half delay between
reduction to practice and filing." Whether suppression could be
inferred, the court ruled that the circumstances surrounding the delay
and the reasonableness of that delay,"6 rather than the time of
delay,56 were the important factors to consider." "Given a total
delay of seventeen months, an unexplained delay of three months,
the complexity of the subject matter at issue," and the fact that
Wattanasin "was moving, albeit slowly, towards filing an application,"
that the novel compound would exhibit the asserted pharmacological behavior. See id. at 1564,
39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1899.
557. See Fujikawa, 93 F.3d at 1565-66, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1900; see also Cross, 753 F.2d
at 1051, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 748.
558. See id. at 1566, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1901.
559. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1901.
560. See iL, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1901.
561. See i at 1566-67, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1901.
562. There are two types of suppression and concealment: deliberate suppression or a legal
inference of suppression based on a delay in filing a patent application. See Paulik v. Rizkalla,
760 F.2d 1270, 1273, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 224, 226 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
563. See Fujikawa, 93 F.3d at 1567, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1901-02; see also Peeler v. Miller,
535 F.2d 647,653, 190 U.S.P.Q. 117,122 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (implying that intentional suppression
requires showing of specific intent which may be evidenced by an unreasonable delay).
564. See Young v. Dworkin, 489 F.2d 1277, 1285, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 388, 395 (C.C.PA.
1974) (Rich, J., concurring) (finding conduct of first inventor as controlling factor).
565. See Correge v. Murphy, 705 F.2d 1326, 1330, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 753, 756 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (noting no specific time constitutes a delay, but rather, court evaluates the circumstances
to find a presumption of abandonment).
566. See Fujikawa, 93 F.3d at 1568, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1902.
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the court concluded that an inference of suppression or concealment
was not warranted.567 In light of the two year period of inactivity
after Wattanasin reduced the invention to practice in 1984, the Court
found, in disagreement with Fujikawa, that suppression or conceal-
ment was not present.5' Finally, the court ignored the question of
whether Wattanasin was spurred to file the application because of the
application of a third party inventor.6 9
The Federal Circuit again focused on reduction to practice in
Schendel v. Curtis,"7° by affirming the Board's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Curtis because Schendel did not adequately
corroborate his alleged reduction to practice and did not make a
fusion protein57 meeting all the limitations of the count.
57 2
Schendel sought to provoke the interference, but since his filing
date was more than three months after Curtis's effective filing date,
the Patent Office required Schendel to show why he was prima facie
entitled to a judgment that he was the prior inventor. To support
such a position, Schendel submitted six declarations describing acts
that he and fellow employees allegedly performed to reduce the
invention to practice before Curtis's effective filing date.7 4
To show his actual reduction to practice, Schendel was required to
prove that he prepared a fusion protein meeting every limitation of
the count 75  After reviewing the six preferred declarations, the
567. See id. at 1569, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1903.
568. See it., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1903-04; see also Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 226
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 224 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
569. See Fujikawa, 93 F.3d at 1567-68, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1902. Spurring, or activities
of another inventor, is always an important factor in priority determinations because it creates
the inference that but for the other inventor's efforts, the public would not have gained
knowledge of the invention. See Brokaw v. Vogel, 429 F.2d 476, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 428
(C.C.PA. 1970).
570. 83 F.3d 1399, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1743 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
571. A fusion protein is a molecule containing the amino acid sequences of two different
proteins. SeeSchendel v. Curtis, 83 F.3d 1399,1400,38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1743,1744 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
572. See id. at 1402, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
573. See id. at 1400-01, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.608(b) (1996)
providing that "the applicant, before an interference will be declared, shall file evidence which
demonstrate that applicant is prima facie entitled to ajudgment relative to the patentee and an
explanation stating with particularity the basis upon which the applicant is prima fade entitled
to the judgment").
574. See Schendel, 83 F.3d at 1401, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
575. See id. at 1402, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745; Hahn v. Wong, 892 F.2d 1028, 1032, 13
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1313,1317 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("To establish reduction to practice of a chemical
composition, it is sufficient to prove 'that the inventor actually prepared the composition and
knew it would work.'" (quoting Mikus v. Wachtel, 542 F.2d 1157, 1159, 191 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
571, 573 (C.C.P.A. 1976))); see also Newkirk v. Lulejian, 825 F.2d 1581, 1582, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1793, 1794 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("[E]very limitation of the interference count must exist in
the embodiment and be shown to have performed as intended.").
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court concluded that Schendel did not provide sufficient, scientific
evidence5 76 that he prepared a fusion protein which contained every
limitation recited by the count, 77 and therefore, did not make the
required prima facie showing that he was entitled to judgment of
priority." The court did not address whether Schendel's testimony
was adequately corroborated because this conclusion mandated
affirming the Board. 9
In dissent, Judge Newman noted that review of the Board's grant
of summary judgment was plenary, and neither the Board nor the
Federal Circuit should have weighed the scientific sufficiency of the
evidence.-5 To the contrary, she opined reasonable factual infer-
ences should have been drawn in favor of Schendel, and the truth of
the factual evidence adduced should not have been determined in
summary proceedings, unlike the majority's conclusions."' Specifi-
cally, Judge Newman maintained that the scientific sufficiency of
Schendel's evidence was not challenged by skilled artisans in this
field.8 2 Judge Newman reasoned that for the majority and the
Board to hold in summary judgment that the scientific record was
insufficient when skilled artisans and the inventor deemed otherwise
was an improper appellate action.-"
In considering matters of jurisdiction in an interference, the
Federal Circuit in Guinn v. Kopft affirmed the Board's retention
ofjurisdiction when an interfering party disclaimed the patent claim
in his application corresponding to the count."
After the Patent Office declared an interference between the
parties, Guinn attempted to terminate the interference by filing a
statutory disclaimer8 6 of his only claim corresponding to the sole
576. The court extensively reviewed every declaration in reaching this conclusion; the court's
review of the declarations will not be discussed because of its length and technical complexity.
See Schend4e 83 F.3d at 1403-04, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746-47.
577. See id. at 1404, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747-78.
578. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748.
579. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748.
580. See id. at 1406, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749 (Newman,J., dissenting).
581. See id. at 1407,38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749 (Newman,J., dissenting); see a/soAnderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,255 (1986); Kahl v. Scoville, 609 F.2d 991,995,203 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 652, 656 (C.C.PA 1979).
582. See Schendel 83 F.3d at 1406-07, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749-50.
583. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749.
584. 96 F.3d 1419, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1157 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1692
(1997).
585. See Guinn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir.
1996), cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 1692 (1997).
586. Section 253 states a "patentee, whether of the whole or any sectional interest therein,
may, on payment of the fee required bylaw, make disclaimer of any complete claim." 35 U.S.C.
§ 253 (1994).
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count of the interference. Guinn stated in the disclaimer that "[t] his
disclaimer is not a request for entry of an adverse judgment under 37
C.F.R. § 1.662."587 Simultaneously, he filed a 37 C.F.R. § 1.635
motion5" "to dismiss the interference for lack of jurisdiction."589
Guinn argued that there was no controversy because he had no claim
corresponding to the interference count remaining in his patent.19°
The Board then "issued an order to show cause why judgment
should not be entered against Guinn as a result of the statutory
disclaimer."591 Despite Guinn's assertion to the contrary, the Board
treated the statutory disclaimer as a request for entry of an adverse
judgment against Guinn in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.662 (c).
5 92
The Federal Circuit held that Guinn's disclaimer of the only patent
claim corresponding to the count did not divest the Board of its
jurisdiction to determine the priority question.593 The court ruled
that the language of 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) required the Board to
"determine questions of priority" after an interference was declared
and did not relieve the Board of its jurisdiction solely because the
claims corresponding to the count were disclaimed.594
The Federal Circuit, disagreeing with Guinn, further held that 37
C.F.R. § 1.662(c) was consistent with 35 U.S.C. § 253 and fell within
the statutory authority granted to the Commissioner under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6. The court reasoned that 37 C.F.R. § 1.662(c) does not call
for judgment as to a party's claims remaining in an interference and
therefore does not interfere with a patentee's right to disclaim under
35 U.S.C. § 253.596
G. Term of Enforceability
The enforceable term of a U.S. patent traditionally is seventeen
years from the date the patent is issued, regardless of how long the
587. See Guinn, 96 F.3d at 1420,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158. Section 1.662(c) of 37 C.F.R.
provides that "[tihe filing of a statutory disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. § 253 by a patentee will
delete any statutorily disclaimed claims from being involved in the interference." See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.662 (c) (1996). A statutory disclaimer will not be treated as a request for entry of an adverse
judgment against the patentee unless it results in the deletion of all patent claims corresponding
to a count. See id.
588. "A party seeking entry of an order relating to any matter other than a matter which may
be raised under § 1.633 or § 1.634 may file a motion requesting entry of the order. See
§ 1.637(a) and (b)." 37 C.F.R § 1.635 (1996).
589. See Guinn, 96 F.3d at 1420, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158.
590. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158.
591. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158.
592. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158.
593. See id. at 1421-22, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1159.
594. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1159.
595. See id. at 1422, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1160.
596. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1160.
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application was pending in the Patent Office.597 However, the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act ("URAA") provided an alternate
term of twenty years, measured from the filing date of the patent
application, if such term is longer than seventeen years from issuance,
for those patents in force on June 7, 1995.118
The enforceable term of a U.S. patent may also be extended under
The Drug, Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (also
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act)." This statute permits a patent-
term extension for a patented drug whose marketing was delayed by
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval. The length of the
extension will vary depending on the circumstances.'
In Merck & Co. v. Kessler,"° the Federal Circuit addressed the
limitations on granting a restoration extension (the extension period
restored under the Hatch-Waxman Act) for patents with a term of
twenty years granted pursuant to the URAA. °2 For patents issued
prior to June 8, 1995, the Patent Office and FDA argued that the
patent term should be seventeen years from issuance plus any
restoration extension, or twenty years from filing (without a restora-
tion extension), whichever was greater."°3 The district court dis-
597. Section 154(a) (2) of 35 U.S.C. provides for a patent "term beginning on the date on
which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the
patent was filed in the United States or, if the application contains a specific reference to an
earlier filed application or applications under section 120, 121, or 365(c) of this title, from the
date on which the earliest such application was filed." 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2) (1994).
598. See id.
599. 35 U.S.C. § 156(a) provides:
(a) The term of a patent which claims a product, a method of using a product, or
a method of manufacturing a product shall be extended in accordance with this
section from the original expiration date of the patent if-
(1) the term of the patent has not expired before an application is submitted
under subsection (d) (1) for its extension;
(4) the product has been subject to a regulatory review period before its
commercial marketing or use ....
I. § 156(a).
600. If a patent was issued and FDA testing for approval began before the 1984 enactment
of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the total extension period restored ("restoration extension") may not
exceed two years. See35 U.S.C. § 156(g) (6) (C). Otherwise, the restoration period must be less
than five years. See id. § 156(g) (6) (B). The effective patent term, including the restoration
period, may not exceed fourteen years following FDA approval of the new drug. See id.
§ 156(c) (3). The term of the patent may receive only one restoration extension and may not
gain another, even for a different drug covered by the patent whose marketing is also delayed
by FDA procedures. See id. § 156(a) (2).
601. 80 F.3d 1543, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 788
(1997).
602. SeeMerck& Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543,1546,38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1347, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 788 (1997).
603. See id. at 1550, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352. Based on the Hatch-Wayman Act, 35
U.S.C. § 156(a), the Commissioner of the Patent Office had issued as "Final Determination"
ruling that the term of a patent "shall be extended in accordance with this section from the
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agreed, holding that the restoration extension under the Hatch-
Waxman Act could be added to the twenty-year term calculated under
URAA, even if the effective restoration period exceeded the two-year
limitation for Hatch-Waxman extensions.
6°4
The Federal Circuit affirmed that patents issued before June 8,
1995, may add the restoration extension to the twenty-year term
regardless of when such extension is granted.6°' Because Congress
had not expressly addressed this issue, the court looked to the plain
language of 35 U.S.C. § 156(a),"6 noting that this statute now reads
that a restoration extension may not be given if the patent has been
"extended under subsection (e) (1) of this section,"6°7 clearly
referring to a previous extension under the Hatch-Waxman Act."
The court found that the legislative history of the URAA supported
this holding. 9 "[T] he phrase 'original expiration date' was insert-
ed [in the Hatch-Waxman Act] in association with the limitation that
to receive a restoration extension 'the term of the patent had never
been extended' by a prior restoration extension."610
original eration date of the patent," the FDA/Patent Office concluded that the seventeen year
date was its "original expiration date" and the restoration extension could only be added
thereto. See 60 Fed. Reg. 30,069-71 (1995) (emphasis added).
604. See id. (noting district court decision that "patents in force onJune 8,1995, are entitled
to add a restoration extension to a term calculated as 20 years from filing regardless of when
the extension is granted"). The district court rejected the Patent Office's reliance on the words
.original expiration date" in 35 U.S.C. § 156(a), reasoning that this statute changed the "original
expiration date" in some cases to mean twenty years from the filing date of the application. For
patents expiring prior to June 8, 1995, but for a restoration extension, the district court
concluded that permitting a two-year restoration extension to be added anew to a URAA
extended term "was allowed under the Hatch-Waxman Act as a 'second' extension." Id. at 1549,
38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1351.
605. See i& at 1550,38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352 (concluding that with this interpretation,
all provisions of URAA and Hatch-Wayman Act could be given effect).
606. See i&. at 1548, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1350 (noting that Patent Office "principally
relied" on this language for determination of their position). The court concluded that the
"original expiration date" means no more than that the expiration date has not been extended
under section 156(e) (1) and, thus, the phrase can identify more than one date. See id. at 1550-
51, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352.
607. See iUt at 1551, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352 (acknowledging that a patent can only
receive one restoration extension (citing 35 U.S.C. § 156(a) (2))).
608. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352 (disagreeing with Patent Office/FDA and finding
that § 156 is not a "linguistic barrier to an add-on to a term extended by URAA.").
609. The Federal Circuit relied on aJune 1982 letter from Congressman Tom Raisback to
Mr. Bruce Lehman, then Counsel to the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration ofJustice, describing in detail technical amendments to House Bill 6444, a 1982
predecessor of the Hatch-Waxman Act. See id. at 1550-51 & n.7, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352
& n.7 (highlighting statement of Congressman Railsback regarding insertion of amendment
reading "from the original expiration date of the patent").
610. ldM at 1550 & n.7, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352 & n.7.
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The Federal Circuit held, however, that not all patents with a
twenty-year term are entitled to a restoration extension. 61' First,
adding a restoration extension to the twenty-year term must not
exceed the fourteen-year limit mandated by 35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (3),
and minor adjustments must be made to the restoration extension
period to comply with this fourteen-year limit.6" Second, no
restoration extension period may be added to those patents with a
twenty-year term that would have expired beforeJune 8, 1995, but for
the restoration extension.63 To add a restoration extension period
to the twenty-year term of these patents, the court reasoned, would
circumvent the language and limits of 35 U.S.C. § 156(a) (2).6l4
III. INFRINGEMENT
Title 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) defines infringement in the following
manner: "[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or
sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into
the United States any patented invention during the term of the
patent therefor, infringes the patent. "615 When a patent holder
brings a patent infringement suit against an accused infringer, the
court must address two main issues: (1) whether the accused
infringer can show that the patent claims asserted by the patent
holder are invalid; and (2) whether the accused device reads on 6
(and thus infringes) the claims of the patent.617 Because 35 U.S.C.
§ 282 establishes a presumption of validity for all patents, an accused
infringer has the burden to prove the invalidity of any patent618 in
611. See id at 1551, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353 (noting problem with pre-URAA
restoration extensions).
612. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352-53 (stating that Congress has made it clear that the
"14-year period is a mandatory limit on the extended term and must be given effect.").
613. See i& at 1552, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353-54 (remarking that "a minor adjustment"
does not make them consistent with the Hatch-Wayman Act).
614. The court reasoned that 35 U.S.C. § 156(a) (2) "provides that a restoration extension
may be given provided 'the term of the patent has never been extended under subsection (e) (1)
of this section.'" Id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353-54 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(2) (1994)).
Therefore, because the terms of such patents had already been extended under subsection
(e) (1), the court concluded that"[a] reapplication of the restoration extension would constitute
a second extension contrary to the statute." Id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1354.
615. SeeS5 U.S.C. § 271(a).
616. See Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1405-06, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1161, 1165-66 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (using term to describe infringement when imitations in
"properly construed claim" are found in accused device).
617. See Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1570, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1551,
1553-55 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that defendant did not prove plaintiffs patent was not valid
and that defendant's infringement was not willful).
618. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (listing four available defenses that accused infringer may employ).
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a validity analysis by clear and convincing evidence.619 By contrast,
the patent holder in the infringement analysis has the burden to
prove infringement by a preponderance of the evidence.62
The Federal Circuit has established a two-step infringement analysis:
(1) construction of the claims of the patent to determine their
meaning and scope; and (2) comparison of the properly construed
claims with the accused structure to determine whether the claims
encompass that structure.621
A. The First Step of the Analysis
The claims of a patent represent the metes and bounds of the legal
protection afforded to an invention.62 2  In the first step of the
infringement analysis, claim construction seeks to determine the
meaning of the claims and thus the exact boundaries of protec-
tion.6" Prior to 1995, the Federal Circuit had treated claim con-
struction somewhat inconsistently. In most cases, the court had
recognized claim construction as a matter of law, which a court must
decide, and subject to an independent (or de novo) standard of review
on appeal.624 In some cases, however, the court also had indicated
619. See Sensonics, 81 F.3d at 1570, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554 (affirming district court
opinion that defendant did not meet the burden of proving that plaintiff's patent was invalid).
620. See Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1535, 19 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1367,
1369 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that patentee must also show that "every limitation set forth in
a patent claim must be found in an accused product or process exactly or by a substantial
equivalent").
621. See Enge! Indus., 96 F.3d at 1403-04, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164 (evaluating alleged
infringement of patent for system for connecting ends of sheet metal duct sections); Read Corp.
v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 821, 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1426, 1431 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(determining alleged infringement of patent for portable loam screening apparatus); Senmed,
Inc. v. Richard-Allan Med. Indus., Inc., 888 F.2d 815,818, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508,1511 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (reviewing infringement claim of patent for surgical staplers).
622. See Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1423-24,30 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1285, 1289-90 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
623. See id., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1285, 1289-90.
624. See Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 822-23, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432 (affirming claim
interpretation is question of law and detailing court's duty to look at "the description of the
invention and specification of claim annexed to them."); Intellical, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc.,
952 F.2d 1384, 1387,21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1383, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (noting that court is not
bound by district court's holding but must make "independent determination" and stating that
claim construction is a matter of law "amenable to summaryjudgment"); Unique Concepts, Inc.
v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1561, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1500, 1503 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (reasserting
de novo review for claim construction and describing court's consideration of three sources to
ascertain meaning of claims); Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 986, 6
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601, 1604 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (reviewing de novo and as matter of law district
court's claim interpretation of meaning of "platicizer"); SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of
Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118-22, 1138-40, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577, 581 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (in banc)
(affirming "matter of law" proceedingwith own evaluation of alleged infringement of single tube
television camera); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1569-71, 219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (establishing that first prong of infringement test-
determining what is patented-is matter of law); SSIH Equip. v. United States Int'l Trade
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that underlying factual questions may arise for a jury to decide, and
findings on disputed terms in the claim and on infringement matters
are subject to a strict clearly erroneous standard of review on
appeal." In 1995, the Federal Circuit resolved these inconsistent
decisions in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,626 by establishing
claim construction as an exclusive matter of law for the court, subject
to de novo review.627 In 1996, the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision.628
In granting certiorari to Markman, the Supreme Court sought to
determine whether claim construction is a matter of law reserved
entirely for the court, or subject to a Seventh Amendment guarantee
that a jury will determine the meaning of any disputed term of art
about which expert testimony is offered.629 The Court held that
"[e]xisting precedent, the relative interpretive skills of judges and
juries, and statutory policy considerations all favor allocating construc-
tion issues to the court."6' According to the Court, "[flunctional
considerations also favor having judges define patent terms of
art. 63' The Court determined that the training and background of
judges rendered them most qualified to properly interpret highly
Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365,376, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 678, 688 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (asserting that "what
is the thing patented" is matter of law, but whether the thing has been constructed, used, or
sold is matter of fact); Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 770-71, 218 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 781, 789 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (determining "identity of invention" is matter of fact and claim
construction is matter of law).
625. See Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg. Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546,
1549, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (clarifying that claim construction is "a
matter of law based on underlying facts" which can be determined byjury); Perini Am., Inc. v.
Paper Converting Mach. Co., 832 F.2d 581,584,4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1621, 1625 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(reminding that legal conclusions "rise out of and rests on" facts); H. H. Robertson, Co. v.
United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 389, 2 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1926, 1929 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(stating that factual considerations regarding district court's interpretation of "bottomless" are
reviewed under clearly erroneous standard); Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 656-57, 229
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 992, 994-95 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (asserting that when underlying facts regarding
claim interpretation are disputed, judge should allow expert testimony to clarify); Paiumbo v.
Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974,226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 5,9 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that where
scope of claim is undisputed, it is a matter of law, but where there is ambiguity the trier of fact
must review underlying factual questions); Bio-Rad Labs., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739
F.2d 604, 614-15, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 654, 662 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding thatjuries can decide
questions of law as long as they are adequately instructed).
626. 52 F.3d 967,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1384
(1996).
627. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970-71, 975, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321, 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc) (reviewing infringement action dealing with
inventory control method for use in dry cleaning business), aftd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
628. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1387 (1996) (reasserting,
however, that whether infringement occurred is still a question of fact for jury).
629. See id. at 1387.
630. Id. at 1392-95.
631. Id. at 1395.
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technical patents.13' The Court further explained that judges are
also better suited than a jury to determine whether "an expert's
proposed definition of a claim term fully comports with the instru-
ment as a whole."33 Finally, the Court opined that "the need for
uniformity in the treatment of a given patent favors allocation of
patent claim construction issues to the court." 6' Accordingly, after
reviewing all these factors, the Court concluded that claim construc-
tion must be a matter of law.
635
1. Guide to claim construction
Since the Markman ruling and its subsequent affirmance by the
Supreme Court, district courts have had to adjust to the new rule that
claim construction is a matter of law. In Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP
Chemicals Ltd.,636 for example, although the district court had
relegated a disputed claim term to the jury in a pre-Markman suit, the
Federal Circuit affirmed because the jury used the proper construc-
tion.6 7 Hoechst Celanese ("Celanese") held a patent that claimed
a method of reducing iodide contamination in an organic medium,
and when BP Chemicals utilized a similar method for iodide
contamination, Celanese sued for patent infringement.638 During
the jury trial, the claim construction issue focused on the word
"stable," which in turn depended on the meaning of "dry physical
dimension. "639 Celanese argued that the term "dimension" meant
"linear measurement," which would result in infringement, while BP
argued that the term meant the volume dimension, which would
result in noninfringement.' The jury interpreted the claims and
found that the patent was infringed. 1 After making a statement on
the meaning of the claim terms,' the district court subsequently
632. See id.
63. Id at 1395-96.
684. Md
635. See id. at 1896.
636. 78 F.8d 1575, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1126 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 275 (1996).
637. See Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1584, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1126, 1128 (Fed. Cir.) (reasserting that in light of Markman, defendant's seeking of de
novo review of claim interpretation on appeal is "clearly not frivolous"), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
275 (1996).
638. See id. at 1577-78, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128.
639. d. at 1578-79, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128-29.
640. See id. at 1579, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129.
641. See id. at 1578, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128.
642. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128 (highlighting that district court's procedure was
based on ruling in Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 822 n.3, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426,
1482 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
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denied a motion for new trial and motion for ajudgment as a matter
of law.'
On appeal, BP Chemicals argued that Markman required a de
novo review of the disputed claim terms, and the Federal Circuit
agreed.' The court then made an independent claim construction
based on the evidence of record.' For intrinsic evidence, the
court reviewed the claims and the specification, and for extrinsic
evidence, the court considered dictionary definitions, technical
experts, and even the testimony of the inventor.' In the end, the
court affirmed the holding of infringement because Celanese's
position provided the only definition of the claim term consistent with
the specification.6
7
Similarly, in Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp.,6 8
the Federal Circuit applied a de novo claim construction.649 Texas
Instruments ("TI") sued Cypress Semiconductor, LSI Logic, and VLSI
Technology, alleging patent infringement of methods to encapsulate
the electrical component of a semiconductor device (semiconductor
die) in a plastic body.65° The case turned on the construction of
the term "conductor."651  The accused infringers argued that the
term referred to the metal leads protruding from the plastic body of
a semiconductor device.652 In contrast, relying on the ordinary
dictionary definition of the term, TI argued that "conductor"
encompassed any element capable of conducting electricity.65 A
643. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128.
644. See id, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128-29 (recounting that BP Chemicals reminded court
that Read Corp. ruling was superseded by Markman).
645. See id at 1581, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130 (supporting Celanese's interpretation of
"dry physical dimension").
646. See id., at 1579-80, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129-30 (reviewing "photographs and
experimental data, the testimony of the scientists who produced the data and interpreted it, and
the testimony of experts in the field."). The court also recognized that, under Markman, the
court owes no deference to the testimony of the inventor. See id. at 1580, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1130 (citing Markman, 52 F.3d at 983, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332).
647. See id. at 1581, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
648. 90 F.3d 1558, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1818
(1997).
649. See Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1563, 39
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492, 1496 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1818 (1997). In the
accused processes, the semiconductor die was not mechanically attached to the metal leads that
protruded from the plastic body of the semiconductor device. These leads, however, were
electrically attached to terminals on the die by means of "whisker wires" that did not extend
outside of the plastic body. See id. at 1562, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495-96. Second, the
accused processes placed one end of the die just below the common plane of the leads. See id.,
39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495-96.
650. See id. at 1560-61, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1494-95.
651. See id. at 1564, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1497.
652. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1497.
653. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1497.
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jury found the patents infringed and awarded TI more than $51
million, but the district court set aside the verdict on a motion for
judgment as a matter of law.Y
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the patent claims and
found that the term conductor was used to indicate an element that
extended beyond the plastic body of a semiconductor device." It
found that specification language further supported this interpreta-
tion. 6 Accordingly, based on this de novo review, the court agreed
that no infringement occurred and affirmed the district court
5 7
This new de novo standard of review for claim construction
fundamentally changed the manner by which district courts ap-
proached claim construction.65 In Ethicon Endo-Surgey, Inc. v.
United States Surgical Corp.,6 9 Ethicon obtained several patents
relating to linear cutter staplers.6" After a Markman hearing was
held, ,he district court determined that the claims in both patents had
654. See id. at 1563, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496.
655. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1497.
656. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1497 (determining that patentee uses term to mean
"leads that 'extend from inside the package to the outside, and connect the semiconductor
device to an external circuit'" (quoting Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp.,
Civ. No. 3-90-CV1590-H, slip op. at 10 & n.6 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 1995))).
657. See id. at 1570, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
658. The most common new technique is the so-called "Markman hearing," during which a
trial judge hears argument and testimony concerning the construction of claims at issue in a
case. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc)
(finding that meaning of language in patent claim is a question of law for which de novo review
is appropriate), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996); see also Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of'Japan,
Ltd., 906 F. Supp. 798 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (J. Rader, sitting by designation) (recounting application
of Markman ruling at special two-day bench trial wherejudge heard expert testimony, "examined
extensive briefing and requested additional briefing" on meaning of claims).
659. 93 F.3d 1572, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 1997 WL 28561
(1997); see also supra notes 517-21 and accompanying text.
660. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572, 1574-75,
40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1019, 1020-21 (Fed. Cir. 1996). A linear cutter stapler is a "surgical
instrument used to cut internal body tissue while simultaneously placing rows of staples along
both sides of the incision to prevent excessive bleeding." See id. at 1574, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1020. To accomplish its purpose, it is important that a linear cutter stapler not cut when its
staple cartridge is empty. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1020. Accordingly, a linear cutter
stapler must have a lockout mechanism to prevent that. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1020.
Ethicon's first patent disclosed a locking mechanism that functioned by impeding the stapler's
pusher bars, which cause the staple drivers to eject staples. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1020.
Concerned that this patent might not cover several lockout mechanisms of its competitor,
United States Surgical Corp., Ethicon sought to broaden its claims through a reissue patent,
which it obtained. See id. at 1575-76, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1021. The Federal Circuit
described the difference between the two patents as follows:
[f]acially, the primary distinction between [the two patents] is that [the claim at issue
in the original patent] seems to tie the location of the lockout mechanism to the slots
through which the pusher bars pass, while [the claim at issue in the reissue patent]
broadly describes the location of the lockout as anywhere in the path of the pusher
assembly.
Id. at 1576-77, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1022.
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to be read narrowly.661 On the basis of the claim language and the
prosecution history, the court found no relevant distinctions between
the claims and interpreted each to require the lockout mechanism to
engage the pusher bars rather than any other part of the firing
mechanism. 66' Because U.S. Surgical's lockout mechanisms did not
engage the pusher bars, but instead engaged the cam bar retainers
(the elements holding the pusher bars) or other portions of the firing
assembly, the district court held that U.S. Surgical's staplers did not
infringe Ethicon's patents as a matter of law. 3
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that
the relevant claim language indicated that the lockout mechanism was
located in the longitudinal slots through which the pusher bars
passed.6" With regard to the reissue patent, however, the court
disagreed with the lower court that the term "pusher assembly" could
be construed synonymously with "pusher bars."6' Despite the
obvious distinction between "pusher assembly" and "pusher bar," the
court concluded that it was not possible to determine the meaning of
"pusher assembly" solely from the claim language.6  Thus, relying
on the prosecution history of the reissue patent, the court was able to
determine that, at a minimum, both the pusher bars and the cam bar
retainer were meant to be included as part of the pusher assem-
bly.667 Accordingly, since some of U.S. Surgical's lockout mecha-
nisms engaged the cam bar retainer, the Federal Circuit found that
the reissue patent's claim read on such mechanisms. 66s  Notwith-
standing this finding, the Federal Circuit ultimately affirmed the
district court's judgment of non-literal infringement on other
grounds, but it remanded for further proceedings with respect to
infringement by equivalents.669
661. See id. at 1577, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1022.
662. The court focused particularly on a comparison of the claim language in the original
patent that recited "the improvement comprising a lockout mechanism connected to said
longitudinal slots for preventing said pusher bars from passing more than one time through said
longitudinal slots," with the claim language in the reissue patent that recited "a lockout
mechanism for preventing firing movement of the pusher assembly in the firing direction after
the pusher assembly has been moved to the retracted position." See id at 1575-77,40 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1021-23.
663. See id. at 1577, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1022.
664. See id. at 1576, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1021, 1022.
665. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1022.
666. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1022.
667. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1022.
668. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1022. The court concluded that the claim "is limited
to an apparatus that blocks the pusher bars rather than more distal portions of the firing
mechanisms, such as the cam bar retainer." Id. at 1578, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023.
669. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023. The court pointed out that the terms "pusher
assembly" and "pusher bars" were both used within the same claim and clause, and that "[i] f the
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In General American Transportation Corp. v. Cryo-Trans, Inc.,670
Cryo-Trans was the assignee of a patent covering cryogenic railcars for
use in transporting frozen foods.67' Unlike conventional refrigerat-
ed railcars that employ mechanical refrigeration systems and consume
fossil fuels, cryogenic railcars use inexpensive carbon dioxide as the
refrigerant. 72 The cryogenic railcar disclosed in Cryo-Trans's patent
contained an insulated compartment along the top of the car, which
stored the carbon dioxide. 3 The compartment's bottom contained
openings adjacent to each of the car's side and end walls.674  In
operation, the compartment was filled with solid carbon dioxide;
then, during transit, the carbon dioxide sublimated, flowing through
the compartment's openings and down along the side and end
walls.
675
General American Transportation Corp. ("GATC") made a
cryogenic railcar similar to the one disclosed by Cryo-Trans's
patent.6 The ceiling compartment in GATC's railcar, however,
had a "row of openings lengthwise along its center and two rows of
openings adjacent to the car's opposite side walls."6 7 "The open-
ings adjacent to the side walls were each three inches from the
nearest side wall, and the endmost of such openings were three feet
from the nearest end wall."678 GATC argued that its railcar did not
infringe Cryo-Trans's patent because its ceiling compartment lacked
openings adjacent to the railcar's end walls.67 Relying on a dictio-
nary definition, the district court interpreted the term "adjacent" in
the claims to mean "not far off' or "not necessarily at but nearby or
near."' Finding that the end of the openings adjacent to the side
terms 'pusher assembly' and 'pusher bar' described a single element, one would expect the
claim to consistently refer to this element as either a 'pusher bar' or a 'pusher assembly,' but not
both, especially not within the same clause." I, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023.
670. 93 F.3d 766, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1334
(1997); see infra notes 734-55.
671. See General Am. Transp. Corp. v. Cryo-Trans., Inc., 93 F.3d 766, 767, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1801, 1802 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. deniae, 117 S. Ct. 1334 (1997).
672. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802.
673. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802.
674. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802.
675. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802. The claim language in dispute recited "a plurality
of openings through said ceiling means adjacent each of said side walls and end walls for
permitting the flow of sublimated carbon dioxide gas from said compartment...." M, 39
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802.
676. See i&, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802 (providing physical descriptions of both designs).
677. M, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802.
678. M, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802.
679. See id. at 769, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802-03.
680. Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803.
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walls were also adjacent to the end walls, the district court held that
GATC's railcar infringed Cryo-Trans' patent.68l
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the district court had
erred in construing the patent claims. 2 Reviewing the claims and
patent specification, the Federal Circuit found that both distinguished
between the openings adjacent to the side and end walls.' For
example, the claim language at issue recited openings adjacent to
"each of said side walls and end walls. .. .". The court found that
the claims and specification treated the openings adjacent to the side
walls and end walls as structurally distinct.' As a result, the Federal
Circuit reversed, holding that GATC's railcar did not literally infringe
Cryo-Trans's patent.
86
2. Considerations of claim construction
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.," the Federal Circuit
explained that claim construction entails analyses of the patent claims,
the specification, and the prosecution history.m The patent
document contains the patent claims and the specification, but the
administrative history of the patent during the application procedures
before the Patent Office set forth the prosecution history. Although
not contained within the patent, the prosecution history is considered
part of the patent used to construe the patent claims. 9
In Amhil Enterprises, Ltd. v. WAWA, Inc.," the Federal Circuit
reiterated the importance of prosecution history in construing the
patent claims. 91 By assignment, Amhil Enterprises held a patent for
a thin, flexible, plastic lid to cover beverage containers with various
structural improvements over prior lid types. 692 When WAWA began
to provide beverage container lids to its convenience stores with
similar features, Amhil sued for patent infringement.693 The district
681. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803.
682. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803.
683. See id. at 769-70, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803.
684. 1& at 770, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803.
685. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804.
686. Cryo-Trans, Inc., 93 F.3d at 772, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805.
687. 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affid, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
688. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,979-80,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1321, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 1995), af'd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
689. See id. at 980,34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1330; Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391,
398, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697, 703 (Ct. C1. 1967) (using entire record of Patent Office
proceedings to determine infringement).
690. 81 F.3d 1554, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
691. Amhil Enters., Ltd. v. WAWA, Inc., 81 F.3d 1554,1559,38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1471,1475
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
692. See id. at 1556, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472.
693. See id. at 1557, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472.
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court granted a motion for summary judgment of
noninfringement.
694
On appeal, the Federal Circuit focused their claim construction
analysis on the faces of the projections on the lid.695 The patented
invention contained a face with "vertical" or "substantially vertical"
projections, whereas the allegedly infringing structure had a face with
sloping projections.66  The court used the prosecution history, in
addition to the patent claim and the specification, to construe the
claim's meaning.69 7 Noting the relevance of prosecution history for
purposes of prosecution history estoppel, the court explained that
claim construction also requires utilization of the prosecution history,
especially where the invention "is in a crowded art."691 Within the
prosecution history, the court pointed out that the patentee had
overcome a rejection for obviousness over a lid with a sloping face by
emphasizing that the claimed invention only pertained to "vertical" or
"substantially vertical" projections.6' The court thus interpreted
"vertical" or "substantially vertical" as "essentially vertical," excluding
lids with sloping faces.7°  Based on this distinction from the prose-
cution history, inter alia, the court affirmed the district court's rul-
ing.
701
In Markman, the Federal Circuit also provided that trial courts may
receive extrinsic evidence such as expert and inventor testimony and
learned treatises; the purpose of this evidence is "'to aid the court in
coming to a correct conclusion' as to the 'true meaning of the
language employed' in the patent." 2  For example, in Vitronics
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,703 the Federal Circuit addressed the role
of extrinsic evidence, severely restricting its use as "improper" when
the disputed terms of a claim may be understood from a careful
reading of the public record.0
694. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473.
695. See id. at 1558-59, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1474-75.
696. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1474:75.
697. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d'(BNA) at 1473-75 (discussing district court's prior analysis).
698. I& at 1559-60, 38 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at 1475.
699. See id. at 1561, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475.
700. Id. at 1562, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476.
701. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476.
702. Markman v.Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,980,34 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1321,1330
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted), affld, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1997). The court nonetheless
cautioned that "[e]xtrinsic evidence is to be used for the court's understanding of the patent,
not for the purpose of va7ying or contradicting the terms of the claims." d at 981, 34 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
at 1331 (emphasis added).
703. '90 F.3d 1576, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
704. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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Vitronics charged Conceptronic with infringement of a patented
method used in the production of printed circuit boards.7°5 Specifi-
cally, the patent claimed a "three zone" method for reflow soldering
of surface mounted devices to a printed circuit board.706 In the
third zone, the board and solder are heated to a "solder reflow
temperature for a period of time sufficient to cause said solder to
reflow and solder said devices to the board while maintaining the
temperature of said devices below said solder reflow tempera-
ture."
707
Relying heavily on the patent specification, Vitronics argued that
the claimed "solder reflow temperature" is a "peak solder reflow
temperature," that is, "a temperature 200 above a liquid's tempera-
ture" at which the solder melts completely and moves freely.708 On
the other hand, Conceptronic argued that the "solder reflow
temperature mean [t]... the liquidus temperature of a particular type
of solder ... ."709 Conceptronic relied on extrinsic evidence, in-
cluding expert testimony, testimony of Vitronics engineers, and a
memorandum filed by Vitronics.1 ° The district court delayed
construction of the claim until the close of testimony, at which time
it ruled in favor of Conceptronic. v1 Vitronics conceded that, as a
matter of law, the court had to grant judgment in favor of Con-
ceptronic because Vitronics had presented no evidence of infringe-
ment under the court's interpretation of the claim.7 12
The Federal Circuit used the appeal to lay down strict guidelines
for the consideration of extrinsic evidence for claim construction.7 18
First, the court observed that numerous sources are available to guide
claim construction, including intrinsic and extrinsic evidence.1 4 As
the court wrote, "in interpreting an asserted claim, the court should
look first to the intrinsic evidence of record, . . . [because it] is the
most significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed
claim language.7 '  The court instructed that it was improper to
rely on extrinsic evidence when an analysis of the intrinsic evidence
705. See id. at 1579, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574.
706. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574.
707. Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574.
708. See id. at 1580, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574.
709. Id, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574.
710. See id. at 1581, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
711. See id. at 1580, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
712. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
713. See id. at 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576.
714. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576.
715. Id, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576.
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alone will resolve any ambiguity in disputed claim terms.716 As the
court explained, the claims, specification, and file history, rather than
extrinsic evidence, constitute the public record of the patentee's
claim, a record on which the public is entitled to rely.717 "In other
words, competitors are entitled to review the public record, apply the
established rules of claim construction, ascertain the scope of the
patentee's claimed invention and, thus, design around the claimed
invention." 18 It is imperative, the court stated, that the public
record not be altered or changed by extrinsic evidence introduced at
trial, such as expert testimony.719 If this were permitted, the right
of competitors to rely on the public record for a determination of the
scope of patent claims would be rendered meaningless.720 Using
these principles regarding the use of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence
for claim construction, the Federal Circuit reversed and held that the
district court had relied impermissibly on extrinsic evidence to
construe Vitronics' patent claims in favor of Conceptronic.2
Vitronics signals to the patent practitioner that extrinsic evidence
and, particularly, expert testimony may not be allowed in construing
claims. Additionally, Vitronics acts as a warning to trial counsel that
the practice of ajudge construing patent claims at the conclusion of
trial may require counsel to present evidence on infringement under
either party's interpretation of the claims. In Vitronics, the late claim
construction by the district court forced the patentee to concede
noninfringement because of its failure to present infringement
evidence consistent with the claim construction sought by the accused
infringer and accepted by the court. Because a court may still adopt
a construction of the claims that neither party has advocated, the
preferred time to construe claims thus would appear to be before and
not after the introduction of evidence at trial. 2
Ironically, although the Federal Circuit treats claim construction as
a pure question of law72 and routinely accords no deference to
716. See id. at 1583, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577.
717. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577.
718. Id. at 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577.
719. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577.
720. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577.
721. See id. at 1585, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579. "Only if there were still some genuine
ambiguity in the claims, after consideration of all intrinsic evidence," the Federal Circuit wrote,
"should the trial court have resorted to extrinsic evidence... to construe claim 1." Id. at 1584,
39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578.
722. See Maxwell v.J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
723. See Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1556, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1801, 1803 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("No matter when or how a judge performs the Markman
task, on appeal we review the issue of claim interpretation independently without deference to
the trial judge."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2554 (1996); cf. Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems.
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district court determinations, not all members of the court agree with
this approach to claim construction. Also, in some cases, these
uncertainties have caused district courtjudges to criticize the Federal
Circuit for not deferring to lower court factual findings in appropriate
circumstances. 24
In Metaullics System Co. v. Cooper,7  the Federal Circuit dismissed
as moot the appeal of Metaullics from an adverse ruling on its
preliminary injunction motion because the patent in suit expired after
the appeal.726 The court also commented on the request that the
Federal Circuit should construe the claims of the patent on ap-
peal. 27 Judge Mayer, writing for the majority, stated that the
Federal Circuit is likely to construe claims better when considering a
developed record. 28 He observed that to construe claims prema-
turely in the context of a preliminary judgment proceeding would
undermine the wisdom of reserving claim construction for judges.7 29
In contrast, Judge Lourie concluded in his concurrence that there
was no basis, even in dictum, for the majority to state that the
appellate court would have to defer to the trial court on so-called
issues of fact arising in claim construction.' °  Judge Lourie ex-
Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1578, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1126, 1128 (Fed. Cir.) (stating that, under
Markman, the Federal Circuit decides "disputed questions of claim interpretation without
deference to the trier of fact"), cert. denied; 117 S. Ct. 275 (1996); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 72 F.3d 857, 863, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1165 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (observing that the Federal Circuit engages in "independent determination of the
construction of claims, as a matter of law, unencumbered by the trial process"), vacated 117 S.
Ct. 1240 (1997).
724. District court judges have expressed concern that the standard of review employed by
the Court of Appeals effectively has rendered the fact finding in which they regularly engage
in construing patent claims a pointless exercise, thus diminishing their role in patent
infringement actions. See Lucas-Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus., L.P., 890 F. Supp. 329, 36
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1235 (D. Del. 1995) (criticizing Federal Circuit's refusal to acknowledge that
trial courts make factual findings based on extrinsic evidence). In Lucas-Aerospae, DistrictJudge
Schwartz stated that extrinsic evidence is a vital and integral part of the claim interpretation
process:
If those possessed of a higher commission wish to rely on a cold written record and
engage in de novo review of all claim constructions, that is their privilege. But when the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals states that the trial court does not do something that
the trial court does and must do to perform [its] judicial function, that court
knowingly enters a land of sophistry and fiction.
Id. at 333-34 n.7, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1239 n.7; see Elf Atochem North Am. Inc. v. Libbey-Owens
Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844,850, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065,1074-75 (D. Del. 1995) (suggesting Federal
Circuit's de novo review of claim construction will upset trial courts' ability to efficiently
administer patent trials).
725. 100 F.3d 938, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1798 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
726. SeeMetaullics Sys. Co. v. Cooper, 100 F.3d 938,939-40,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1798, 1799
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
727. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1799.
728. See id at 939, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1799.
729. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1799.
730. See id. at 940, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1799.
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plained that the Supreme Court in Markman did not expressly
characterize elements of claim construction as questions of fact.73'
He pointed out that, because the Supreme Court did not criticize or
overrule any aspect of the in banc Markman opinion,732 the in banc
Federal Circuit statement in Markman controlled that claim construc-
tion is properly viewed solely as a question of law.
733
General American Transportation Corp. v. Cryo-Trans, Inc.,7' also
focused on the respective responsibilities of the trial court and the
court -of appeals under the Markman regime. The Cryo-Trans patent
issued in 1987 disclosed a railcar refrigerated by carbon dioxide snow
held in a compartment that ran along the length of the car above the
cargo area, containing openings, or vents adjacent the side and end
walls of the car to allow sublimation and proper distribution of carbon
dioxide gas around the frozen cargo.735 GATC manufactured a
prototype cryogenic railcar, known as the "GARX 68000. "736 The
prototype consisted of simply blocking the openings closest to the end
walls of the car.7 7 GATC argued that with this change, the Arcticar
did not have openings "adjacent" the end walls as specified in the
'876 patent claims, even though the nearly 68-foot railcar still had
openings located less than three feet from the end walls that provided
the same cooling effect.7' The trial judge relied on various sources
of extrinsic evidence as a factual basis for interpreting "adjacent" as
used in the patent claims and for determining whether the Arcticar
has openings "adjacent" the end walls.
739
In view of the evidence adduced at trial, the district court found
that the term "adjacent" as used in patents means "not necessarily at
but nearby or near," and concluded that the term as used in the
731. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1799.
732. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1799.
733. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1800.
734. 93 F.3d 766, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1334
(1997); see supra notes 670-86 and accompanying text.
735. See General Am. Transp. Corp. v. Cryo-Trans, Inc., 93 F.3d 766, 767, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1801, 1802 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cer. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1334 (1997). The effective flow of the
cold carbon dioxide gas around the load keeps the frozen food refrigerated, even on long cross-
countryjourneys. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802.
736. General Am. Transp. Corp. v. Cryo-Trans, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 774, 778 (N.D. In. 1995),
aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 93 F.3d 766,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1334 (1997).
737. See id. at 779.
738. See id. at 791.
739. See C0yo-Trans, Inc., 93 F.3d at 769, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803. Significantly, in
addition to reviewing numerous technical documents and photographs detailing the structure
of the accused Arcticar and a physical embodiment of the '876 patent (i.e., the production
version of the CRYX 1000 railcar), the trial judge conducted a site visit to inspect and view the
railcars at issue.
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patent means "not far off."71° Moreover, the court determined that
"the purpose of the bunker vents of the '876 patent is to facilitate the
passage of sublimating C02 along the corrugations making up the
walls of the car" and that the "Arcticar's bunker vents are close
enough to provide the same function."741 Thus, the district court
ruled that, "[g]iven the proximity of the Arcticar bunker vents to the
end walls, the Arcticar literally infringes the '876 patent."
742
On appeal, a split panel of the Federal Circuit reversed the district
court's finding of infringement on the ground that the court had
misconstrued the claims at issue.' In articulating the applicable
standard of review, the majority (Judge Lourie, writing for the
majority, with Judge Schall) emphasized that "[c]laim construction is
a question of law, reviewed de novo on appeal."7' The Federal
Circuit majority rejected the district court's claim construction,
adopting instead a contrary construction of the claims based on its
own reading of the patent.' The majority confined itself exclusive-
ly to the "intrinsic" evidence, i.e., the claim language and the specifica-
tion of the 876 patent as well as the prosecution history. It gave no
consideration to the "extrinsic" evidence which informed the trial
judge, and undertook to interpret the claim anew, without according
any deference to the trial court's findings of fact based on evaluation
of all the evidence.
746
740. Id, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803.
741. Cyo-Trans, Inc., 893 F. Supp. at 791-92.
742. Id
743. See Cryo-Trans, Inc., 93 F.3d at 769, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803.
744. M, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803.
745. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803 (reviewing construction claim de novo to reach
result contrary to district court conclusion).
746. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)at 1803. Relying heavily on its interpretation of the patent
specification, the majority concluded that the phrase "openings ... adjacent each of said side
walls and end walls" in claim 1 referred to:
structurally distinct openings that are provided adjacent to each of the railcar's four
walls. Each opening is "adjacent" to only one wall, the nearest one to which it directs
the downward flow of carbon dioxide gas. Thus, an opening "adjacent" to a side wall
cannot also be an opening "adjacent" to an end wall. The patent does not contem-
plate the openings performing double duty in this manner. We therefore reject the
district court's claim construction, which was inconsistent with the specification and
drawings and rendered superfluous the claim requirement for openings adjacent to the
end walls.
1&, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804. In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit ignored the
findings of fact that compelled the trialjudge's construction of the claims. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1803. Although the trial judge found that the GATC Arcticar met the claimed
requirement of openings "adjacent" the end walls because the Arcticar included openings that
are located near to the end walls and achieve the disclosed purpose of refrigerating the entire
frozen food load, the Federal Circuit majority concluded that there are no openings in the
Arcticar "adjacent" to the end walls because the specification appeared to indicate that "the
openings were all closest to and thus 'adjacent' to the side walls." Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1803-04 (emphasis added).
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CircuitJudge Mayer, dissenting, was clearly critical of the majority's
rejection of the lower court's claim analysis without deferring properly
to its assessment of the evidence. 7 7 Mayer accepted the ordinary
meaning of "adjacent" found by the trial judge, stating that "the term
'adjacent' as used in the '876 patent means 'not far off,'" 7' and
criticized the majority's "citations to the claim language and specifica-
tion to support a meaning other than the ordinary meaning of
'adjacent' [to be] misplaced."749 He reasoned that:
[T] his court's de novo claim construction would necessarily prevent
a finding of infringement whenever a vent is nearer a side wall than
an end wall. This cannot be. For example, a vent only an inch
away from an end wall will not be considered "adjacent" to the end
wall as long as the vent is less than an inch from a side wall. Given
the dimensions at issue, surely a vent such a short distance from an
end wall is "adjacent" to that wall and must be infringing. The
difference between this hypothetical and our case is only a matter
of degree. The vent here was only 33 inches from the end wall of
a railcar which is 812 inches long. The district court is in a much
better position to evaluate this matter of degree."s
B. Second Step: Comparison of Claims to Accused Structure
After the construction of the claims, the second step of the
infringement analysis requires a comparison of the accused structure
with the claims to determine whether the structure falls within the
claim's scope.7"' Under the "all limitations rule," for either literal
infringement or infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, the
accused structure must contain each and every limitation of a patent
claim.752 This comparison of the accused structure to the patent
claims is a question of fact subject to a clearly erroneous standard of
review on appeal. 753
747. See id. at 772,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805-06 (MayerJ., dissenting) (disagreeing with
majority's de novo claim construction).
748. Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805 (MayerJ., dissenting).
749. Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805 (MayerJ., dissenting).
750. Id. at 772, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806 (emphasis added).
751. See Engel Indus., Inc. v. The Lockformer Co., 96 F.Sd 1398, 140304, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (outlining phases of patent inf-ingment analysis).
752. See Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 796, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1097,
1099 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (setting forth standard for establishing infringement of patent).
753. SeeEngel Indus., 96 F.3d at 1405-06,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165 (adhering to view that
identity of accused device for patent claim is question of fact to be reviewed for clear error).
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1. Literal infringement
Literal infringement occurs when the accused structure contains all
the limitations recited in a patent claim.754 Due to this requirement
that an accused device "read on" the claims of a patent, few cases are
appealed on the issue of literal infringement as compared to the issue
of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. As demonstrated
above by the Celanese case, however, when a true issue of literal
infringement exists, the importance of claim construction becomes
critical. 55
In Modine Manufacturing Co. v. United States International rade
Commission,756 for example, the Federal Circuit demonstrated the
importance of claim construction on literal infringement analyses.75'
Modine held a patent directed to a highly efficient and environmen-
tally advanced condenser for use in automotive air conditioning.
758
Showa Aluminum imported, sold, and used several models of
condensors similar to those patented by Modine. 759  Modine
brought a patent infringement action before the ITC.7 Some of
the disputed claim terms included the phrase, "relatively small
hydraulic diameter. "761 During the prosecution of the patent, an
upper limit of hydraulic diameters was given in some of the claims
from 0.070 to 0.040 inches, although the claims at issue only included
the "relatively small" definition and the specification stated the range
as "about."762 The accused products all used a diameter greater
than 0.040 inches.71 The ITC construed the patent claims as all
requiring an upper limit of 0.040 inches and, because the accused
754. SeeJohnston v. IVAG Corp., 885 F.2d 1574,1580,12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1382, 1384 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (defining elements of literal infringement).
755. See Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1581, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1126, 1130 (Fed. Cir.) (describing basis for court's decision, which was based on
construction of terms "dry physical dimension" and "stable"), cert. deniea 117 S. Ct. 275 (1996).
756. 75 F.3d 1545, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
757. See Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1554-55, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1615 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (demonstrating that finding of literal
noninfringement was based on incorrect claim construction).
758. See id. at 1549, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610 (describing patent at issue).
759. See id. at 1548, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610 (elucidating role of respondent Showa
Aluminum in controversy).
760. See id. at 1549, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610.
761. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
762. See id. at 1552-54, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613-14. The specification also explained
that the exact diameter depended on specified conditions. See id. at 1554,37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1615.
763. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615 (describing characteristics of accused products).
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product did not fall within the range, the ITC found no infringe-
ment.
76
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded.76 The
court explained that ordinarily a claim limitation is described in
descriptive words and, if a numerical range appears in the specifica-
tion or in other claims, such a range does not limit the claim to the
recited numbers.7 ' The court emphasized: "It is usually incorrect
to read numerical precision into a claim from which it is absent,
particularly when other claims contain the numerical limitation."
767
The court recognized that the preferred embodiment even included
the 0.015-0.040 inch range, but because the specification used the
word "about" to delimit the hydraulic diameter range, the court
concluded that the ITC erred by specifying a meaning not specified
within the claims.7 s  Indeed, the Federal Circuit resolved that,
where a limitation is included in several claims in terms of different
scope, a presumption arises that a difference in scope arises as to each
claim.
769
2. Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
If an accused structure does not literally infringe a patent claim,
then the structure still may infringe under the doctrine of equiva-
lents.77°  In Lifescan, Inc. v. Home Diagnostics, Inc.,77t the Federal
Circuit emphasized the requirement that a court not only consider
literal infringement but also consider infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents.772
Lifescan held a patent to a method of determining the amount of
test material in a fluid, such as the amount of glucose in blood.77
764. See id at 1554-55, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615 (recounting Commission's determina-
tion and basis for its decision).
765. See id. at 1558, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
766. See id. at 1551, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612 (stating rule of claim interpretation).
767. ML, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612; seeSpecialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981,
987, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601, 1604 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("'Particular embodiments appearing in
the specification will not generally be read into the claims.'").
768. See Modine Mfg. Co., 75 F.3d at 1554, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615 (discussing proper
significance that term "about" should receive).
769. See id. at 1551, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612 (explaining effect of including limitation
in several claims with terms of varying scope (citing Tandon Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1023, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1283, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 1987))).
770. See Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., 16 F.3d 394,397, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767,
1769 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (defining how accused structure may infringe under doctrine of
equivalents).
771. 76 F.3d 358, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1595 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
772. See LifeScan, Inc. v. Home Diagnostics, Inc., 76 F.3d 358, 359, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1595, 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (indicating that court must rule out both literal infringement and
infringements under doctrine of equivalents before summary judgment can be granted).
773. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596.
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The method involved the comparison of dry and wet reflectance
measurements on a test strip as compared to the reflectance after an
incubation period under identical timing schemes.774  Home
Diagnostics utilized a similar method, except that the patent claim
called for an initial dry measurement from the actual test strip, but
the Home Diagnostics method took an advance dry measurement
from a strip at the factory.75 Based on this distinction, the district
court granted a motion for summary judgment of
noninfringement.
776
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the literal infringement
decision, but reversed with regard to infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents.777 The court emphasized that the infringement
analysis involves a two-step process, construction of the claims and
comparison of the properly construed claims to the accused struc-
ture.771 In addition, the court held that this two-step process must
be applied both to literal infringement and infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents. 7 9 For the literal infringement analysis, the
court found no error because of the differences between the claimed
invention and the accused device pertaining to the manner of taking
the dry measurements.7' The court, however, could not rule
similarly on infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
78'
Because a genuine issue of material fact existed on whether the
advanced dry measurement at the factory constituted an equivalent of
the dry measurement from the actual test strip, the court determined
that a reasonable trier of fact could have found infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents.7 2 It found the grant of summary
judgment improper and reversed.' s
774. See id at 359-60,37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1597 (detailing preferred embodiment derived
in Lifescan's patent).
775. See id. at 360, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1597 (outlining similarities and differences
between Home Diagnostics' method and Lifescan's method).
776. See id. at 361, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1597-98 (recounting basis for district court's
ruling).
777. Seeid. at 362,37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1598,1599 (announcing appellate court's ruling).
778. See id. at 359, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596 (detailing two-step analysis for infringe-
ment).
779. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596 (addressing extent to which infringement analysis
must be applied).
780. See id. at 361-62, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1598 (asserting reasoning behind finding of
non-infringement).
781. See id. at 362, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1599 (reaching different conclusion on
infringement under doctrine of equivalents).
782. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1599.
783. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1599 (reversing and remanding for resolution of
outstanding factual question concerning infringement under doctrine of equivalents).
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In Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc.,7 the Federal
Circuit further demonstrated the necessity of the infringement
analysis for the doctrine of equivalents.7' Insituform held a patent
for an apparatus and method for impregnating the lining of a flexible
tube used to repair underground pipes with resin. 8  The invention
utilized a vacuum allowing the removal of air from the flexible tube
during the resin impregnation process. 7 Inliner utilized a similar
impregnation process, except that, whereas the patented invention
used a single "cap" to connect to the flexible tube, Inliner utilized
multiple "caps."788 Insituform sued Inliner for infringement, and
the district court returned a verdict of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents.8 9
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concurred that the Inliner device
did not literally infringe the patented invention because of the
apparent distinction between a single cap and multiple caps.7'0 The
court also agreed that the district court had properly determined that
prosecution history estoppel did not prevent a finding of infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents. 791 Due to an error in claim
construction, however, the Federal Circuit remanded the case.
792
In so doing, the court warned against misconceptions regarding the
application of the doctrine of equivalents: "[I] t is incorrect to refer
to a claim as being expanded or enlarged when infringement is found
under the doctrine of equivalents."793
a. The function-way-result test
The function-way-result test represents the traditional test for
determining infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, that is,
whether the accused structure performs substantially the same overall
784. 99 F.Sd 1098, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1602 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1555
(1997).
785. See Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 99 F.Sd 1098, 1107, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1602, 1608 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (discussing significance of undertaking infringement analysis
under doctrine of equivalents, in addition to literal infringement), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1555
(1997).
786. See id. at 1102, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604.
787. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605 (detailing process used in Insituform patent).
788. Id. at 1104-05, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607 (referring to use of multiple caps in
Insituform patent).
789. See id. at 1101, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604.
790. See id. at 1105-07, U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607-08.
791. See id. at 1107-09, U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1609-10.
792. See id. at 1109, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610.
793. Id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610 (citingWilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey &
Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 684, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942, 1948 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
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function, in substantially the same way, to obtain substantially the
same overall result as the described in the patent claim. 94
In Engel Industries, Inc. v. The Lockformer Co.,795 the Federal Circuit
applied the traditional function-way-result analysis. 96 Lockformer,
succeeded later by Met-Coil, held a duct connecting system pat-
ent.797 The system facilitated the connection of sheet metal ducts
sections by "a retainer means," described in the specification as
crimping of the ends.98 Engel manufactured a competing duct
connection system, which provided for the connection of ducts by a
continuous spring force.7 ' Lockformer sued Engel, and the district
court ruled that Engel had infringed the patented duct connection
system under the doctrine of equivalents.8s°
On appeal, the Federal Circuit applied the function-way-result
analysis.""1 Because the system used by Engel utilized a spring force,
and not crimping, to connect the ducts, the court reversed the
finding of infringement 0 2 The court explained: "[A] lthough both
duct connecting systems may perform substantially the same function
... and may achieve substantially the same result ... they do not
perform in substantially the same way."803 Thus, because a spring
force is not the same as a crimping force, the "way" of connecting the
ducts was not equivalent, and the Federal Circuit reversed the district
court's holding.0 4
In Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., °5 the Federal Circuit further refined
the function-way-result analysis." 6 Zygo held a patent for an inter-
ferometer.0 7  The interferometer contained a stationary diffuse
screen on which a visible cross-hair reticle marked the center of the
794. See Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 1718 (1966).
795. 96 F.3d 1398, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
796. See Engel Indus., Inc. v. The Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398,1407,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (relying on function-way-result rationale in reaching non-
infringement conclusion).
797. See id. at 1399, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162.
798. Id at 1406-07, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166-67.
799. See id. at 1406-07, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166-67.
800. See id. at 1403, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163 (recounting legal and procedural history
of case).
801. See id. at 1406-07,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166-67 (applyingfunction-way-result analysis
to find non-infringement).
802. See id. at 1407,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166-67 (finding no infringement and reversing
district court's decision).
803. Id. at 1406, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
804. See id at 1406-07, 40 U.S.P.Q 2d at 1166-67 (reasoning that no infringement occurred
under doctrine of equivalents because Engels' system performed in a substantially differentway).
805. 79 F.3d 1563, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see supra notes 453-58.
806. See Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1565, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, 1282
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (analyzing means by which Zygo interferometer patent achieved its result).
807. See id. at 1565, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282.
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optical axis. 08 Wyko produced two interferometer systems, one with
a stationary diffuse screen on which light produced an output generat-
ed by computer software for purposes of alignment, and another with
a diffuse screen on which images from a prism provided align-
ment.8s 9 Zygo sued Wyko for patent infringement and, although
the district court found no literal infringement, the court found
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents."' 0
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reiterated that to find infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents, a court must find the presence of
every element or its substantial equivalent within the accused
device.' Thus, with regard to the Wyko interferometer using
computer software to produce the alignment output, the court
concurred that a software output may serve as an equivalent of a
physical entity.12 With regard to the Wyko interferometer using the
prism to produce the alignment output, however, the court disagreed
that this structure could serve as an equivalent 813  The court
explained that merely showing that a device performs the same
function to achieve the same result is not sufficient. "The result must
be achieved in substantially the same way."14 The court concluded
that, because the prism entailed a different structure and operation,
there could be no equivalent "way."
815
b. Limitations on the function-way-result test
The function-way-result test is not the sole consideration for a
finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. In Hilton-
Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc.,s16 the Federal Circuit
clearly explained that several methodologies exist to determine
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.817 For example, the
808. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282.
809. See ae at 1566, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283 (describing interferometer devices
produced by Wyko).
810. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283 (recounting procedural history of case).
811. See i& at 1568, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285 (reasserting elements of infringement
under doctrine of equivalents).
812. See id. at 1569, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285 (agreeingwith trial court finding regarding
equivalency).
813. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285 (reaching different conclusion than trial court
concerning equivalency of Wyko's prism to Zygo's design).
814. M, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285.
815. Id, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1286. The court explained. "A finding of equivalency just
because the same result is achieved is 'a flagrant abuse' of the term 'equivalent.'" Id. (quoting
Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 573 (1863)).
816. 62 F.3d 1512, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), rev'd, 117 S. Ct.
1040 (1997).
817. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1518-20, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 164547 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997).
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court held that in addition to the function-way-result test, the test can
also be whether a substitute element plays a role that is substantially
different from the claimed element.818 Yet, the court did not stop
with the addition of the insubstantial difference analysis but held that
there is simply no definitive test for infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents.1 9 The court recognized the importance of evidence
of copying, designing around, and independent development, in
addition to the insubstantial difference analysis.82° Hilton Davis thus
expanded the utility of the doctrine of equivalents in infringement
analysis. Although now reversed, Hilton Davis82' provided the
framework for subsequent decisions in 1996 by the Federal Circuit on
the doctrine of equivalents.
In National Presto Industries, Inc. v. West Bend Co.,8 22 the Federal
Circuit reviewed a jury determination of infringement based on the
doctrine of equivalents in light of Hilton Davis."z' National Presto
developed and applied for a patent on a device for cutting vegetables
into spiral curls. 24 However, West Bend heard rumors about the
device, developed a similar product, and began to sell the product
before the National Presto patent issued."s After issuance, National
Presto sued West Bend, and ajury found the patent infringed under
the doctrine of equivalents. 2 6
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered several arguments
relating to the jury's infringement finding. 27  First, West Bend
argued that the issue of infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents was a question of law for the judge, not a question of fact for the
jury.828 The court quickly rejected this argument, citing Hilton-
Davis.8 29 Second, West Bend argued that National Presto had failed
to proffer sufficient evidence to satisfy the factual questions of
"function, way, result, and 'why."' 8'  Again citing Hilton Davis, the
818. Id. at 1517-1518, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644-45.
819. See id. at 1521-22, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
820. See id. at 1519-20, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646-47.
821. See Hilton Davis, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997), revk 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc).
822. 76 F.3d 1185, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
823. See National Presto Indus., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1191, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1685, 1688 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
824. See id. at 1188, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686.
825. See National Presto Indus., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1049, 1051
(W.D. Wis. 1993), rev'd, 76 F.3d 1185, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
826. See National Presto, 76 F.3d at 1190-92, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688-89.
827. See id. at 1191, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
828. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
829. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688 (relying on Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v, Warner-
Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997), which held
that infringement under equivalency analysis was a question for the jury).
830. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
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court rejected this contention, explaining that there was no definite
formula for establishing infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents.131  Quoting Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air
Products Co., 32 the court emphasized that the evidence needed to
prove equivalency "is not the prisoner of a formula."8 3 Finally,
West Bend argued that its product could not infringe the National
Presto patent because West Bend had received its own patent for its
vegetable slicer."M The court also rejected this argument,8 " ex-
plaining that, "improvements or modifications of a product may
indeed be separately patentable,"836 but these differences do not
"[prevent] infringement of the prior patent."837
In Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Manufacturing, Inc.,8" the
Federal Circuit also demonstrated the application of the new Hilton-
Davis standard for infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents. 9 Athletic Alternatives held a patent to a tennis racket with
splayed strings.8" When Prince manufactured and sold a tennis
racket with a similar string structure, Athletic sued for patent
infringement.84' On a motion for summary judgment of
noninfringement, Prince argued that the splaying methodology used
by Athletic utilized three offset distances, whereas the Prince tennis
racket utilized only two offset differences.' The district court
agreed with Prince's claim construction and granted the motion.843
831. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
832. 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950).
833. National Presto, 76 F.3d at 1191, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
834. See i. at 1191, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689.
835. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689.
836. Id, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689.
837. See id. at 1191-92, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689. West Bend made one additional
argument to avoid infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, namely, that the district
court had failed to make a hypothetical claim analysis. See id at 1192, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1689. West Bend alleged that the trial court had an obligation to identify the available range
of equivalents and so instruct the jury, clarifying the content of the prior art. See ido, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689. The Federal Circuit likewise rejected this argument, explaining that
West Bend (and not the court) had the burden to show that the accused device is in the prior
art. See i&, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689.
838. 73 F.3d 1573, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
839. See Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg. Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
840. See id. at 1574, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366.
841. See io, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367. Prior to the suit, Prince and Athletic Alternatives
had been working together to develop and license a splayed string racket. See it., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1367. As part of a confidentiality agreement, Athletic had shared its prototype with
Prince, which later abandoned the project in favor of a similar product. See id,, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1367.
842. See id. at 1577, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1369.
843. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1369.
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed that the patented tennis
racket contained three offset distances and that the Prince racket
contained only two distances.'s Although affirming the absence of
literal infringement, the court closely examined whether the Prince
racket infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.8s The court
recited the Hilton Davis standard, whether the differences between the
accused structure and the patent claim are insubstantial to one of
"ordinary skill in the relevant art."8 46  It also reiterated that, for
infringement under the "all limitations" rule of the doctrine of
equivalents, the accused structure must contain each limitation in the
patent claim or its equivalent . 47 Because the patent claim required
three offset distances-the accused structure contained only two-the
court concluded that the "all limitations" rule could not be satisfied
and thus affirmed the judgment of the district court s18
In Roton Barrie, Inc. v. Stanley Works,'49 the Federal Circuit similar-
ly considered the issue of insubstantial differences between accused
and claimed structures. 59 Stanley appealed from a judgment of the
district court finding, inter alia, willful infringement of Roton's patent
on a pinless hinge structure. 51 On appeal, the Federal Circuit
adhered to its insubstantial differences test, set forth in Hilton-
Davis."5 2 According to the court, Hilton Davis teaches that evidence
of copying implies that the differences between the claimed and the
accused product or process are insubstantial.55 Conversely, evi-
dence of designing around weighs against finding infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents, because such evidence may indicate that
the competitor designed substantial differences into the accused
product or process to avoid an infringement claim.8 -4 The apparent
reason for the difference in the court's treatment of copying versus
designing around is that the patent system finds copying to be
reprehensible while designing around "is the stuff of which competi-
tion is made."
55
844. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372.
845. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373.
846. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373.
847. See i&. at 1582, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375 (listing relevant cases).
848. See id. at 1582-83,37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373 (finding that Athletic Alternatives could
not prevail as a matter of law).
849. 79 F.3d 1112, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1816 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
850. SeeRoton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1126,37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1816,
1827 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
851. See id. at 1125, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826.
852. See id. at 1126, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827.
853. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827.
854. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827.
855. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827 (citation omitted).
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In Roton, the Federal Circuit opined that the district court failed to
consider the substantial differences between the claimed hinge
structure and the accused hinge.856 The court also noted that
Stanley was aware of the patent at issue and attempted to design
around it, which provided "an inference of no infringement under
the doctrine." 7 The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that
Stanley's attempts to design around, coupled with the substantial
differences that resulted, dictated reversal of the district court's
finding of infringement.'
c. Dedication to the public-failure to claim an embodiment
When a patentee's failure to claim a distinct alternative embodi-
ment set forth in the specification evidences a clear intent to
surrender that alternative embodiment to the public, the patentee
later may be estopped from asserting infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents.859
In Maxwell v. f Bake, Inc.,"6 the Federal Circuit considered such
a case. The patent at issue related to a system for joining pairs of
shoes together. 61 The asserted claim unambiguously called for a
"fastening tab" that "extend[ed] horizontally between the inside
surfaces of the outer sole ... and inner sole ... of the shoe.""62
This "preferred embodiment" of the invention was also shown in
Figure 2 of the patent." The specification further taught that
"[a]lternatively, [the tabs] may be stitched into a lining seam of the
shoes at the sides or back of the shoes.""u That alternative embodi-
ment, however, was not claimed."s Due to this omission, the jury
found infringement, and the district denied a motion for judgment
as a matter of law.86
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that a person of ordinary skill
in the art would conclude from a review of the specification, claims,
856. See id. at 1126-27,37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827 (outlining differences between the two
devices).
857. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827.
858. See id. at 1127, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827.
859. See Maxwell v.J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1107,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1007 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
860. 86 F.3d 1098, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see infra notes 1064-76, 1200-
07 and accompanying text.
861. See Maxwell v.J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1101,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1003 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
862. Id at 1102, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
863. See id. at 1101-02, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
864. Id. at 1106, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
865. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
866. See id. at 1104, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
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and prosecution history that Maxwell intended to dedicate this
unclaimed embodiment to the public. 67 The court explained:
Here, Maxwell limited her claims to fastening tabs attached between
the inner and outer soles. She disclosed in the specification,
without claiming them, alternatives in which the fastening tabs
could be "stitched into the lining seam of the shoes." ... By failing
to claim these alternatives, the Patent and Trademark Office was
deprived of an opportunity to consider whether these alternatives
were patentable. A person of ordinary skill in the shoe industry, reading
the specification and prosecution history, and interpreting the claims, would
conclude that Maxwell, by failing to claim the alternate shoe attachment
systems in which the tabs were attached to the inside shoe lining, dedicated
the use of such systems to the public.s
Thus, the court held that an intentional surrender of subject matter
during prosecution may create an estoppel precluding application of
the doctrine of equivalents.8 9 Importantly, the estoppel was found
not simply because subject matter was disclosed in the specification
and not claimed, but because the applicant's failure to claim the
distinct alternative embodiment described in the specification
unequivocally showed an intent to give up patent protection for that
embodiment. 0 Accordingly, this is perhaps no different than the
typical case of prosecution history estoppel. 71
C. Special Infringement Analyses
1. Means-plusfunction claims
A means-plus-function claim, as denoted at 35 U.S.C. § 112,
specifies that a claim element expressed "as a means or step for
performing a specified function, without the recital of structure,
material, or acts in support thereof... shall be construed to cover
corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specifica-
tion and equivalents thereof." 1 2  To determine whether a claim
limitation is met literally when expressed as a means for performing
a stated function, a court must compare the accused structure with
867. See id. at 1107-08, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
868. Id. at 1108, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
869. See id. at 1107, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
870. See id. at 1106, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
871. It is noteworthy that the Maxwell panel distinguished this case from Graver Tank &
Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950). Unlike the patentee in Graver,
who intended to claim the subject matter in dispute, Maxwell "limited her claims" to a specific
embodiment. See Maxwel, 86 F.3d at 1107-08, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006-07.
872. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 6 (1994).
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the disclosed structure.8 73 In addition, a court must also find
"equivalent structure as well as identity of claimed function for that
structure."874
In Markman, the Federal Circuit did not decide whether the
determination of structures equivalent to those disclosed in the
specification is a question of fact or law or whether the issue is
decided by the jury or judge.8 7 When a determination may be
made based on a review of the prosecution history, however, as in
Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co.,s 6 the Federal Circuit has
resolved this issue in favor of the judge. In that case, Alpex held the
patent to an invention in the field of home video game systems. 77
The patent described a "keyboard-controlled apparatus for producing
video signals by means of random access memory (RAM) with storage
positions corresponding to each discrete position of the raster for a
standard television."7 8 "The television raster comprises numerous
discrete dots or bars, approximately 32,000, which the cathode ray
beam illuminates on a standard cycle," thereby creating the image on
the television screen.8 79 Sufficient RAM was thus required "to
accommodate each of the approximately 32,000 memory positions
needed to represent the raster image."8" The system used a so-
called "bit mapping" technique in which the RAM held "at least one
"bit" of data for each position in the memory "map" of the ras-
ter.,,s81
The Nintendo Entertainment System ("NES"), manufactured by
Nintendo Co., was another apparatus for producing video signals by
means of storage positions corresponding to discrete positions of the
raster for a standard television receiver.8 2 The NES's video display
873. See Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 975, 226 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 5, 8 (Fed. Cir.
1985); see also supra Part II.E.5.
874. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1737, 1739 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (in banc) (citations omitted).
875. In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 977, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,
1327 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), aft'd 116 S. Ct 1384 (1996), the Federal Circuit held that claim
construction is a matter of law for the judge to decide. Chief Judge Archer, writing for the
court, presented one intriguing issue that the court declined to answer. "[Wihether a
determination of equivalents under § 112, para. 6 is a question of law or fact." Id at 977 n.8,
34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 n.8.
876. 102 F.3d 1214, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1667 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
877. SeeAlpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102 F.3d 1214, 1216,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1667, 1668 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The inventors patented a micro-processor-based home video game
system that used modular plug-in units-replaceable, read-only memory, or ROM, cartridges-to
permit home video systems to play multiple games. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
878. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669.
879. See id. at 1217, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669.
880. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1669.
881. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669.
882. See id. at 1217-18, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669-70.
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system did not include RAM with storage positions corresponding to
each discrete position of the raster; but used a patented picture
processing unit ("PPU") to generate images.' NES's device placed
pre-formed, horizontal slices of data in one of eight shift registers
capable of storing a maximum of eight pixels.' The data was then
processed directly to the screen.' The PPU repeated this process
to assemble the initial image on the screen. 6  Based on this
technology, Alpex sued Nintendo for patent infringement.8 7 The
dispute centered on whether the NES employed a "means for
generating a video signal," as recited in the asserted claims.'
Following a jury trial, the district court entered judgment holding
Alpex's '555 patent valid and willfully infringed, and awarded
$253,641,445 in damages and interest.
88 9
On appeal, Nintendo argued that the asserted claims of the Alpex
patent required the use of a RAM memory map for all of the 32,000
pixels in the raster, whereas the NES used shift registers that provide
a maximum of only sixty-four pixels."sg According to Nintendo,
there could be no literal infringement or infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents. 91 Nintendo maintained that the prosecu-
tion history for the '555 patent barred Alpex from claiming that the
NES infringes because Alpex distinguished the '555 patent claims
from a prior art patent that uses shift registers like Nintendo. 9 2
At the outset, the Federal Circuit noted that prosecution history is
relevant not only for prosecution history estoppel purposes but also
for construing the meaning and scope of claims.89 3  During the
prosecution of the application that became the Alpex patent, the
examiner rejected a claim that specified a series of limitations in
883. See id. at 1218, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
884. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
885. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
886. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
887. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
888. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
889. See id. at 1215, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
890. See id. at 1219, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670-71.
891. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671.
892. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1671. Specifically, during prosecution for the '555 patent,
Alpex explained to the Patent Office that, unlike Okuda's patent, which claimed a shift register-
based video display structure, the claimed structure used a bit-map system. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
at 1671. Distinguishing the Okuda patent, Alpex argued that "[b]ecause random access to the
shift registers is not possible, Okuda is unable to selectively modify a single bit... but, instead,
must operate on a line at a time to modify the stored display data." Id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1671.
Alpex added that "[t]he random access techniques of applicants' invention enables any single
point on the TV screen to be altered at will (under control of the micro-processor)." Id., 40
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1671.
893. See id. at 1220, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671.
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means-plus-function format to a display control apparatus using a
RAM-based, bit-map system." Specifically, Alpex distinguished
Okuda based on the structural difference between a RAM-based and
a shift register-based video display system."' The district court gave
no weight to Alpex's statement regarding Okuda, however, because
Alpex asserted infringement of different claims. 9
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded it was error to ignore the
prosecution history, discerning "no reason why prosecution history
relating to the structure of the video display in the means-plus-
function limitations of [one claim] is not pertinent to the same
structure of the same display system in the means-plus-function
limitations of [other claims]."8" The court declared emphatically
that "[ s] tatements made during the prosecution relating to structures
disclosed in the specification are certainly relevant to determining the
meaning of the means-plus-function limitations of the claims at
issue.""98 Accordingly, the court concluded that Alpex's arguments
that a system based on shift registers is not structurally or functionally
equivalent to a RAM-based system that can randomly access a single
bit constituted an admission that its claims did not cover a video
system based on shift registers.8" The court thus held that, because
the invention disclosed in the patent possessed the same structural
and functional traits as Okuda, Alpex's claims could not be construed
to cover the NES, either literally or under the doctrine of equiva-
lents.9t0
Of all the cases to construe means-plus-function claims in 1996,
however, York Products, Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Center,90 '
is perhaps the most interesting in light of the court's determination
of what constitutes a means-plus-function claim. York held a patent
to a vehicle cargo bed liner, such as those used in the bed of a pickup
894. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671-72.
895. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672.
896. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672.
897. Id, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672.
898. Id, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672.
899. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672.
900. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672. In reaching this conclusion, the court construed
the claimed means for generating a video signal by looking at the specification to determine the
disclosed structure corresponding to the claimed means and the prosecution history regarding
that structure. The court thus considered the determination of structural equivalents is a
question of law for the judge when the decision turns on information from the prosecution
history. See iU, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672. But the court did not answer, however, whether
the structural equivalents determination is a question of law or fact when prosecution history
like that in Alpex is not pivotal to the decision. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672.
901. 99 F.3d 1568, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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truck." 2 When Central Tractor sold similar bed liners manufac-
tured by Custom Form, York sued for patent infringement 0 3 The
parties were unable to agree on the issue of claim construction, so the
district court adopted a construction advocated by Custom Form, who
also defended Central Tractor, 4 and granted a motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law on the issue.90°
On appeal, the Federal Circuit applied a de novo standard of review
on the issue of claim construction."' Significantly, the court
considered the construction of claim 32 of the patent, which
described the depth of the load lock as "means formed on the
upwardly extending liner sidewall portions .... ,907 The court
stated that the use of the word 'means' gave rise to a presumption of
the use of means-plus-function language.9" The court cautioned,
however, that the "mere incantation of the word 'means' in a clause
reciting predominately structure cannot evoke section 112, 6.""
Accordingly, although the claim used the word "means," because
there was no link of the term to a function, the court determined that
the claim did not invoke paragraph six of 35 U.S.C. § 112.910 As a
result, the court concluded that if a recitation of the word "means"
does not contain a link to some function "the presumption in use of
the word 'means' does not operate."9 '
In Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,912 the Federal Circuit also consid-
ered the interpretation of the use of the term "means. "913 Cole
held a patent to a disposable brief used for toilet training that could
be torn open for removal without pulling it over the legs.
914
Kimberly-Clark developed a similar brief, which also could be torn
open for removal, except that it formed the means of removal by
ultrasonic-bonded side seams.915  Cole sued Kimberly-Clark for
902. See York Prods., Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1569, 49
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619, 1620 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
903. Id. at 1570, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620-21.
904. Id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620.
905. Id. at 1571, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621.
906. Id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621.
907. See id. at 1573, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623.
908. Seeid. at 1574,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623 (citing Greenbergv. Ethicon Endo-Surgery,
Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1584, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
909. Id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623.
910. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1624.
911. Id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1624.
912. 102 F.3d 524,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 139 L. Ed. 2d 20
(1997).
913. SeeColev. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 530-32, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001,1006-
1007 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 139 L. Ed. 2d 20 (1997).
914. See id. at 526, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
915. See id. at 527, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
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patent infringement, but the district court found noninfringement
because the Cole patent claimed the perforation as a "perforation
means," which the court determined could not encompass an
ultrasonic weld.916 The court restricted the scope of the term
"perforation means," concluding that the claim was not a mean-plus-
function claim pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6. 91
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court's decision
that "perforation means" was not a means-plus-function claim.91
The court acknowledged that to invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 6, a claim
must not recite a definite structure that performs the described
function.9"9 The court then stated that the mere use of the word
"means" does not automatically indicate a means-plus-function claim,
and similarly, that the absence of the word "means" does not
automatically prevent the construction of a claim as means-plus-
function.9 21 Yet, because the claim in the Cole patent contained not
only function but also a specific structure for the function, the court
concluded that the claim could not be interpreted pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 112, 6.21 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed.922
Interestingly, Judge Rader, the same judge who ruled in York
Products that the "mere incantation of the word 'means' in a clause
reciting predominately structure [could not] evoke section 112,
6,"  dissented in this case, based on the statement regarding the
presumption under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6.924 He argued that "[m]ere
invocation of the word 'means' also does not magically conjure all the
916. See id, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003. The district court granted summary judgment on
the literal infringement claim, concluding that none of Kimberly-Clark's products included
perforations. See id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003. On reconsideration, the court also granted
summaryjudgment on the claim of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, concluding
that, "because of prosecution history estoppel, 'perforation means' cannot be read to include
the seams formed by the ultrasonic welds in [Kimberly-Clark's] accused products." Id at 528,
41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
917. See id. at 527, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
918. See id. at 530-32, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006-07.
919. See id at 531, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
920. See id, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006. The court must decide on an element-by-element
basis, based on the patent and prosecution history, whether to apply 35 U.S.C. § 12, 6. See id.,
41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
921. See id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006. The court stated:
The claim describes not only the structure that supports the tearing function, but also
its location (extending from the leg band to the waist band) and extent (extending
through the outer permeable layer). An element with such a detailed recitation of its
structure, as opposed to its function, cannot meet the requirements of the statute.
M, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
922. See id. at 533, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007-08.
923. York Prods., Inc. v. Central Tractor, 99 F.3d 1568, 1574, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619,
1623 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
924. See Kimberly-Clark, 102 F.3d at 533, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008 (RaderJ., dissenting).
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implications of means-plus-function claiming, but Laitram suggests that
the use of 'means' creates at least a presumption in favor of section
112, 6."92
2. Product-by-process and pmduct claims
Like means-plus-function claims, product-by-process claims are
another special type of claim drafting technique.926 If a product is
difficult to define, then the product-by-process claim allows a
description of the invention by the process steps which result in the
creation of the product."
In contrast to product-by-process claims, one may also simply claim
the product.9 21 Indeed, one of the most heralded of the recent
product patent cases involved the 1995 case, Exxon Chemical Patents,
Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp.9" Exxon held a patent to a lubricating oil
composition used as a crankcase lubricant.9' Based on the patent,
Exxon sued Lubrizol for patent infringement.931 The patent recited
the elements of the patent claim by specifying (or listing) the five
ingredients that comprised the product.9 32 Exxon contended that
the patent to the product encompassed all recipes for the creation of
the product, even if one of the ingredients recited in the patent was
missing, but Lubrizol argued that the patent could not also protect
the process (or ingredients) utilized to obtain the product because
the patent only extended to a product and not a process.933 A jury
found the patent not invalid, but willfully infringed, and awarded
damages; the district court granted Exxon's request for an injunction
and the award of attorney fees and costs.934
925. Id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008 (Rader, J., dissenting) (citing Laitram Corp. v.
Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1536, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
926. A product-by-process claim describes how a product is made, not how it is used. See
Mentor Corp. v. Coloplast, Inc., 998 F.2d 992, 997, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1521, 1526 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
927. See In reHughes, 496 F.2d 1216, 1219, 182 U.S.P.Q. 106, 108 (C.C.P. 1974) (holding
that, "where [a] product is incapable of description by product claims .... [the patent
applicant] is entitled to product-by-process claims that recite [the) novel process of manufhc-
ture").
928. Cf In re Hack, 245 F.2d 246, 248-49, 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 161, 163 (C.C.P.A. 1957)
(holding that, in order to claim a product patent based on the discovery of a new use of a
known composition of matter, the patent must claim a composition that is both new and
obvious).
929. 64 F.3d 1553, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2554
(1996).
930. Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1555,35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1801, 1802 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2554 (1996).
931. See id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802.
932. See id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802.
933. See id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802.
934. See id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802.
1772
1996 PATENT LAW DECISIoNs
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the district court had
applied an improper claim construction, reversed the infringement
ruling, and vacated the injunction as well as the award of damages
and attorney fees.935 Specifically, the court concluded that patent
claims directed solely to a product could not extend to cover the
process for making the product.
9 6
In a powerful dissent, CircuitJudge Nies explained that the majority
had invented overly technical requirements for the drafting of claims
in chemical patents.937 Judge Nies noted that, although Lubrizol
had used all five of the ingredients recited in Exxon's patent, the
resulting product did not contain a traceable amount of all five
ingredients in the claimed amounts.9" She explained: "[T] o show
infringement, the majority believes that it was Exxon's burden to
prove that, at some point during production of Lubrizol's products,
the mixing pot contained [the claimed ingredients].""' As such,
Judge Nies contended that the majority had created unduly "technical
rules for how chemical compositions must be claimed."9"
In 1996, the Federal Circuit considered and rejected a petition for
rehearing in bane.941 Circuit Judge Newman, dissenting from the
rejection of the petition, disagreed with the panel's decision in Exxon:
It is incorrect as a matter of law, as a matter of chemistry, and as a
matter of patent practice. The panel majority's new rule of "claim
construction" will cast a cloud upon many thousands of existing
patents, and major classes of chemical invention will confront
unclear, unnecessary, confusing, expensive, and perhaps impossible
scientific requirements.942
In her dissent, Judge Newman further criticized the majority panel's
decision as holding that a claim to a chemical composition is not
935. See id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802.
936. See id. at 1557-58, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804:
In sum, a review of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history all
point to the conclusion that Exxon claims a product, not merely a recipe for making
whatever product results from the use of the recipe ingredients. This conclusion
respects that which is claimed, namely a chemical composition. The chemical
composition exists at the moment the ingredients are mixed together. Before creation
of the mixture, the ingredients exist independently. The particular proportions
specified in the claims simply define the characteristics of the claimed composition.
M, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804.
937. See id. at 1564, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809 (Nies, J., dissenting).
938. See id. at 1564-65, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810 (NiesJ., dissenting).
939. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810 (NiesJ., dissenting).
940. Id. at 1564, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809 (NiesJ., dissenting).
941. Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 77 F.3d 450, 451, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1767, 1767 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (in banc).
942. IdM at 451, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1768 (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g
in banc).
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infringed if there is any interaction between any of the ingredients
after being added to the composition.9" She stated: "Under the
court's new law, table salt dissolved in water will not be an adequate
description of the composition for infringement purpose, since the
sodium chloride molecule no longer 'exists': in dissolution the
sodium and chloride ions will have broken their bonds to each other,
in interaction with molecules of water."9 Judge Newman then
warned that such a claim construction could possibly render "[m] any
thousands" of chemical patents fatally unenforceable as a matter of
law.945
3. Infringement by importation
In the Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988 ("PPAA"),946
Congress amended the patent infringement provisions of 35 U.S.C.
§ 271 to include § 27 1(g), which provided patent infringement
remedies for the importation, sale, or use in the United States,
without authorization, of a product made by a process patented in the
United States.947 Several years later, Congress amended section
271 (g) to include offers to sell, an amendment effective as ofJanuary
1, 1996.948
In Bio-Technology General Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 14 the Federal
Circuit considered the limited exceptions when the importation, sale,
use, or offer for sale of a product made by a process patent in the
United States does not violate § 271 (g).1" Genentech held by
assignment a patent relating to the process of making a human
growth hormone ("hGH") that is identical, or functionally identical,
to the natural hormone and another patent relating to a cloning
vehicle capable of replicating hGH.951 Bio-Technology General,
which manufactured and imported hGH into the United States, sued
Genentech seeking a declaratory judgment.952 Genentech counter-
943. See id. at 452,37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1768 (Newman,J., dissenting from denial ofreh'g
in banc).
944. Id, 37U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1769 (Newman,J, dissentingfrom denial ofreh'g in banc).
945. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1768 (Newman,J., dissenting from denial of reh'g in
banc).
946. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107,
1563 (codified in scattered tites of 35 U.S.C.).
947. See 35 U.S.CA § 27 1(g) (West Supp. 1997).
948. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809,4988 (1994)
(effectiveJan. 1, 1996).
949. 80 F.3d 1553, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 274 (1996).
950. See Bio-Technology Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1560, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 274 (1996).
951. See id. at 1556-57, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
952. See id. at 1557, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323-24.
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claimed for infringement under § 27 1 (g) and moved for a preliminary
injunction."' The district court found that Genentech would suffer
irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction and granted the
motion.95
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the standards for issuance
of a preliminary injunction"' and emphasized that the patentee has
the burden of establishing a likelihood of success on the merits of the
infringement suit.956 The court then emphasized the role of
§ 271 (g) in patent infringement cases, explaining how the provision
deals not with the making of a product by a patented process in the
United States but with the importation, sale, use, or offer to sell such
a product.9 57 Next, the court considered the statutory exclusion of
any product "'materially changed by a subsequent process"' and any
product that has become "'a trivial and nonessential component of
another product.' 95  Additionally, the court recognized that the
statute contained a grandfather clause, stating that liability would not
arise if (1) on January 1, 1988, the product was already in substantial
and continuous use or sale by the accused infringer in the United
States, or (2) substantial preparation for the use or sale of the
product was made before January 1, 1988.119  Bio-Technology
argued that, because it had made substantial preparation for sale or
use of hGH in the United States, it was entitled to the grandfather
clause.9" The Federal Circuit disagreed, however, holding that
merely raising money does not satisfy the requirement of "substantial
preparation."96
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. American Cyanamid Co.,962 the Federal Circuit
looked at the "materially changed" clause of § 271 (g).963 Eli Lilly
held a process patent to an intermediate compound necessary for the
953. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
954. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324. The court also concluded that Genentech had
demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, and that a balance of the
hardships as well as the public interest favored granting the injunction. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1324.
955. The determination of whether to grant a preliminary injunction is within the discretion
of the district court. See Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d at 1557, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1324. A reviewing
court must apply an abuse of discretion standard to the district court's decision to grant or deny
a preliminary injunction. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
956. See id. at 1558, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
957. See id. at 1560, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
958. Id. at 1561, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326-27 (quoting 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(g)).
959. See id. at 1562, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327-28.
960. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328.
961. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328.
962. 82 F.3d 1568, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
963. See Eli Lilly Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 82 F.3d 1568, 1572, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1705, 1708 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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production of an antibiotic generic drug.9" American Cyanamid
produced the generic drug outside the United States and when
American Cyanamid began to import and sell the drug, Lilly sought
a preliminary injunction.9" The district court determined that Lilly
had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of the validity
issue, but had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
question of infringement 9" Accordingly, the district court denied
the preliminary injunction.
6 7
On appeal, the Federal Circuit determined whether the production
of a generic drug, necessitating the use of a process patent, violated
§ 271 (g).11 In deciding this infringement question, the court
reviewed the legislative history of the PPAA.969 The court noted
that, although Congress recognized the importance of protecting
direct and unaltered products of patented processes, it also created
two exceptions for products produced abroad by a patented process
but modified or incorporated into other products before importation
into the United States. As a result, a product made by a patented
process is not considered within the terms of § 271(g) after (1) it is
materially changed by subsequent process, or (2) it becomes a trivial
or nonessential component of another product.9 70  American
Cyanamid argued that no infringement occurred because the
intermediate was "materially changed by subsequent process"971 into
the generic drug.972 After an exhaustive review of the legislative
history to § 271 (g), the Federal Circuit agreed and affirmed. 97
Notably, however, the court concluded that there is no clear
definition of what constitutes "materially changed" in terms of
§ 271 (g).974
964. See id. at 1570, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706.
965. See id. at 1570-71, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706-07.
966. See id. at 1571, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707.
967. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707.
968. See id. at 1571-72, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707-08.
969. See id. at 1573-74, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709.
970. See idi at 1572-73, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708-09 (rejecting contention that § 271(g)
did not bar importation of compound that had no commercial use in United States other than
one used by existing patent).
971. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (1) (1994).
972. See Eli Lilly, 82 F.3d at 1573, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709 (arguing that the chemical
was materially changed through a four-step process).
973. See id. at 1573-78, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709-13 (reviewing legislative history of 35
U.S.C. § 271(g)).
974. See id. at 1578, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713 (stating that legislative history does not
provide conclusive answer on how to define "materially challenged").
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4. Preliminary injunction infringement analysis
Upon an allegation of patent infringement, the law provides for a
preliminary injunction if the patentee can show (1) a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits, (2) an irreparable harm, (3) the
balance of hardships tipping in its favor, and (4) a tolerable effect on
the public interest.97 The grant of a preliminary injunction,
however, remains within the discretion of the trial court." The
patentee bears the burden of proving entitlement to the injunc-
tion.9 7 In patent infringement cases, moreover, the trial court's
determination whether to grant a preliminary injunction often
involves at least an initial construction of the patent claims in order
to determine the likelihood of success.978
In Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. DePuy-Motech, Inc.," the Federal
Circuit demonstrates the typical approach given by both a trial court
and the appeals court on a preliminary injunction issue. Sofamor
held three patents on surgical implant devices to correct deformities
or traumas in the human spine.9"° When DePuy-Motech introduced
a competing surgical implant device similar to those covered by the
Sofamor patents, Sofamor sued for patent infringement and sought
a preliminary injunction.98 1 Based on an initial construction of the
words "body attaching means" and "threaded plug," the district court
concluded that Sofamor had not demonstrated a likelihood of success
on the merits and denied the preliminary injunction.
98 2
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the standards for the grant
of a preliminary injunction and concluded that the district court had
denied properly the preliminary injunction. The court reviewed
975. See Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191, 1195
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (listing requirements for award of preliminary injunction).
976. SeeWe Care, Inc. v. Ultra-Mark Int'l Corp., 930 F.2d 1567, 1570, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1562,1564 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (declaring that abuse of discretion must be shown to overturn lower
court's decision).
977. See Reebok Intel Ltd. v.J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1555, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1781,
1783 (Fed. Cir. 1994). If the patentee makes a "clear showing" that the asserted patent is not
invalid and demonstrates that the patent's infringement, a presumption of irreparable harm
arises. SeeAtlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Chems., 773 F.2d 1230, 1233,227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289,292
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that preliminary injunction should issue, after balance of equities, when
evidence shows that valid patent has been infringed).
978. See Hyfitech 849 F.2d at 1455, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1198 (interpreting claims to
determine likely success on the merits of alleged infringement).
979. 74 F.3d 1216, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
980. See Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. Depuy-Motech, Inc., 74 F.3d 1216, 1218, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1529, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
981. See id. at 1218-19, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530.
982. See id. at 1219, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530-31.
983. See id. at 1219-21, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1531-32 (affirming district court's decision).
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the means-plus-function claims of the disputed patents and deter-
mined that the district court had decided properly that Sofamor had
not shown a reasonable likelihood of success.9" Notably, Sofamor
had argued that the district court erred by providing only an initial
construction of the claims, but the Federal Circuit ruled that
"Markman does not obligate the trial judge to conclusively interpret
claims at an early stage in a case."
9'
In Novo Nordisk of North America, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,98 the
Federal Circuit ruled on another appeal involving a claim construc-
tion issue, but in this case, the court reversed the district court. 7
Genentech held a patent directed to a recombinant DNA method for
producing a "hGH" expression product equivalent to the natural
hormone.91 In contrast to the prior art, which had required the
removal of a "leader sequence," the Genentech patent disclosed a
method for directly expressing hGH without a leader sequence, using
a "cleavable fusion expression" process.99  Cognizant of the
Genentech patent, Novo sued Genentech seeking a declaratory
judgment of invalidity or noninfringement. Genentech counter-
claimed for infringement under § 271 (g) and sought a preliminary
injunction.99 ° Before the district court, Genentech argued that its
patent covered the direct expression of hGH as well as the cleavable
fusion expression of the hormone, and that the company thus had
established a likelihood of success on the merits. The district court
granted the injunction.99'
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court's claim
construction, specifically reviewing the meaning applied by the district
court to the term "human growth hormone."9 2 Genentech argued
that the patent covered both the direct expression of hGH and the
cleavable fusion process, but the court did not accept the proferred
984. See id. at 1220-21, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1531 (stating that means-plus-function test
revealed that two devices were distinguishable).
985. Id. at 1221, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532. The court continued: "A trial court may
exercise its discretion to interpret the claims at a time when the parties have presented a full
picture of the claimed invention and prior art." Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532.
986. 77 F.3d 1364, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1773 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
987. See Novo Nordisk of N. Am., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 77 F.3d 1364, 1371, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1773, 1779 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. deniA; 66 U.S.LW. 3324 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1997), vacated,
108 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
988. See id. at 1365, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
989. Id. at 1366, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774-75.
990. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
991. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
992. See id. at 1368-71, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777-79 (discussing definition of human
growth hormone as used in Genentech's patent to determine whether Novo's hormone violated
the patent).
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construction. 93 The court recognized that, although the specifica-
don recited both hGH processes, the claims only recited the direct
expression." The court specified: "While claims are to be inter-
preted in light of the specification, all that appears in the specifica-
tion is not necessarily within the scope of the claims and thus entitled
to protection. What is not claimed, even though disclosed as part of
the 'invention,' cannot be enjoined."95 Furthermore, the court
noted that the prosecution history indicated that the claimed
invention was directed only to the direct expression of hGH.9 6
Accordingly, the court rejected the district court's claim construction
and reversed the grant of a preliminary injunction.
997
In PPG Industries, Inc. v. Guardian Industries Corp.,99s however, the
Federal Circuit demonstrated that a district court may properly grant
a preliminary injunction. PPG held a patent on a composition of
solar control glass, the type of glass used in automobiles that transmits
most visible light of the spectrum while filtering out ultraviolet and
infrared radiation.9 PPG sued Guardian for patent infringement
and sought a preliminary injunction. I °0 The district court granted
the motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Federal Circuit
affirmed."°°" Guardian strenuously contested the injunction, but
the Federal Circuit rejected all the arguments, explaining that
Guardian would have ample opportunity to pursue its arguments
(both old and new) further in the merits phase of the litigation.
10 2
D. Exceptions to Infringement
The sale of a patented article includes an implied license to use the
article for its intended purpose. 3 ' This implied license also
includes the right to repair the patented article and the right to
993. See id. at 1369, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777 (finding that patent claim limited used to
product hGH).
994. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778.
995. Id-, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777.
996. See id. at 1370, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778 (finding that patent claim was limited to
direct expression human growth hormone).
997. See id& at 1371, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779 (vacating injunction issued by district
court).
998. 75 F.3d 1558, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see supra notes 412-23, 493-
501 and accompanying text.
999. SeePPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558,1560,37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1618, 1619 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1000. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1619.
1001. See id at 1567, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626 (ruling that district court's issuance of
preliminary injunction was not abuse of discretion).
1002. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626.
1003. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 484 (1964).
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In Kendall Co. v. Progressive Medical Technology, Inc.,' the Federal
Circuit had a recent opportunity to consider the scope of the repair
doctrine. Kendall held a patent to a medical device for applying
compressive pressure to a patent's limbs, comprised of the following
parts: a pump, a pair of pressure sleeves that wrap around the
patient's limbs, and connecting tubes.' In order to use the
medical device, the pressure sleeves were replaced for each successive
use in order to reduce the risk of contamination. ' 7 Both Kendall
and Progressive sold the replacement sleeves, and as Progressive sales
began to affect the repair market, Kendall sued the company for
contributory infringement.' Because the district court could find
no basis for the direct infringement of the patent pursuant to the
repair doctrine, however, the court granted Progressive's motion for
summary judgment of noninfringement.ta 09
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered the arguments pertaining
to the repair doctrine.""10 Kendall argued that for the repair
doctrine to apply, the replacement part must be physically worn-
out" The court rejected this argument and ruled that the sleeves
were effectively worn-out upon the replacement of the pressure
sleeves for hygienic reasons. 12 The court applied a broad inter-
pretation of the doctrine, explaining that the purchaser of a patented
product may rightfully choose premature repair.'01 Kendall also
argued that because the products were labeled for single use, the
1004. See, e.g., Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1375-76,21
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that repair doctrine is extension of
implied right of purchaser or licensee to use patented item); Everpure, Inc. v. Cuno, Inc., 875
F.2d 300, 302-03, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1855, 1856 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (declaring that repair
doctrine permits lawful user to preserve and maintain through repairs to patented combination).
1005. 85 F.3d 1570, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1917 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1006. See Kendall Co. v. Progressive Med. Tech., Inc., 85 F.3d 1570, 1571, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1917, 1918 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1007. See id. at 1572, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918.
1008. See idt, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919 (alleging that selling devices to replace unworn
sleeves constituted direct infringement).
1009. See id. at 1572-73, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919 (holding that replacement of pressure
sleeves was within customers' rights under the repair doctrine and did not constitute a direct
infringement).
1010. See id. at 1573-76, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919-22.
1011. See id. at 1573, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920 (maintaining that customers could have
used pressure sleeves for three or more years).
1012. See i& at 1576, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922 (stating that replacement of pressure
sleeves after each use was necessary).
1013. See id. at 1575, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921 (asserting that time of repair is decision
to be made by purchaser, not patentee).
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repair doctrine should not apply.0 14 Citing the fact that the prod-




One of the advantages of holding a patent is the ability to license
another to make, use, or sell the claimed invention, usually in
exchange for royalty payments. To the patentee who has chosen to
license his invention, the contractual rights set forth in the license are
tantamount. If the licensee has exceeded the rights contracted for in
the license, the licensee may be liable to the licensor-patentee for
infringing the patent.
Although most licensing disputes are contractual, and therefore
settled in state courts, the Federal Circuit may often decide such
disputes when the validity or infringement of a patent underlying the
license is at issue.
In Cyrix Corp. v. Intel Corp., °10 6 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment that the licensees were
within the scope of their respective patent license rights and did not
infringe the patent.10 17 Cyrix sold microprocessors that incorporat-
ed patented products made by two licensees (IBM and ST) under
their respective license agreements with the patentee (Intel).101
s
ST was operating under a license agreement between Mostek and
Intel, which ST acquired by assignment. 10 9 Initially, ST manufac-
tured the microprocessors, but when it was unable to meet Cyrix's
demand, ST requested its affiliate (ST-Italy) to manufacture the
needed chips for sale.' 2° The district court ruled against Intel and
found no infringement because the licensees were within their
respective contractual rights.1 2'
1014. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921.
1015. See id. at 1376,38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921 (noting that customers were only following
notice of single use and that this safety obligation did not require customers to purchase
pressure sleeves from Kendall only).
1016. 77 F.3d 1381, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1884 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1017. See Cyrix Corp. v. Intel Corp., 77 F.3d 1381, 1385, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1884, 1887
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that license agreement between Intel and IBM did not prohibit IBM
from making and selling products to Cyrix that were assigned by Cyrix).
1018. See id. at 1383, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885. In the first license, the licensee (IBM)
had the right to "make, use, lease, sell and otherwise transfer IBM Licensed Products." Id., 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885. In the second license, the licensee (ST) had the right "to have
made, to use, to sell (either directly or indirectly), to lease and to otherwise dispose of
LICENSED PRODUCTS." Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885-86.
1019. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886.
1020. See id. at 1383, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886.
1021. See id. at 1384, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886.
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed that IBM acted within the
scope of the first license. 0 22 The agreement granted IBM the right
to make and sell "IBM Licensed Products;" it was not limited to




The Federal Circuit also affirmed that ST acted within the scope of
the second license. 10 24 The agreement granted ST the right to have
the product made for it by another company such as ST-Italy, and the
right to sell that product to third parties such as Cyrix) °2  The
court distinguished E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Shell Oil Co.,
1°26
reasoning that the arrangement in du Pont was a sham because a
third-party, acting under defendant's "have made" rights, manufac-
tured and sold the product to defendant and then bought it back in
a set of paper transactions.1 27  In Cyrix, however, the court deter-
mined that "the third-party (ST-Italy) properly manufactured
microprocessors under ST's 'have made' rights, and ST then properly
sold the products to a different entity, Cyrix."
1028
Royalty payments under a license agreement are usually a function
of the number of patented articles sold. When it is not possible to
measure the number of patented articles sold, however, the Federal
Circuit stated in Engel Industries, Inc. v. The Lockformer Co., 1 29 that
royalty payments may be based on the sales of non-patented articles
without improperly extending the patent monopoly to unpatented
articles. 030 At trial, the district court held that a license agreement
was valid103' even though the royalty payments were calculated in
part based on unpatented articles. 03 2  Relying on precedent, the
1022. See id at 1385, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1887 (finding that IBM's actions were within
scope of licensing agreement).
1023. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1887.
1024. Seeid. at 1388,37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1889 (rejecting contention that manufacture by
ST-Italy created sublicense in violation of license).
1025. See id. at 1387, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1889.
1026. 498A.2d 1108, 1114,227 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 233,237 (Del. 1985) (holding that agreements
enabling a third party to manufacture a product for defendant and allowing the defendant to
sell it back to the third party constituted a sublicense, which was prohibited under the original
license).
1027. See Cyfix Corp., 77 F.3d at 1387, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1889.
1028. See i&, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1889 (determining that transactions were separate,
unlike exchanges in du Pon, which were two parts of one transaction).
1029. 96 F.3d 1398, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1030. SeeEngel Indus., Inc. v. The Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1408,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also supra notes 751, 753, 795-804 and accompanying text.
1031. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1161. The license stated that, "to provide a convenient
means for measuring the value of the license, ENGEL [licensee] agrees to compensate
MET-COIL [licensor] with respect to comers designed for use in the practice of the [patented]
invention." ld, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167. The license specified that the royalties paid to
the licensor for each comer produced were "a measure of the value of the use of the [patented]
invention." Id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
1032. See id. at 1407-08, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
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Federal Circuit affirmed that royalties may be based on unpatented
components if it provides a convenient means for measuring the value
of the license." 3  Noting that the voluntariness of the licensee's
agreement to the royalty provisions was a key consideration,.1° the
court found that there was no improper exercise of market pow-
er.1
0 35
IV. INFRINGEMENT REMEDIES AND LIMITATIONS ON RECOVERY
Remedies for the infringement of a patent are available to the
patentee. These remedies include damages, injunctive relief, and
reasonable attorney fees.'136
A. Damages
Prevailing in an infringement action entities the patent holder to
recover damages, interest, and costs. 37 The damages must be
sufficient to compensate for the infringement,"°  but the damages
may not be less than a reasonable royalty.0 39 A determination of
damages may be based on the patentee's lost profits.' ° ° If the
patentee cannot establish lost profits, the court may award damages
using a reasonable royalty rate based on a hypothetical negotiation
between a willing licensor and licensee at the time the infringement
began.
0 4'
1. Lost profits and reasonable royalties
In Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Engineering, Inc.,"°42 the Federal
Circuit affirmed an award of damages of $3.4 million in lost profits,
$7.4 million as a reasonable royalty, and a doubling of the damages
1033. See id. at 1408, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 138, 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577, 592 (1969); Automatic Radio Mfg.
Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 378 (1950)).
1034. See Engel Indus., 96 F.3d at 1408, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167. The record indicated
that the licensee at least initially agreed voluntarily to the royalties provisions, and was not
required to purchase unpatented parts from Met-Coil or to refrain from the manufacture of
competing duct-connecting systems. See id. at 1408, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168.
1035. See id. at 1409, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168.
1036. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 284-287 (1994).
1037. See id. § 284.
1038. See id.
1039. See id.
1040. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelly Co., 56 F.8d 1538, 1555, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1107
(Fed. Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
1041. SeeState Indus. v. Mor-Flo Indus., 883 F.2d 1573,1580,12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026, 1031
(Fed. Cir. 1989).
1042. 95 F.3d 1109, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see supra notes 459-63 and
accompanying text.
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for willful infringement." Minco also requested damages for
price erosion and compensatory damages for the sale of Combustion
Engineering's (CE) business."~ The district court found that CE's
infringement caused Minco to lose $3,455,329 in lost profits in the
fused minerals market, and awarded a reasonable royalty of 20% on
other sales." 4  The district court denied Minco's request for
damages resulting from price erosion and CE's sale of its busi-
ness.1
0 46
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's awards of lost
profits and a reasonable royalty, detecting no clear error in the lower
court's conclusions."°47 Despite CE's protest to the contrary, the
Federal Circuit agreed that the district court had ample support for
awarding lost profits, including the fact that the fused silica product
from the patented invention was in significant demand and that the
record showed a preference for that product." 8  Moreover, two
other primary fused silica manufacturers bowed out of the market
because of the patent. 49 Thus, the record supported strongly the
district court's finding that, but for the infringement, Minco had a
reasonable probability of completing the sales.' 0
The Federal Circuit also saw no error in the district court's
determination of the royalty rate, which was based on a number of
findings, including head-to-head competition, CE's inferior product
prior to the infringement, the lack of noninfringing alternatives, the
fact that CE regarded the invention as significant, high rates of profit
in the industry, CE's earnings of 22.4% of sales under the new
technology, and CE's substantial increase in earnings after they began
operating the patented furnaces.051 The Federal Circuit also
affirmed the district court's refusal to award Minco further damages
on price erosion, a claim the Court found speculative in light of other
forces in the market.0 1 2 Additionally, the Federal Circuit affirmed
denial of compensatory damages for Minco's sale of its fused silica
1043. See Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 95 F.Sd 1109, 1112, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1044. See i&r at 1118, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
1045. See id. at 1119, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
1046. See U at 1120, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009.
1047. See id. at 1119, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009 (noting that the industry enjoyed high
profitability and the patented process produced higher quality product).
1048. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
1049. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
1050. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
1051. See id. at 1119-20, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009-10.
1052. See id. at 1120, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009.
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business because little evidence supported this element of damag-
es. 1
053
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court's addition of a
"kicker"' 4 in Mahurkarv. C.R. Bard, Inc.,1 55 finding that the
district court had abused its discretion.0 5 ' The district court
awarded a reasonable royalty rate of 34.88%, which comprised a
25.88% rate plus a 9% kicker.0 7 The district court calculated the
initial royalty rate of 25.88% based upon actual net profit, the profit
margin Bard would have been able to negotiate, and Bard's savings
for research and development 10 58 The district court added an
additional 9%, labeling it a "Panduit kicker."' 9
The Federal Circuit reversed, stating that the district court invoked
the Panduit case out of context;' °w Panduit supplied a method for
determining lost profits, whereas this case did not involve lost profits,
only the calculation of reasonable royalties.0 6' Moreover, the
Federal Circuit clarified that the Panduit case could not authorize
additional damages or a "kicker" on top of a reasonable royalty rate
because of heavy litigation or other expenses. 062 Rather, if other
expenses were to be compensated, those must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence of willfulness and exceptionality, which the court
found was not evident in this case.0 63
The Federal Circuit vacated the award of damages in Maxwell v. J
Bake, Inc. 0" after reversing the district court's finding of infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents. 65 The district court
found that three fastening systems infringed Maxwell's patent for
fastening shoes together.06 6 One system infringed literally and two
1053. See id. at 1121,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009-10.
1054. SeePanduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
726 (6th Cir. 1978) (establishing methodology for determining damages in case involving
extensive litigation).
1055. 79 F.3d 1572, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1288 (Fed. Cir. 1996); seesupra notes 162-67, 224-32
and accompanying text.
1056. See Marhurkar v. C.1L Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1580, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1288, 1294
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
1057. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293.
1058. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293.
1059. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293.
1060. See id. at 1581, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293-94.
1061. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293.
1062. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294.
1063. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294.
1064. 86 F.3d 1098, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see supra notes 860-71 and
infra notes 1200-07 and accompanying text.
1065. SeeMaxwell v.J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1108,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1098, 1109 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
1066. See id. at 1106, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
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systems infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. 67 In the jury
instructions, the district court asked the jury to determine both a
reasonable royalty and additional damages necessary to compensate
for the infringement l°' The jury awarded a reasonable royalty of
$.05 per pair of shoes and an additional $1.5 million for damages in
excess of the royalty, which the district court upheld.06 9
The Federal Circuit vacated the damages after reversing the district
court's decision to denyJ. Baker's motion for ajudgment as a matter
of law that two of the systems did not infringe.0 7 ° The court held,
however, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
instructing the jury to award a reasonable royalty as well as any
additional damages required to compensate for infringement.
10 71
The Federal Circuit also found substantial evidence to support the
damages determined by the jury, including evidence of other
agreements entered into by the patentee at a similar rate and expert
testimony that the effective royalty rate was reasonable.10 72  The
Federal Circuit vacated the award and remanded the case to the
district court for a determination of damages based solely on the
infringing system.
10 73
In a footnote, the Federal Circuit stated that the decision to award
$1.5 million in damages in addition to the reasonable royalty in
Maxwell was not inconsistent with the recent decision in Mahurkar v.
C.. Bard, Inc.,1°74 in which the Federal Circuit held that a district
court may not increase a reasonable royalty with a "kicker" based on
litigation or other expenses. 75 Rather, the court indicated that
such an increase must be awarded under §§ 284 and 285 as enhanced
damages or attorney's fees. x076
In Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., °77 the Federal Circuit affirmed
the award of lost profits for infringement by Aerosonic, but reversed
the district court's reduction in the amount to account for re-
1067. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
1068. See i. at 1109, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
1069. See id. at 1104, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
1070. See id. at 1110, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009.
1071. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009.
1072. See id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009.
1073. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009.
1074. See id. at 1110 n.4, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1011 n.4 (dting Mahurkarv. C.R Bard, Inc.,
79 F.3d 1572, 1580-81, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1288, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
1075. See Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1110 n.4, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1011 n.4.
1076. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1011 n.4.
1077. 81 F.3d 1566, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see infra notes 1160-65 and
accompanying text.
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pairs.' 78 Aerosonic had apparently destroyed most of its manufac-
turing records after litigation had begun, making it impossible to
determine the exact number of infringing devices manufactured.' 79
The district court used a manufacturing log from the last six months
as evidence of the number of manufactured devices and extrapolated
this number back over the years of infringement, assuming an equal
rate of production during that period.' 0 The district court re-
duced this number by 38% "in order to account for any duplication
resulting from device repair or inefficiency in the production of the
vibrators.''
Sensonics appealed, arguing that the failure to retain production
records required a strong adverse inference.1082  The Federal
Circuit agreed, but affirmed the extrapolation to determine the
number of infringing devices because Sensonics did not suggest an
alternative method and the extrapolation was the best available
reconstruction of the activity.108  The court reversed the 33%
reduction, however, because Aerosonic failed to produce evidence to
support the reduction and uncertainty is resolved against the
infringer. °s  Therefore, the Federal Circuit modified the district
court's decision to include payment of damages for the total number
of units produced. 8 .
In Hebert v. Lisle Corp.,08 6 the Federal Circuit remanded the case
for a determination of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
and damages after reversing the finding of inequitable conduct.
108 7
Although the issues of infringement and damages were tried, they
were not decided.10 The district court also did not reach Lisle's
post-trial motion requesting that the district court rule, as a matter of
law, that Hebert was not entitled to lost profits as a measure of
damages.
108 9
1078. See Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.Sd 1566, 1573, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1551,
1556-57 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1079. See id. at 1572, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556.
1080. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556.
1081. Id, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556.
1082. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556.
1083. See id. at 1573, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556.
1084. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556-57.
1085. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556.
1086. 99 F.3d 1109, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1611 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1087. See Hebert v. Lisle Corp., 99 F.3d 1109, 1120, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1611, 1619 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (thejury found the patentvalid but unenforceable because Hebert allegedly withheld
material prior art and submitted a fPase declaration/oath with an intent to deceive or mislead
the Patent Office); see also infra Part IV.C (discussing inequitable conduct).
1088. See id. at 1112, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
1089. See id. at 1119, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618.
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The Federal Circuit, in remanding the case, provided some
guidance to the district court for awarding damages, should Hebert
prevail on his charge of infringement."' The Federal Circuit's
guidance included a review of several basic principles of patent
damages: damages must be established by evidence and may include
lost profits due to diverted sales, price erosion, and increased
expenditures caused by the infringement. 0 ' The Federal Circuit
also cautioned the district court that it was incorrect to bar a patentee
who had not yet manufactured the product from proving that its
actual damages were larger than a reasonable royalty, but advised that
the burden to prove such damages is "commensurately heavy."'
°92
The Federal Circuit affirmed a $72 million damage award for
infringement of the patent at issue in Stryker Corp. v. Intermnedics
Orthopedics, Inc.'98 The patent in suit covered a femoral prosthesis
and in particular its stem portion,9 4 which had a removable distal
tip.1°95 The district court awarded damages for all femoral prosthe-
ses regardless of whether the distal tip on the infringing device was
inserted into the patient or not.1096 Intermedics appealed the
portion of the damage award reflecting sales of its stems that were
never implanted in patients with distal sleeves.' 97
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to award
damages for all stems. 9' The district court based its decision on
a finding that the infringement occurred by reason of manufacture,
use, or sale of the stem, for Intermedics had always manufactured its
sleeves with the distal tip, or the sleeve option. 1 99 Moreover, the
district court found that surgeons could not decide to implant the
distal sleeve until they were in the operating room, so they needed
the entire system, including the sleeve.1100 As a result, the court
held that basing the damages on all sales was correct because each
time Intermedics supplied a system to a surgeon, Stryker Corp. lost
the ability to make the sale.'1  The Federal Circuit affirmed,
1090. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618.
1091. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618.
1092. Sensonics, Inc., 81 F.Sd at 1120, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618.
1098. 96 F.3d 1409, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see infra notes 1166-74 and
accompanying text.
1094. See Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 96 F.3d 1409, 1411, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1095. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066.
1096. See id. at 1416-17, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.
1097. See id. at 1416, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.
1098. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
1099. See id. at 1416, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.
1100. See id. at 1416.17, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.
1101. See id. at 1416, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
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stating that Intermedics' supply of prostheses to surgeons kept the
plaintiff "out of the operating room."1102
Intermedics also appealed the district court's application of the
four-factor test for lost profits originally set forth in Panduit."l 3 Of
these four factors, Intermedics challenged the finding that there were
no acceptable noninfringing substitutes during the period of the
infringement). 10 4 The appellants alleged the district court defined
acceptable alternatives only as those devices that infringe, dismissing
testimony of acceptable substitutes in internal documents that
identified three other companies as competitors.1 5
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, 0 6 agreeing with the
district court that Intermedics' own documents established that its
competitors lacked the distal modularity of both the patented product
and the infringing product. As a result, these devices were not
acceptable substitutes. 107 Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that
the appellants had failed to establish clear error by the district court
and affirmed the damages award."0"
In Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp.," 9 the Federal Circuit vacated a $2.7
million damage award after reversing the trial court's finding of
infringement by one of two accused devices because the trial court
did not distinguish between the two devices in addressing the issues
of lost profits, convoyed sales, and reasonable royalty."' The
district court awarded lost profits to Zygo because it found that the
SIRIS device, the device marketed by Wyko prior to the two accused
devices, was not an acceptable noninfringing alternative."" Wyko
argued that the award of lost profits was inappropriate because they
could have continued to manufacture the SIRIS device, which Wyko
1102. KL at 1417, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
1103. SeePanduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
726 (6th Cir. 1978) (promulgating test with four factors: (1) demand for patented product;
(2) ability to meet demand; (3) absence of noninfringing substitutes; and (4) amount of lost
profits per unit).
1104. See Stfyker, 96 F.3d at 1418, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
1105. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
1106. See d., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
1107. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072; see also Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor
Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1373, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[T]he
mere existence of a competing device does not necessarily make the device an acceptable
substitute. A product on the market which lacks the advantages of the patented product can
hardly be termed a substitute.").
1108. See Stiyker, 96 F.3d at 1418, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
1109. 79 F.3d 1563,38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1996); seesupra notes 453-58, 805-15
and accompanying text.
1110. See Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 7
9 F.3d 1563, 1570-71, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, 1287-
88 (recognizing uncertainty concerning whether trial court's findings are applicable only to
Original Wyko).
1111. See id. at 1571, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287.
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ceased selling when it began selling the accused 6000 and 6000
Redesign devices." 2
The Federal Circuit vacated the award of lost profits and remanded
with instructions for the court to provide findings in support of its
conclusion that the SIRIS was not an acceptable noninfringing
alternative,'11 3 even though the court did not have a firm convic-
tion that a mistake had been made that warranted a reversal on this
issue." 4 The Federal Circuit questioned the district court's conclu-
sion because the record regarding the acceptability of SIRIS was
insufficient. 5  If SIRIS were an acceptable noninfringing alterna-
tive, then an award of lost profits would not have been appropri-
ate." 6 The Federal Circuit also noted that if the SIRIS device were
an acceptable alternative, then Wyco, with a competitive
noninfringing device "in the wings," would have been in a stronger
position to negotiate for a lower royalty rate than the 25% royalty rate
determined by the district court.
111 7
In Oiness v. Walgreen Co.," 18 a retrial on damages, the Federal
Circuit reversed ajury award of $1.1 million in lost profits and $10.2
million in future profits."' 9 Evidence of damages presented by
Oiness included pictures of three stores with infringing headrests and
an estimation, based on average sales per unit floor space, that the
sales of headrests resulted in lost profits between $4.8 and $6.5
million."2 ° The jury awarded Oiness damages for lost profits as
well as damages for loss of future profits, including those in the
premium market, the retail market, and the adertising specialty
market. 2  Wagreen moved for a judgment as a matter of law, a
remittitur, and a new trial, because Walgreen presented evidence that
it sold only 142,230 headrests in the retail market at an average net
profit of $1.33, for profits of $189,000.1122
1112. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287.
1113. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287 (noting that whether Sints device was acceptable
noninfringing alternative was relevant only for period that Sints device was marketed by Wyko).
1114. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287 (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
1115. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287.
1116. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287.
1117. See id. at 1571-72, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287-88 (acknowledging relevance of fact that
Wyko could have continued marketing Sinis device to determination of royalty during
hypothetical negotiations).
1118. 88 F.3d 1025,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1119. Oiness v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.3d 1025, 1034,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1304, 1310-11 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
1120. See id. at 1029, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307.
1121. See id. at 1028, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1306.
1122. See id. at 1030, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307. The court also noted that 23,610
headrests were unaccounted for and held that the jury could reasonably assume that Walgreen
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The Federal Circuit found that the award was based on estimation
and extrapolation 2 3 and vacated the jury's award, remanding with
instructions to orderjudgment of $220,567 in actual sales reasonably
inferred by the jury or a new trial on damages." 4 It also reversed
the jury's award of projected lost profits."' The court concluded
that Oiness' experts failed to consider another infringer, 26 identify
other market forces that also could cause decreases in prices,"2 7 or
provide credible economic testimony for all projected lost profits
categories.18 In addition, the Federal Circuit also reversed the
interest award, finding that the judge had abused his discretion in
awarding prejudgment interest on the future profits portion of the
damages award."2 9 The court's remand included directions to the
district court to award interest on only the $220,567 of lost profits
supported by the record.""0
In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,"3 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's determination that a 1% royalty would
provide reasonable and entire compensation. 3 2  In arriving at the
royalty rate, the Court of Federal Claims determined that a royalty
rate ceiling in a hypothetical negotiation would be 1.2%.1" s In
coming to this conclusion, the court considered three letters from
Hughes to other companies containing acceptable terms for licensing
the patent for scientific or experimental vehicles."13 4  Based on
these three offers, the court concluded the negotiations would be
between the 1.2% ceiling and the 1% rate the government conceded
would be just compensation. 3 5  From these values, the court
concluded that the royalty rate would settle at 1%."13
sold these as well. Thus, the total value of actual sales was $220,567. See i&., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1307.
1123. See id. at 1029-30, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307 (determining that pictures of three
Walgreen stores did not support conclusion for all 1600 Walgreen stores).
1124. See id. at 1030, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307.
1125. I&, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307.
1126. Id, at 1031-33, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308-10.
1127. 1d at 1033, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310.
1128. Id, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310.
1129. See id, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310 (stating that awarding interest on projected lost
profits compensated plaintiff unduly for losses it had not yet suffered).
1130. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310.
1131. 86 F.3d 1566, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1132. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1574, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065,
1071 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1133. See id. at 1570, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
1134. See id. at 1569-70, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
1135. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
1136. See id. at 1570, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067-68.
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The Federal Circuit affirmed the court's decision, stating that it was
not convinced that the court clearly erred in determining that a
royalty rate of 1% was appropriate. 1 3 7 The Court of Federal Claims
considered the offers made to other aerospace firms, the context in
which those offers were made, and even Hughes' allegations that
widespread infringement must have lowered the rates.n s8 Hughes,
could point to no evidence showing that the offers in the letters were
reduced because of widespread infringement; one of the letters
contained an indication that it was its "normal" royalty rate.11
9
Because Hughes' evidence was insufficient to overturn the court's
findings and Hughes failed to show that any error in such findings
would be harmful error, the Federal Circuit affirmed."4
2. Enhanced damages, attorney fees, and costs
The determination of increased damages is a two step process.1 14
1
First, the court determines whether there is guilty conduct upon
which increased damages may be based."' Second, if there is such
conduct, then the court may use its discretion to increase the award
of damages, given the totality of the circumstances.1 1  Guilty
conduct requires some culpability, such as willful infringement, bad
faith litigation, or failure to satisfy the affirmative duty to use care to
avoid infringing another's patent.' The Federal Circuit will
affirm a district court's decision of enhanced damages unless it was
based on clearly erroneous findings of fact or constitutes an abuse of
discretion.1 145
In National Presto Industries, Inc. v. West Bend Co.,1146 the Federal
Circuit affirmed ajury finding that West Bend had willfully infringed
1137. See id. at 1571, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
1138. See id. at 1570, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.
1139. See id. at 1573, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.
1140. See id. at 1574, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
1141. SeeState Indus. v. Mor-Flo Indus., 948 F.2d 1573,1576,20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1738,1740
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
1142. See id., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
1143. See id.; Read Corp v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826-27,23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426,1435-
36 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (outlining specific factors, reflecting egregiousness of defendant's conduct,
which court may consider in applying second prong of damages inquiry).
1144. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1523, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1641, 1649 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (in banc), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 1040
(1997) (noting that inquiry into defendant's intent is necessary only when patent owner seeks
enhanced damages or attorney fees).
1145. See Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 542-43, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1622,
1624-25 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
1146. 76 F.3d 1185, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see supra notes 822-37 and
accompanying text.
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patents held by National Presto." 7 West Bend appealed, using a
two-pronged attack."' First, West Bend argued that the question
of willful infringement was an equitable issue for the court to
consider, not the jury."4 9 Second, West Bend argued that it could
not have willfully infringed the patent because National Presto filed
suit on the day the patent issued.
50
Dismissing West Bend's first argument, the Federal Circuit held that
willful infringement "turns on considerations of intent, state of mind,
and culpability," and remains with the trier of fact.a 5' The Federal
Circuit also found substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict
that West Bend's infringement was willful, despite the filing of suit on
the day the patent issued."52 West Bend cited State Industries, Inc.
v. A. 0. Smith Corp.'.. for the proposition that "the patent must
exist and one must have knowledge of it to be a willful infring-
er."" 4 The Federal Circuit distinguished State Industries, however,
noting that the infringer in that case had no knowledge of the patent,
but West Bend knew exactly when Presto's patent came into existence
and had several months advance notice."55 Moreover, the district
court observed that West Bend (1) did not obtain a written opinion
of counsel until eleven months after Presto's suit was filed, 5 6 (2)
recognized that the jury could have disbelieved testimony regarding
West Bend's accessability of the patent, (3) noted the evidence of
West Bend copying of the design, 57 and (4) realized that West
Bend continued its infringing sales even after suit was filed.1
5 8
Thus, there was substantial evidence whereby ajury could have found
willful infringement.
1 5 9
In Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp.," 6° the Federal Circuit remand-
ed the case back to the district court for a determination of bad faith,
1147. National Presto Indus., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1188,37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1685, 1686 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1148. See id. at 1192-93, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690-91.
1149. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690.
1150. See id. at 1193, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690-91.
1151. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690.
1152. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690.
1158. 751 F.2d 1226, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 418 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
1154. National Presto Indus., Inc., 76 F.3d at 1193, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690 (citing State
Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 418, 425 (Fed. Cir.
1985)).
1155. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690.
1156. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690.
1157. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690.
1158. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690.
1159. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690.
1160. 81 F.3d 1566, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see supra notes 1077-85 and
accompanying text.
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vexatious behavior, or other grounds warranting an award of attorney
fees.1161 The district court initially refused to award either attorney
fees or enhanced damages, but did not discuss whether the parties'
actions were sufficient to deem the case an "exceptional" one-the
criterion for an award of attorney fees. 62 The factual basis for
Sensonics' request for attorney fees included false Aerosonic pre-
litigation statements that led to Sensonics filing a suit against a third
company, Aerosonic attorney's conduct of passing notes in a deposi-
tion about the copying of the invention, misleading the district court
about the issuance of a reexamination certificate, and Aerosonic's
failure to preserve manufacturing records."
63
The Federal Circuit found that the district court acted within its
discretion in declining to enhance damages because the infringement
was not willful."' However, the Federal Circuit remanded with
directions to determine whether attorney's fees were also warranted,
as the court failed to discuss willful infringement or bad faith in the
context of those particular fees.Y6
In Stryker Cop. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc.," 66 the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of willful infringe-
ment. 1167 The district court found that Intermedics deliberately
copied the ideas or design of the patent and failed to investigate the
scope of the patent and to form a good faith belief that the patent
was either invalid or not infringed."' Intermedics argued the
district court clearly erred in finding that copying occurred because
Intermedics did not make a "slavish," or nearly identical, copy of the
commercial embodiment of the '023 patent, 69 as required by State
Industries, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp.""T Intermedics also alleged that
the district court committed clear error when determining the issue
of notice be.cause of "unrefuted, unrebutted evidence in the record
1161. Sensonics, Inc. v.Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566,1575, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1551,1558.
1162. See id. at 1574,38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557-58 (recognizing that award ofattorney fees
requires "exceptional case" which may be demonstrated by bad faith or willful infringement as
well as litigation misconduct or unprofessional behavior).
1163. Id at 1574-75, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
1164. See id. at 1574, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557 (stating that, absent willful infringement
or other indicium of bad faith, punitive damages such as enhancement are not warranted).
1165. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
1166. 96 F.3d 1409,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1996); seesupra notes 1093-1108 and
accompanying text.
1167. Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 96 F.3d 1409, 1419, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1168. Id. at 1414, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068.
1169. Id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068.
1170. 751 F.2d 1226, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 418 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that "slavish" copy,
or use of patentee's product as template for production of copy, alone indicates willfulness).
1794
1996 PATENT LAW DECISIONS
that inJanuary 1990 [the patent attorney] was not aware that the '023
patent raised an infringement issue."17 The district court, howev-
er, found that Intermedics had notice of the patent on January 23,
1989, when the manager of product development sent a letter to
patent counsel regarding consideration of Intermedics' new product
and a brochure of the patented stem marked, "U.S. patent pend-
ing."" 72 The district court also found that Intermedics had actual
notice of the '023 patent as ofJanuary 5, 1990, when the attorney saw
a reference to the '023 patent in the Official Gazette." 7 3 Despite
his knowledge of the patent, he failed to conduct an investigation as
to possible infringement by Intermedics' new product" 74
The Federal Circuit commenced its review of this controversy by
surveying its prior willfulness decisions regarding copying, including
In re Hayes Microcomputer Products, Inc.175 and Bott v. Four Star
Corp.1176  Rejecting Intermedic's argument, the court found that
"slavish copying" need not be found for willful infringement." 77
Rather, according to the court, the correct inquiry was whether the
infringer "'intentionally copied the ideas of another"' 78 or "'delib-
erately copied the ideas or design of another.' 79 In its eyes, State
Industries did not require "slavish copying," but instead looked at the
totality of the circumstances with copying as one relevant factor." 0
The Federal Circuit also held that Intermedics did not establish
clear error by the district court in critical findings of fact.1
8'
Intermedics alleged that the patent attorney was not aware that the
'023 patent raised an infringement issue, citing the patent attorney's
own testimony."8 2  The Federal Circuit, however, found sufficient
evidence in the record to support the district court's finding that the
attorney had knowledge of the product as well as the patent."
8
1171. Stryker Corp., 96 F.3d at 1415, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
1172. Id at 1414-15, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
1173. See id. at 1415, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
1174. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
1175. 982 F.2d 1527, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1176. 807 F.2d 1567, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
1177. Stryker Corp., 96 F.3d at 1414, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068.
1178. Id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068 (quoting In re Hayes Microcomputer Prods., Inc., 982
F.2d 1527, 1543, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
1179. Id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068 (quoting Bottv. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567,1572,
1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
1180. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068.
1181. See id. at 1415, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
1182. See id. at 1416, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
1183. See id. at 1415-16, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.
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Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decision as
not clearly erroneous."'
In Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals Ltd.,' the Federal
Circuit affirmed the jury verdict of willful infringement, even though
the question of infringement was a close one."8 6  Evidence was
submitted to the jury that BP had conducted research in an effort to
avoid the patented process, and turned to the process that was found
to be infringing after failing to find some other solution to its prob-
lem."8 7 BP argued that infringement by equivalency cannot be
willful infringement since it shows BP's good faith effort to avoid the
patent."11 Although the jury did not indicate whether the infringe-
ment by BP was literal or under the doctrine of equivalents," 9 the
Federal Circuit found that there was literal infringement."9
The Federal Circuit rejected BP's arguments that a new trial was
required because the jury was not asked to distinguish between literal
and equivalent infringement."9' The court also dismissed BP's
argument that the patent examiner's acceptance of its reexamination
request of the Celanese patent six months prior to trial supported the
closeness of the infringement question and demonstrated that the
infringement was nonwillful." 9' The court held that an examiner's
grant of a Request for Reexamination is not probative of
unpatentability."95 Moreover, in the court's view, the grant of a
Request for Reexamination does not establish the likelihood of patent
invalidity"94 Therefore, despite the closeness of the question, the
Federal Circuit found substantial evidence in the record whereby a
reasonable jury could have found willfulness and sustained the
verdict."95
1184. See id. at 1416, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.
1185. 78 F.3d 1575, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see supra notes 63647, 723,
755 and accompanying text.
1186. See Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1583, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1126, 1132-33 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1187. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133.
1188. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133.
1189. See id. at 1584, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133.
1190. See id. at 1582, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132.
1191. See id at 1581,38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131 (finding that BP was fully apprised thatjury
was instructed on equivalent infringement and that judge chose jury verdict form lacking
questions regarding specificity of the verdict).
1192. See id, at 1584, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133.
1193. See id,, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133.
1194. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133.
1195. See id, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133.
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B. Marking
A patentee, or a person making or selling a patent article for or
under the patentee, may mark those articles to give notice the public
that the articles are patented. 9 A failure to mark the products
prevents recovery in an action for infringement unless the infringer
was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe thereaf-
ter;119 7 damages may be recovered only for infringement occurring
after such notice."9 8 A patentee has the burden of proving at trial
that it has complied with statutory requirements and that the marking
has been substantially consistent and continuous."99
In Maxwell v. f Baker, Inc., 2°° the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial ofJ. Baker's motion for ajudgment as a matter
of law on the issue of patent marking under 35 U.S.C. § 287(a). 2°'
J. Baker alleged that damages should not have been awarded for
infringement occurring before actual notice was given in June 1990,
and that substantial evidence did not support the jury's verdict that
Maxwell had complied with the marking statute as of November
1987.1202
The Federal Circuit found substantial evidence that Maxwell had
complied with the marking statute as of November 1987 and affirmed
the district court's denial of a motion for a judgment as a matter of
law on the issue of marking. Maxwell had licensed the invention to
a third party, making it more difficult to insure compliance with the
marking provisions.' 23  When third parties are involved, however,
a rule of reason approach is justified and the court may look towards
the patentee's reasonable efforts to ensure compliance with the
marking requirements. 2 4 In this case, Maxwell had made exten-
sive and continuous efforts to ensure Target's (the licensee) compli-
ance. 25 The Federal Circuit noted that at least ninety-five percent
of the shoes sold were marked, even though a numerically large
1196. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1994).
1197. See id.
1198. See id.; see also American Med. Sys., Inc. v. Medical Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1537, 28
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1199. See American Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1537, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331; see also Motorola,
Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 770, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 297, 300-01 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
1200. 86 F.3d 1098,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see supra notes 860-71, 1064-
76 and accompanying text.
1201. SeeMaxwell v.J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1112,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1010 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
1202. See id. at 1111, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009.
1203. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.
1204. See id. at 1111-12, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.
1205. See id. at 1112, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.
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number of shoes were sold without the proper marking.120 6  Fur-
ther evidence of the purportedly extensive and continuous efforts
included the imposition of a requirement in the licensing agreement
mandating the inclusion of the patent number on all shoes, notifica-
tion to Target's manufacturer of the requirement, notification to
Target of errors in the marking of shoes, and Maxwell's insistence
that Target exercise its best effort to correct failures to mark.
120 7
C. Inequitable Conduct
Applicants and their representatives have a duty of candor and
good faith in dealing with the Patent Office.120 1 Inequitable con-
duct consists of an affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact, a
failure to disclose material information, or submission of false
material information, coupled with an intent to deceive.1 2 9 Clear
and convincing evidence must be used to prove allegations of
inequitable conduct 210  Using its discretion, the court weighs the
threshold findings of materiality and intent in light of all the
circumstances of the case to determine if inequitable conduct is
committed.12 11 The Federal Circuit reviews the district court's
judgment for an abuse of discretion.
1 212
The Federal Circuit in Refac International, Ltd. v. Lotus Development
Corp.12 13 affirmed the district court's holding of inequitable con-
duct 12 14  The district court found the patent unenforceable be-
cause of omissions in the inventors' affidavits, which were submitted
to overcome a rejection on the grounds of inadequate disclo-
sure. 21 5  The examiner previously rejected the inventor's Rule
132 121 affidavit because it was self-serving and had little probative
value regarding an adequate disclosure.21  In response, the inven-
1206. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.
1207. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.
1208. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1996).
1209. See Molins PLC v. Textron Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1826
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (cidingJ.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559, 223 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
1210. See id. at 1178, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826.
1211. See id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827.
1212. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867,876,9 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1384, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
1213. 81 F.3d 1576, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1665 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1214. SeeRefac Int'l, Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 81 F.3d 1576, 1585,38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1665,
1672 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1215. See id. at 1578-80, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1666-68.
1216. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.132 (1996) ("When any claim of an application or a patent under
reexamination is rejected ... affidavits or declarations traversing ... objections may be
received.").
1217. See Refac Int?, Ltd., 81 F.3d at 1578, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1666.
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tors filed three affidavits containing opinions or factual statements
directed to the sufficiency of the applicant's disclosure.1218 Each of
the three affidavits failed, however, to disclose a prior association of
the affiant with the inventor's company or that they had a pre-existing
knowledge of a commercial embodiment of the invention,
LANPAR. 21 9 The district court found that one of the affidavits, the
Jones' affidavit, contained material omissions intended to mislead the
Patent Office into granting the patent.1 2 0 The omissions included
Jones' employment with the inventor's company, Jones' previous
knowledge of the commercial embodiment LANPAR, instruction
relating to LANPAR, and Jones' drafting text for a LANPAR manu-
al.122 ' The district court noted that the other two affidavits alone
did not provide a basis for inequitable conduct.
222
The Federal Circuit found the district court's credibility determina-
tion supported an intent to mislead the Patent Office and was not
clearly erroneous. 1223  The district court believed the patent
attorney's testimony that he inquired into the backgrounds of the
affiants, and that the inventors did not inform him of the association
with the company or the knowledge of the company.2 24  As a
result, the district court was entitled to conclude that the inventors
intentionally withheld the information from the Patent Office.
1225
The Federal Circuit dismissed two arguments that the Jones'
affidavit did not support a finding of inequitable conduct.22 6 First,
Refac argued that the Jones' affidavit was cumulative of the other two
affidavits and therefore not material as a matter of law. 227 Second,
Refac argued the Jones' affidavit contained only opinion, and not the
required factual statements needed to be given probative value,
thereby preventing an inference of an intent to mislead.2 28  The
Federal Circuit held that affidavits are inherently material even if only
cumulative and the affirmative act of submitting one must be
construed as evidencing an intent that they be relied upon.
229
1218. See id. at 1578-80, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1666-68.
1219. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667-68.
1220. See id. at 1580, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
1221. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
1222. See id. at 1579-80, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667-68 (noting that "the effect of the
fraudulent omission in the Jones Affidavit was heightened by the omissions in the other [two]
Affidavits").
1223. See id. at 1581-82, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669.
1224. See id. at 1582, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669.
1225. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
1226. See id. at 1580-85, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668-72.
1227. See id. at 1583, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
1228. See id. at 1584, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671.
1229. See id. at 1583, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671.
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Moreover, since the examiner did not allow the claims in response to
the inventor's own affidavit, the inventors were on notice that the
examiner would consider it important to know of the affiant's pre-
existing knowledge of the invention or connection with the inven-
tors.123° Therefore, Federal Circuit could not hold as a matter of
law that the omissions in the affidavit did not constitute inequitable
conduct.12"
The Federal Circuit reversed the judgment of unenforceability for
inequitable conduct in Hebert v. Lisle Corp.1232 Lisle alleged that
letters it sent to Hebert containing references to other exhaust
manifold spreaders, the invention at issue, and the results of a prior
art search, were required to be disclosed to the Patent Office as prior
art.12 33 Hebert did not disclose either the letters or the search
results to the Patent Office." Lisle also alleged that Hebert used
the spreader more than one year before filing his application, and
argued that filing an oath averring to the contrary was inequitable
conduct.'2 The jury determined that Hebert had committed
inequitable conduct.12 6
When reviewing a jury verdict finding inequitable conduct, the
Federal Circuit determines whether substantive evidence at trial
supported presumed factual findings of material withholding and
deceptive intent." 7 The Federal Circuit also determines whether
there was substantial evidence whereby a reasonable jury could have
reached the verdict on the entirety of the record and in light of
correct instructions on the applicable law." In reviewing the
record in Lisle, the Court ruled that there was not substantial evidence
to support a finding of material withholding and intent to deceive the
examiner.1239  The Federal Circuit found that the information
alleged to be withheld from the examiner was not conclusively shown
to be prior art.'2 ° Lisle's own expert, who alleged that the failure
to cite the letters constituted inequitable conduct, could not even
1230. See id. at 1584, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671.
1281. See id. at 1584-85, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672.
1232. 99 F.3d 1109, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1611 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see supra notes 1086-92 and
accompanying text.
1233. See Hebert v. Lisle Corp., 99 F.3d 1109, 1113, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1611, 1613 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
1234. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
1235. See id. at 1116, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
1286. See id. at 1113, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
1237. See id. at 1114, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
1238. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
1239. See id. at 1116, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
1240. See id., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
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testify that the submissions referred to in the letters were prior
art.1241 The court determined that Lisle did state that Hebert did
not know of closer prior art than that cited by the examiner.
1242
Finally, the jury specifically rejected the argument that the patent was
invalid for public use or sale, the basis for Lisle's charge of filing a
false oath. 24  Therefore, no substantial evidence supported the
findings of material withholding or an intent to deceive.121
The Federal Circuit reversed the finding of inequitable conduct in
a reissue patent proceeding, Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.
121
The district court's finding of inequitable conduct rested on three
findings. The district court first found that a declaration deliberately
misled the examiner about the declarant's experience and gained
allowance of the application. 12' The second finding was that
Litton intentionally withheld a reference from the examiner.
1247
Finally, the district court found culpable the citation of catalogs in a
footnote in a patentability report."2
The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the district court both
overestimated and misconstrued the declaration.'249 According to
the court, the declaration contained no misleading or exaggerated
claims of the declarant's experience.'2 0 Moreover, the declaration
at issue was only one of four different declarations upon which the
examiner relied.' Secondly, there was no reference withheld
from the examiner because the Federal Circuit had previously held
that an applicant cannot intentionally withhold a reference the Patent
Office has already examined even though the applicant may not have
disclosed the reference.12 2  Furthermore, the record did not
disclose that anyone knew of the allegedly withheld reference."'
Finally, the Federal Circuit held that the citation of the catalogs in a
1241. See id. at 1115, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
1242. See id. at 1116, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
1243. See id. at 1116-17, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616.
1244. See id. at 1117, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616.
1245. 87 F.3d 1559, 1571, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1246. See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 87 F.3d 1559, 1570, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,
1328 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1247. See id. at 1570-71, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328.
1248. See id. at 1571, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328.
1249. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328.
1250. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328.
1251. Seeid., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328; see also supra notes 1213-31 and accompanying text;
cf Refac Int'l, Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 81 F.3d 1576, 1583, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1665, 1670-71
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (rejecting argument that one of three affidavits submitted was cumulative,
making it immaterial as a matter of law).
1252. See Litton Sys., 87 F.3d at 1571, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328 (citing Molins PLC v.
Textron Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1185, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1832 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
1253. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328.
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footnote was not a substantial violation of the duty of candor since
the catalogs were cumulative of references which were already before
the examiner.'5
4
In Nordberg, Inc. v. Tesmith, Inc.,' z 5 the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision that Nordberg did not engage in
inequitable conduct for falling to disclose an invalidating reference
and a prior use, even though the reference and prior use were not
disclosed to the examiner." 6  Telsmith argued that Nordberg
should have known of the Saunders patent, the invalidating reference,
because it owned the patent and had a copy in its own files.'1
7
Additionally, Telsmith argued that the high materiality of the Saunders
patent and the prior use required an inference of an intent to
mislead the Patent Office, which Nordberg did not rebut.'
The Federal Circuit found these arguments unpersuasive. It held
that, although a copy of the Saunders patent was in Nordberg's files,
those files contained several hundred patents and Telsmith did not
show that any Nordberg employee had actually searched the files and
found a copy during the pendency of the application.'2 9 The
Federal Circuit further held that the applicant's actual knowledge of
the reference's existence must be proven.126 The court, therefore,
rejected Telsmith's argument that Federal Circuit precedent only
required proof that the representative should have known of the art
or information,"" pointing out that Molins could not support
Telsmith's argument as the applicant knew of the existence of the
undisclosed references in that case.1
262
In rejecting Telsmith's second argument, the Federal Circuit held
as not clearly erroneous the district court's finding that the prior use,
which occurred under a confidentiality agreement, was not prior
art.1263  The evidence tended to support, rather than undermine,
the district court's finding that the use was not material prior art and,
therefore, did not need to be disclosed to the examiner.'
26
1254. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328-29.
1255. 82 F.3d 394, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1593 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1256. Nordberg, Inc. v. TeIsmith, Inc., 82 .3d 394, 396, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1593, 1596
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (discussing TeIsmith's allegations of misconduct and deception).
1257. See id. at 396-97, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1595.
1258. See id. at 396, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1595.
1259. See id. at 397, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1595.
1260. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1595.
1261. See id. (citing Molins TLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1823, 1826 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
1262. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1595.
1263. See id. at 398, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596 (holding that Telsmith did not demonstrate
that the district court's finding was clearly erroneous).
1264. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596.
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D. Laches and Estoppel
Laches and estoppel are two equitable defenses to a charge of
patent infringrent.1265 The application of these defenses are
committed to the sound discretion of the district court. As such, the
Federal Circuit's review is limited to a search for an abuse of
discretion.1266 To invoke laches as a defense, the defendant must
prove two factors.'267 The first factor to be proven is a delay in
filing suit for an unreasonable and inexcusable length of time from
the time the plaintiff knew or should have known of its claim.'265
The second factor is that the delay caused injury to the defen-
dant.2 69  If the length of delay is more than six years, borrowed
from the limitations on damages, 27° there is a presumption that
laches applies. 1271 This presumption creates a prima facie defense of
laches 127 2 that the plaintiff may dispel "by offering evidence to show
an excuse for the delay or that the delay was reasonable."'273 Proof
of both factors, whether by actual proof or by presumption, does not
mandate the recognition of a laches defense.1274  The court must
still exercise its discretion.
2 75
Equitable estoppel, like laches, is not governed by hard and fast
rules, but is also committed to the discretion of the district
court. 276  Estoppel requires the proof of three elements.
2 77
First, the actor having knowledge of the true facts must communicate
something in a misleading way, either by words, conduct, or si-
lence. 271 Second, the other party must have relied on the commu-
nication.1279 Finally, the other party would be harmed materially
1265. SeeA.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1266. See id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
1267. See id. at 1032, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328.
1268. See id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328.
1269. See id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328 (stating that the defendant must show that
plaintiffs delay "operated to the prejudice or injury of the defendant").
1270. See 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1994).
1271. See A.C. Aukerman Co., 960 F.2d at 1037-38, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332-33.
1272. See id. at 1037, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.
1273. See id. at 1038, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.
1274. See id. at 1036, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331.
1275. See id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331 (stating that laches are equitable judgments that
courts may deny in light of present circumstances).
1276. See A.C. Aukerman Co., 960 F.2d at 1041, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335 (stating that
equitable estoppel is not confined to a particular set of facts).
1277. See id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335-36 (discussing the elements of equitable estoppel).
1278. See id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335 (discussing the elements of equitable estoppel).
1279. See id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335.
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if the actor may successfully assert a claim inconsistent with the prior
conduct.
128 0
The Federal Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district
court's decision in Hall v. Aqua Queen Manufacturing Inc. 281 con-
cerning laches and estoppel.12 2 Hall had a patent directed to a
waterbed that the waterbed industry did not highly regard. 2 "3
Toward the end of the life of the patent, Hall obtained a judgment
for $6.8 million from one manufacturer.12" Hall then filed eight
suits against other manufacturers of waterbeds, six in 1991 and two in
1992.1285
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all eight
accused infringers on the alternative grounds of laches and equitable
estoppel.128 6  The court found that Hall knew or should have
known of the defendants' allegedly infringing activities six or more
years prior to the filing date of the suits. 1287 Furthermore, the
court found no justifiable excuse for Hall's delay and that each of the
defendants had established economic or evidentiary prejudice
stemming from that unreasonable delay.' 25 Finally, after weighing
the equities of applying the laches bar against an alleged conspiracy
and willful infringement by the industry, the court concluded that
application of the laches bar was appropriate.
121
9
On appeal, Hall argued that the district court misapplied the
Aukerman presumption, erroneously rejected his excuses for the delay,
and abused its discretion by barring his suits despite evidence of a
conspiracy and willful infringement.1 290 Agreeing with Hall in part,
the Federal Circuit found that the district court did err in its
application of the Aukerman presumption.1291 The Federal Circuit,
1280. See id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335-36.
1281. 93 F.3d 1548, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1925 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1282. See Hall v. Aqua Queen Mfg., Inc., 93 F.3d 1548, 1558, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1925, 1933
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (affining district court's grant of summary judgment as to all defendants
except U.S. Watermattress).
1283. The Water Bed Institute, a trade organization, had issued an opinion in 1973 that the
'356 patent was of limited scope and probably invalid. It therefore advised members not to pay
royalties to Hall for use of the patent. See id, at 1551, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1927. Hall's
failure to assert the patent against anyone in litigation following this opinion reinforced belief
that it was invalid. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1927.
1284. See id. at 1552,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1928 (stating that Hall obtained an infringement
verdict in 1991, which was affirmed on appeal and satisfied in 1992).
1285. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1928.
1286. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1928.
1287. See id. at 1553, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1928.
1288. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1928.
1289. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1928.
1290. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1928-29.
1291. See id. at 1553, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1929.
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however, found that the district court's misapplication of the
presumption was harmless, as it "adversely affected the defendants
rather than Hall.""" As to Hall's other contentions, the court held
that Hall's reasons for delay were not acceptable excuses1293 and the
district court's rejection of them was not an abuse of discretion. 94
It also upheld the district court in refusing to find that defendants
willfully infringed and, therefore, could not justify a refusal to apply
the laches defense. 12
5
The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the district court's decision
regarding one of the defendants, U.S. Watermattress. 29  Hall
raised the triable issue of fact regarding when he knew or should have
known of U.S. Watermattress' activities.1297 Hall contended that he
did not know or -should not have known of U.S. Watermattress'
activities more than six years before filing suit. 298 Both the district
court and the Federal Circuit agreed. 1299  As a result, U.S.
Watermattress had the burdens both of production and persuasion
regarding the unreasonableness of Hall's delay in bringing suit.Y0
Instead, however, the district court required Hall to bear these
burdens and found in favor of U.S. Watermattress only because Hall
had failed to excuse his delay.' The Federal Circuit also found
error in the district court's determination of prejudice, since no
prejudicial action cited by U.S. Watermattress was shown to have
occurred after 1987, the beginning of the delay period. l -'2  For
these reasons, the Federal Circuit held that the district court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of U.S. Watermattress was improvident
and vacated it.1 °3
1292. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1929. According to the Federal Circuit, the lower court
erroneously required the defendants, rather than Hall, to come forward with evidence
demonstrating prejudice while the presumption was in effect. "The Aukerman presumption
places a burden of production on [Hall]." IL, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1929.
1293. Hall proffered the following excuses for his delay poverty from the mid-1970s through
the mid-1980s, inability to find counsel during that time, and pendency of litigation with another
company from 1985-1992. See id, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1928.
1294. See id. at 1554-55, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1929-30.
1295. See id at 1555, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930 (stating that Hall's allegations of willful
infringement lacked substantial support and that there could be no abuse of discretion in
applying the laches defense).
1296. See id. at 1557, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931.
1297. See id. at 1555, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930.
1298. See id. at 1555-56, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930.
1299. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930.
1300. See id. at 1556, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930.
1301. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930-31.
1302. See id. at 1556-57, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931-32.
1303. See id. at 1557, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932.
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Because the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on
laches for the first seven defendants, it did not reach their arguments
on equitable estoppel.1" Reversing the laches decision as to
U.S. Watermattress, however, required the Federal Circuit to address
equitable estoppel.' As with laches, U.S. Watermattress bore the
burdens of proof and production for the elements of equitable
estoppel, which include statements or conduct that communicate
something misleading, actions taken in reliance, and resulting
prejudice.1306  The Federal Circuit did not need to review the
district court's finding regarding a misleading communication in light
of its determination of the reliance and prejudice issues. ls 7 As to
showing reliance, the Federal Circuit agreed with Hall that U.S.
Watermattress had failed to demonstrate that any expansions occurred
during the relevant delay period."' 8 Hall also raised genuine issues
of fact regarding U.S. Watermattress' true motivation in light of the
evidence, which compelled the court to consider that U.S.
Watermattress' action may have resulted from a belief that the patent
was invalid, rather than from a belief that Hall would not sue under
the patent."' Finally, since the district court relied on the same
insufficient evidence to find for prejudice for equitable estoppel as it
did for laches, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court and
vacated the summary judgment."l1 l
1304. See id. at 1551, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926.
1305. See id. at 1557-58, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932-33.
1306. See id. at 1557, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932.
1307. See id. at 1558, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932.
1308. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932.
1309. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933.
1310. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933.
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